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

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

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The Heritage Foundation

Unique in *Policy Review* history, our Fall 1991 issue is devoted entirely to work of The Heritage Foundation. The articles in the following pages were either written by staff members of The Heritage Foundation (in some cases adapted from Heritage *Backgrounders*) or adapted from speeches given at Heritage.

Policy Review is financed by The Heritage Foundation. As editor, I report to the foundation's president, Edwin J. Feulner Jr., who is publisher of the magazine; and to the senior vice president for research, Burton Yale Pines, who is associate publisher. The magazine is considered Heritage's flagship publication.

At the same time, *Policy Review* was deliberately set up not to be a house organ, but rather an independent magazine dedicated to advancing conservative ideas and debate. Unlike our sister publications, the *Brookings Review* and the *American Enterprise*, we do not carry the name of our institution, and it is not unusual for *Policy Review* to publish arguments at odds with arguments made in other Heritage publications.



While most of our articles are written by authors from outside Heritage, *Policy Review* has published many articles by Heritage authors over the years. In "Waiting for Mr. X" (Summer 1989), Burton Yale Pines accurately predicted that it was in the Soviet Union's interest to withdraw from Eastern Europe. A prescient article by Kim R. Holmes, Heritage's director of foreign policy studies, ("In Search of a Strategy," Winter 1991) took the Bush administration to task for its "neglect of the rising new Russia under Boris Yeltsin." In "A Conservative Vision of Welfare" (Spring 1987), Heritage's director of domestic policy studies, Stuart Butler, provided a comprehensive summary of the empowerment strategy for which he and Heritage have become celebrated. One of the most influential articles in *Policy Review* history was "Beyond the Stingy Welfare State: What We Can Learn from the Compassion of the 19th Century" (Fall 1990) by Marvin Olasky, then a Bradley Scholar visiting Heritage.

The following pages draw much more extensively on Heritage's resources. They convey the creativity that Heritage people apply to a rich diversity of policy questions, and show why Heritage is the nerve center of practical and forward-looking conservatism.

—A.M.

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The Ash Heap of History

Why Communism Failed

ADAM MEYERSON

At least one Marxist prediction was bound to come true sooner or later, and one finally did in the breathtaking days of August 1991: the Communist state withered away. The collapse of central Communist authority in the Soviet Union did not result as Marx thought it would—from the universal spread of a new consciousness that would make dictatorship of the proletariat unnecessary. It came instead because large sections of the party, the KGB, and the Soviet armed forces lost faith in Communism as an idea worth killing for—and because the political, economic, and religious institutions of the West provided a much more attractive alternative to Communism than they did during the time of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Communism was well designed for certain fields of human endeavor—Olympic teams, space exploration, espionage, rural electrification and in some countries rural medical care. Above all it was well designed for military strength and intimidation. Otherwise, Communism stunted human creativity and prosperity everywhere it was imposed. Compare East with West Germany, North with South Korea, Red China with Taiwan and Hong Kong, the Cubans of Havana with those of Miami. The culture and population were similar in every case, and in every case the people under non-Communist rule achieved much more than those under Communism.

Contempt for Human Nature

Communism was a universal failure because it misunderstood and, worse, was contemptuous of human nature. It has sometimes been said that Communism was a beautiful idea that went astray because of the imperfections of its leaders and of life on this earth. This is completely false. Communism would have failed under even the most benevolent of leaders, because it was an evil idea based on hatred of the institutions that give people the greatest happiness and the greatest opportunity to develop their talents and their moral sense of responsibility.

There was no place for freedom in the Communist vision. Ordinary citizens were given no say over the most basic decisions about their lives—where to live, where to work, what to read, how to educate their children. The workers in whose name the party spoke were forbidden to form unions of their own choosing. Independent thought and religious faith were to be eradicated as a vestige of "false consciousness." In the end, Communism could not eradicate dissent or faith; for all the technology of totalitarianism, it could not control the free minds and souls of men and women.

No Place for Love

Nor was there any place for love or friendship or community in Communism. Marx saw the family simply as an instrument of exploitation, rather than the building block of a loving and caring society. And while destruction of the family was never really put into practice in most Communist regimes, their goal was to destroy virtually every other institution between the individual and the state. The positive attraction of Communism came mainly from its vision of universal human brotherhood. But even this vision was impoverished and desiccated. The Judeo-Christian religious tradition and the Anglo-American political tradition offer much richer visions of human brotherhood, combining universality with a respect for the individual, the family, the private voluntary organization, and the local community.

There was, of course, no room for God in the Communist vision; yet for all its pretensions to "scientific materialism," the party could not deliver material goods to the people. This was because Marxists suppressed competition and failed to understand the role that the human spirit, as opposed to basic labor and capital investment, plays in the creation of wealth. Even more important, the Marxists got private property all wrong. They saw property as the source of alienation and dehumanization, when in fact ownership—whether of a house or a store or a plot of land or a factory—gives people a stake in the society and the opportunity to express their greatest creativity as they make decisions about something they know well and care about deeply.

The greatest mistake of Communism was to consider human nature to be infinitely malleable, and readily

ADAM MEYERSON *is editor of* Policy Review.

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changeable by altering economic institutions. The truth is that whatever economic institutions exist, man will always have a capacity both for extraordinary cruelty and avarice and for extraordinary generosity and justice—or to put it in religious terms, that man is both sinful and created in the image of God.

By ignoring the problem of man's sinfulness *after* the Revolution, Communism failed to put institutional safeguards on abuses of power by its own rulers. In capitalist democracies, market competition limits potential abuses by economic monopolies, elections give voters an opportunity to throw the rascals out, and checks and balances limit abuses of power even when the rascals are still in office. Communism, by contrast, offered no protection against the absolute corruption of absolute power. The resulting death toll—of people killed by their own governments in Communist countries—numbers in the tens of millions. And it is no accident that in every single Communist country, a regime that promised universal equality ended up lavishing vastly unequal privileges on its ruling class.

Denial of Justice

By ignoring man's capacity for reason and justice *before* the Revolution, Communism underestimated the possibilities for incremental reform of the Western institutions it sought to replace. Progress under Marxist theory could take place only through a violent overturning of society. Communists held that it was impossible to make capitalism or bourgeois government more responsive to human needs; and in many countries, the devotees of Marx and Lenin killed those who tried to reform the system, lest they undermine the dialectical imperative for revolution.

But Western institutions are much different from the way they were 74 or even 24 years ago. Hard as it is to imagine today as we look at Moscow's pathetic apparatchiks, the Communist idea once inspired millions of intelligent people and led many of them to extraordinary acts of valor and self-sacrifice—from the Old Bolsheviks who kept their faith while being tortured in Stalin's gulag, to Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai on their Long March. They were motivated above all by hatred, by a conviction of the rottenness of the old order, which they wanted to thoroughly uproot and destroy. What they didn't realize was that the old order could change through much more humane means than Communist revolution. Three important phenomena have occurred in this century that will dwarf in world-historical significance the Communist deviation of the past 74 years. The first is the global spread of democratic capitalism. The second is the global spread of constitutional democracy. The third is the liberalization, in the best sense of the word, of Western religious institutions.

Reformed Capitalism

Capitalism is a much more populist institution than it was in the days of Marx and Lenin. No longer dominated by ever-larger companies from a handful of countries and ethnic groups, world markets are driven by the pulsating energy of small- and medium-sized firms from Thailand to Sweden to Mexico. Businesses treat their employees much better than they used to, in part because of pressure from labor unions, even more because the logic of competition has forced companies to recognize that people are their most important resource. The dispossessed proletariat has nearly disappeared in most Western and East Asian market economies, as the prosperity of capitalism together with government policies has turned workers into property-owners. Furthermore, the capitalist growth engine has given free societies the wherewithal, through private charity and public welfare, to help those who fall through the cracks, as millions inevitably do in market economies.

The global spread of constitutional democracy is equally amazing. Communism once looked attractive to millions of people as the best alternative to czarism and fascism in Europe, and to oligarchic or military authoritarianism in the Third World. Today, czarism, fascism, and oligarchic authoritarianism have virtually disappeared, as constitutional democracy is spreading through Europe, Latin America, and Asia, and making inroads into Africa and the Islamic world. The anti-fascist anger that used to be behind so much Communist energy has thus been increasingly targeted on Communism itself. So, too, the voluntary relinquishment by Britain, France, and other Western European countries of their overseas colonies redirected the anti-imperialist rhetoric of Communism against the last remaining empire, the Soviet state.

Rise of Religious Liberty

The importance of religious reforms cannot be overestimated in the battle of ideas against Communism. Like the French Revolution before it, Communism initially attracted many adherents who hated established clergies, particularly those who persecuted religious minorities and reinforced the power of authoritarian governments. This attraction has ended, however, as the different Christian denominations and Judaism have put aside most of their mutual recriminations, and have decided to avoid entanglement with state power. It is no accident that the Catholic Church of Poland played such an important role in the unraveling of the Soviet empire; the Polish church was able to assert the moral power of the nation in its struggle against Communism because it had a centuries-long tradition of independence from the state. And it was altogether appropriate that in the aftermath of the failed coup in Moscow, the Orthodox Patriarch and a rabbi should have jointly presided over memorial services for the martyrs—a ceremony that would have been unthinkable in 1917. The Patriarch's denunciation of the coup, even before it was clear it would fail, signals a new political independence for the Orthodox Church.

Communism is not completely dead, of course. Marxist-Leninist regimes still rule China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba—20 percent of the world's population. In the Soviet republics, apparatchiks in local bureaucracies still have the capacity to bollix up economic reform; and we should not rule out the possibility of another, better organized coup from Moscow's old guard. But international Communism has been smashed at its power center. May it rest in peace. ☎

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Building the New Establishment

Edwin J. Feulner Jr. on Heritage and the Conservative Movement

An Interview by Adam Meyerson

Edwin J. Feulner Jr., president of The Heritage Foundation and publisher of *Policy Review*, is one of the principal strategists and institution-builders of the conservative movement. During the summer of 1991 he talked with *Policy Review* editor Adam Meyerson about the achievements and mistakes of both Heritage and the conservative movement, and the challenges they face as they try to build a new governing establishment by the end of the decade.

Policy Review: **You've been president of The Heritage Foundation now for 14 years. What have been Heritage's three or four most important achievements during this period?**

Feulner: On the policy side I would cite our contributions to the strategic defense initiative, the Reagan Doctrine of supporting anti-Communist freedom fighters, and President Reagan's turnaround of the American economy after the stagflation under Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

No think tank has done more than Heritage over the past decade to show policy-makers why missile defenses are strategically necessary and technologically feasible, and why they would make America and the world safer. We've been vindicated by the Scud attacks in the Gulf War, and by the technological progress made by the SDI Organization over the past eight years. Today we argue that SDI is more important than ever during a period of nuclear proliferation. And the coup against Gorbachev this August reminded us of the terrible uncertainty about who will control all those Soviet nuclear warheads.

Heritage took the lead among think tanks in enunciating and popularizing the Reagan Doctrine of supporting anti-Communist freedom fighters in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere. This policy told the Soviets they could no longer get away with the Brezhnev Doctrine, which said, in effect, "What's ours is ours, what's yours is negotiable." The Reagan Doctrine aimed instead at expanding the free world, not simply protecting it from Communist assault, and its success forced the Soviets to come up with some "new thinking" in foreign policy. The Heritage Foundation's most specific achievement here was to make sure Jonas Savimbi got the aid he needed in Angola, despite the opposition of the State Department and congressional liberals.

Heritage's biggest contribution to America's economic turnaround has been our aggressive marketing of supply-side economic theory to policy-makers. No think tank has had greater influence on Capitol Hill than we have in stressing the incentive effects and political dynamics of tax cuts, or in arguing that deficit reduction through tax increases is an economic and political sham that feeds the growth of federal government without really reducing the deficit. We played a major role in helping preserve the Reagan tax cuts and thus sustaining the longest boom in American history. Our biggest problem with the Bush administration, which we agree with on many occasions, is that it ignored the lessons of the 1980s in the budget agreement of 1990.

More broadly, Heritage has made conservative ideas not only respectable, but in some cases even mainstream. Ideas ranging from school choice to tenant ownership of public housing to privatization are now not just the dreams of a few conservative intellectuals. They are setting the terms of national debate. Obviously, we didn't do this by ourselves. Other conservative think tanks have made important contributions, in part because they are following our marketing example, in part because we mutually reinforce each other's credibility. Even more than by think tanks, conservative ideas have been spread by politicians elected and appointed to office. But politicians have to run on something, and they run on ideas that institutions like Heritage develop and make accessible to them.

Institutionally, I could point to many achievements—the growth of our annual income from $800,000 in 1977 to $18.1 million in 1990, the building of a broad-based network of financial support, with 175,000 members contributing to Heritage over the past year. But our greatest institutional achievement has been to build Heritage as a permanent Washington presence here to stay for the long term. My overriding managerial objective has been to make sure that Heritage is a permanent part of the Washington policy-making apparatus.

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P.R.: **How would you describe Heritage's relationship with the Bush administration, has it changed since the budget summit, and how is it different from that with the Reagan administration?**

Feulner: Heritage is a "critical friend" of the Bush administration. Our role is to run conservative ideas up a flagpole, hope the politicians will salute, and if they salute 10 percent of the time or 95 percent of the time, we're still going stick to the same ideas and hold to them. The Reagan administration saluted about 65–70 percent of the time. The Bush administration salutes about 50–55 percent.

We have considerable access to the key members of Bush's staff and cabinet, and, at the working level, many of his key people are long-time friends from within the conservative movement.

President Bush has been good on certain bedrock items for conservatives. He supports SDI. He has been good on school choice and child-care and other family issues. He has been good on the U.S.–Mexico free trade agreement. It looks like his judicial nominations will make more permanent one of President Reagan's greatest accomplishments—the eviction of the Radical Left from control of the courts. Furthermore, the Thomas nomination is a big plus for the conservative movement and Heritage's New Majority Project because it propels alternative black role models to the forefront of our national leadership. No longer will Jesse Jackson and Marion Barry be the automatic prototype of U.S. black leaders.

Over the past year or two, Bush was too close to Mikhail Gorbachev, and too distant from the emerging democratic leadership in the Soviet republics. But during the coup, he stood with Boris Yeltsin and the forces of freedom at the most important time.

The president's leadership in the Gulf War was also tremendously important for conservatives. The war proved to the American people that the taxpayer funds we've been spending on defense were worth it. It proved to the military and the civilian leaders in the Department of Defense that it's sometimes appropriate to use your fancy weapons, and not just strut them around on the parade ground. Finally, and this can't be overstated, the war revealed America's primary leadership role in the world. I see this everywhere I travel—whether in Asia, Europe, or Latin America. With the Soviet Union disintegrating, the United States is the world's only political, military, economic, and cultural superpower. And now everyone knows that the American people have the will to use this power, to support their political leaders in doing what's necessary to expand freedom—not just in situations like Grenada, but in real, potentially very tough fights.

Our fundamental problem with the president was his reneging on his "no new taxes" pledge. He and his people still don't understand how this betrayed the core of the entire conservative coalition. Remember, the conservative coalition is not just another interest group to be placated; it is the base of his support. Our opposition was not a case of conservatives being parsimonious in terms of helping the disadvantaged. It's much more fundamental in three regards. Federal taxation is a measure of the control that government has over people's lives, the limitation of choice that individual people have. And so an enormous increase in taxes is, inherently, something that I and most conservatives oppose, again not because we're cheapskates or tightwads, but because it means that individual freedom has been lessened.



Edwin J. Feulner Jr. striking the Berlin Wall: "Our goal is not to join the Washington establishment. It is to create a new establishment that will supplant the old."

Second, we recognize, in such areas as welfare, that increasing spending invariably means a bigger bureaucracy and more money in the pockets of middlemen. This increased spending does not mean effective solutions or help directly to the supposed beneficiaries.

Third, and George Bush who values personal loyalty should have understood this better than anybody, he went back on his word. Of all the lessons that he—a man of real character—should have learned, one of the most important is that you stay true to your word.

Another disappointment to us with Bush has been the reregulation of the American economy. One of my fundamental laws of Washington is that "people are policy."

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Because the president has appointed regulators to the independent agencies, the volume and reach of regulation is increasing. I'm glad the vice president has a Competitiveness Council, but a lot of its work is to undo the damage caused by the administration-appointed regulators.

We've been tougher on Bush than on Reagan, because we were probably a little too soft on the Reagan administration the first time around. Our expectations were so high, not only because a conservative had won the presidency, but also because of conservative/Republican control of the Senate. We had a whole new political mix in the early 1980s where virtually anything seemed possible. Specifically, we didn't fight Reagan's TEFRA tax increases in 1982 as hard as we should have. Reagan now says agreeing to TEFRA was the biggest mistake of his presidency; well, we should have held his feet to the fire. We should have been pounding on the Reagan tax policy then at least as hard as we were pounding on the Bush tax policy eight years later. Heritage's—and other conservatives'—failures on TEFRA opened the floodgates for subsequent tax increases, and in fact there were four separate tax increases between 1982 and 1990.

"Ideas ranging from school choice to tenant ownership of public housing to privatization are now not just the dreams of a few conservative intellectuals. They are setting the terms of national debate."

***P.R.:* What are the most important management principles you have applied to Heritage that you think are applicable to other public policy institutions?**

Feulner: The best description I would use for myself as a manager is "optimistic entrepreneur." An optimist doesn't just sit around and complain about a bad situation; he looks for new opportunities instead of arguing why something undesirable can't be changed. Because he's looking for new opportunities, he tends to have more energy. He gets more involved and is more likely to "seize the day" when an opportunity comes along than a pessimist who figures that it's probably a snare and a delusion anyway, so why bother?

An entrepreneur doesn't only develop new ideas and discover new talent. He markets them intensively and effectively to his target audiences. This requires having a clear sense of your priority issues and audiences. Too many of my colleagues in the conservative movement set themselves off on one track, and then after a certain length of time totally change direction and start doing something else because that's where the sex appeal or the money is, or that's where they perceive the victories of the future to be. That's no way to build an institution. Heritage goes through a rigorous "management by objective" process every year, which becomes our business plan. Based on that, we set our priority issues and reorder our budget for the year. All of these decisions are made in consultation with our active, involved board of trustees, who provide stable guidance from the real world of business.

I hire the best people I can, and then give those people a lot of responsibility. Occasionally some of our people will make a mistake, but no one bats a thousand, and attracting good people and giving them some room for making decisions is essential if you want to build an institution larger than your own personality. I'm proud of the long-term stability of our management team at Heritage; it shows that our people are both professionally competent and have an enduring commitment to the principles our board has set for our institution. A number of other conservative institutions suffer because the person in charge tries to do everything himself and fails to develop a stable management team with enough depth.

I'd also encourage other conservative institutions to pay more attention to broadening their membership. Having a 175,000-member base gives Heritage immense credibility around this town. We're not a stooge of a small group of big businessmen. We have several times more supporters than the whole Ralph Nader complex. We have enough members that no one can accuse us of being in any particular industry's or any particular person's hip pocket. As important, we have 175,000 people across the country we can communicate our ideas to directly. We provide alternatives to the news about Washington they get from network TV or daily newspapers. In turn our communications with our members greatly magnifies our national influence.

***P.R.:* One secret to Heritage's success may be that it doesn't try to do everything, but instead sticks to well-defined priorities. What are the most important things you decided Heritage should *not* do, and why?**

Feulner: The first thing we decided not to do was get directly involved in the political side of things. The Heritage Foundation is not a 501(c)(4) lobbying organization; we're a 501(c)(3) educational organization. If we can provide the raw material, the ideas, somebody else should be able to organize the political coalitions to convert the ideas into legislation and then get the legislation passed. There are plenty of those organizations already around. It would have been asking too much from the senior management team here to have to juggle between the two, to distinguish over the years between legitimate advocacy of our viewpoint versus actual lobbying and politics, and I think lobbying would have been a great distraction from the foundation's fundamental role.

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Patriot missile shooting down Scud over Israel: "No think tank has done more than Heritage over the past decade to show policy-makers why missile defenses are strategically necessary and technologically feasible."

We also decided that we're a Washington-based group. When I was approached early on by groups like the Toledo Rotary Club to teach free enterprise to the students of Ohio public schools, or by other organizations to maintain a major conservative speakers' bureau for colleges and universities, my response was, there are other organizations around to do those sorts of things; we'll be happy to put you in touch. That's why we established our Resource Bank, which is now in touch with 1,600 scholars and 400 organizations worldwide.

Similarly, several years ago, when Heritage decided to encourage and support the emergence of state-level conservative think tanks, we also decided that this shouldn't be a Heritage "franchise" operation. We put these local think tanks in touch with each other, and with the scholars in our Resource Bank. We even put them in touch with our major donors in their area. But they're independent, they're freestanding, they're self-starting, and they're multiplying with extraordinary success. This is one of the most exciting developments in the conservative movement today.

Another important decision was not to take government money. Federal money illustrates Acton's dictum on power: it tends to corrupt, and the more you get of it, the more absolute is the corruption. Whenever organizations become dependent on government contracts for substantial amounts of money, it's hard to think that on a particular subject they're not going to come out where the contracting agency wants them to. When the contract money covers overhead as well as direct cost, it corrupts beyond the immediate project; it tends to corrupt the whole institution.

P.R.: **Why doesn't Heritage take positions on major social issues such as abortion?**

Feulner: This decision is based on a judgment about where we can deploy our resources most effectively. Other conservative organizations devote substantial resources to the pro-life cause. We cooperate with them at conservative coalition meetings. But abortion has primarily been an issue for the courts and state legislatures rather than for our priority audiences—the Congress and the federal administration. We think we can be most effective focusing on defense, foreign policy, and economic policy.

While these subjects will remain our top priority, Heritage is also going to become more active and involved in cultural and family issues, which are more and more going to be at the defining edge of conservatism.

Just as government isn't the answer to most problems, it alone is not necessarily the culprit—especially in the area of culture and values. The government and the economy rest on society's underlying institutions. No amount of government spending or tinkering will alleviate social problems if our families, neighborhoods, and churches are in a state of decline. On the other hand, certain government policies in the area of taxes and welfare, for example, have undermined the family; and conservatives will argue that when two out of three black children are born to single mothers, advocates of the Great Society have a lot of explaining to do.

We've won the Cold War, and we've proved to everyone from Moscow to Buenos Aires to Beijing, if not at OMB and Harvard, that the market system works.

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President Bush with Mexican President Salinas: "Bush has been good on SDI, family issues, U.S.–Mexico free trade, and the Supreme Court. Our fundamental problem is with his reneging on his 'no new taxes' pledge."

Nonetheless, battles over national security and interferences with the market system still have to be fought and refought. One of the things I've learned from 26 years in Washington is that there's no such thing as a permanent political victory. You have a win for the day, but your political adversaries are going to be reopening that battle the next day, the next month, the next year. But fundamentally conservatives have proved we were right about national security and the superiority of the market system. Meanwhile we still have a lot of groundwork to cover on cultural issues.

***P.R.:* The Heritage Foundation is criticized by some conservatives as having joined "the Washington establishment." Is that your objective, and if so, do you think you have achieved it?**

Feulner: Our goal is not to join the Washington establishment. It is to create a new establishment that will supplant the old. The existing Washington establishment doesn't know it yet, but it is on its way out. When the Brookings Institution denies that it's liberal, when icons of the old establishment are attacked by their own—look at Clark Clifford exposed every day on the front pages of the *Washington Post*—you know that the old order is crumbling and that something new and different is going to come in and take its place. We represent this new thinking, and we're ready to move in. That's one reason why it's appropriate that Heritage be at the opposite end of Massachusetts Avenue from the Brookings Institution. Brookings has been around now for 75 years. We may be the new kid on the Avenue, but we're going to be around for a long time as a permanent reminder of the new conservative establishment.

Of course, we will need many other Washington institutions on our side to help build this new establishment. Conservatives need much better grass-roots organizations to put voter pressure on Capitol Hill, much greater coordination and specialization among conservative senators and congressmen, and a reinvigorated effort at the precinct level. In addition, we need to reinvent the *ad hoc* coalition, and build a stronger conservative presence in the media and in the universities.

I'm particularly concerned about the absence of strong *ad hoc* coalitions on major political issues. Conservatives were outmobilized by the other side on the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987; the Left organized much earlier and more efficiently than we did. This also happened on many of the key votes for aid to anti-Communist freedom fighters in Nicaragua, and it happened again in the 1990 budget debacle. We can't become the governing majority until we correct this problem.

Conservative columnists have outnumbered liberals on major newspaper op-ed pages for seven or eight years. Today we're seeing the same thing on radio and TV talk shows. But conservatives are still not getting a fair shake in regular news coverage. We're making progress, and I was pleased to see that on the day after President Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, the *Washington Post* ran three separate stories about a speech Thomas had given at Heritage four years earlier. But major conservative speeches are still not covered when they are given, and our ideas are not treated by all reporters with the same credibility as liberal ideas. Building this credibility and getting a fair shake is an important institutional priority for conservatives.

Another is to build several major academic institutions that can have a major impact on public policy. Right now, no conservative university or academic department has as great an influence on the intellectual debate as the University of Chicago economics department did 25 years ago. The Hoover Institution comes closest to filling this role today, and the American Enterprise Institute is a critical mass of scholars in Washington.

But there is no leading centrist or center-to-right university in the Washington area. George Mason University in Northern Virginia comes closest with some of its programs, but these are only in a limited number of fields. A conservative establishment will need a significant presence at major academic institutions, both in Washington and elsewhere, with a comprehensive influence on public policy across the board.

***P.R.:* Heritage is also criticized by some on the Right as a center of "big-government conservatism." How do you respond to critics who say that instead of steering last year's federal child-care legislation in a more conservative direction, Heritage should have opposed any federal involvement in child-care at all? That instead of pushing for a national health plan that would provide incentives for individual choice and accountability, Heritage should have opposed federal health legislation on first principles?**

Feulner: The question that always faces us at Heritage is, are we going to be real players and participants in the Washington policy process, or are we, as Bill Buckley said when he launched *National Review* 36 years ago, just going to stand athwart history yelling "Stop!" The problem is, what do conservatives do when the country,

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or Congress, doesn't stop? That's where we come in. To take a football analogy, we are a special team. We come in after the academics, the grass-roots organizations, and the rest of the movement have done their best to move the ball up the field, or to stop the other side from reaching our goal line. By the time an issue reaches us we are trying to get a field goal or trying to stop a liberal touchdown, so we can't always fight on the ground of our choosing. Sometimes we have to get the best we can in a situation. I must say that some of our critics who grumble that we are not opposing legislation on first principles are the people who failed to convince the country on first principles and left us facing the other team with the ball on our 10-yard line.

So we believe that our role specifically as a Washington institution is to be a participant. Initially we opposed federal involvement in child-care. We pointed out that this was a limited problem that could be dealt with by certain targeted alternatives. When it looked, however, as if some form of child-care legislation was going to roll through town, we decided we'd better figure out the best way of dealing with the issue, and also come up with approaches that would be useful as models for other issues as well, while causing problems for liberals and advancing other elements of our agenda. We succeeded: We helped shape the child-care debate so that the final legislation included a voucher-type program that could be copied in education, maybe even someday in health, welfare, and other areas. Our role is making political change at the margin. Obviously, we like to think we are taking giant bites, but often we can win by just nibbling away. As Milton Friedman always reminds us, don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

Political change also requires playing offense as well as defense. Jack Kemp is right when he tells the conservative movement you don't get anywhere by constantly saying "No, no, no!" Sometimes, you've got to say, "Hey, if you're determined to do this, here's a better way," and that's why we've come up with some of the alternatives we have.

Health care is a good case in point. The fact is, whether we conservatives like it or not, we are very close to having a national program that's going to provide health care for everybody in the country. And the question is, is it going to be modeled on a market-based form, with maximum flexibility, maximum choice for the individual consumer? Or is it going to be done the way the Canadians or some of the Europeans have done it—in a way that limits choice and innovation, increases costs, decreases services, and would be very, very difficult to change afterwards? And if you're late getting into a debate like that, your credibility is very low, you're not going to be taken seriously as a participant in those kinds of discussions.

***P.R.:* What are the most important mistakes you have made at Heritage, and how have you learned from them?**

Feulner: I mentioned earlier Heritage's failure to oppose TEFRA more vigorously in 1982. We made sure we didn't make the same mistake with the tax increases of 1990.

We were later than we should have been with our Congressional Assessment project, which is studying why Congress as an institution is so unresponsive to the voters. Congress has always been Heritage's most important target audience, and we should have been at the cutting edge in studying its weaknesses as an institution, and recommending major reforms. I am very pleased that we're now really moving ahead on this.

I also wish that we had realized earlier the potential for building coalitions with Hispanics, blacks, Asians, and other minorities who have had only liberals to speak for them, but whose aspirations and values we frequently share. I think this has been a weakness of conservatism in general. We did have some early efforts—enterprise zones and our work with public housing projects—starting in 1980, which resulted in tenant management and

"We were probably a little too soft on the Reagan administration, especially its TEFRA tax increases."

empowerment. All of this was building a foundation that gave us the credibility that has made our New Majority Project a success. Our early policies were excellent, but I wish that we had made more of an effort to evangelize. While liberals were telling minority groups that they represented their best interests by pushing for an expansion of the welfare state, we were creating ways to open up economic opportunities to them. And while Heritage has always been involved with individuals who also belong to a minority group—black economist Walter Williams got his start as a national newspaper columnist a dozen years ago with Heritage—it wasn't until our New Majority Project got going two years ago that we really began to work systematically at building these coalitions. I suspect that Heritage is now the most important forum in the country for black and Hispanic conservatives. The consistent exchange of ideas with minority leaders has been the catalyst. I only wish this had been true earlier, because the potential has always been there.

***P.R.:* The greatest conservative victory over the past decade has been the collapse of the Soviet empire. What were the most important contributions that conservatives made to this victory?**

Feulner: The election of Ronald Reagan and the conservative tide that swept Republicans into control of the Senate in 1980 permitted the defense buildup that eventually convinced the leaders in Moscow that they couldn't keep up, especially if Reagan were as successful with SDI as he was with his other defense programs. The Reagan Doctrine was vital in forcing Moscow, at last, to pay for its aggression. It also put the Soviets on

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the defensive. Boris Yeltsin's people have publicly thanked Paul Weyrich for his work training democratic forces in the Russian Republic.

Equally important—and too often overlooked today, in the era of denigrating Reagan's presidency—is the incredible power of words. "It's with words that we govern men," Disraeli once said. And Ronald Reagan governed men when he had the audacity to stand up and call the Soviet Union the "Evil Empire." So did Frank Shakespeare when he was chairman of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and had the guts to take the Baltic services out of Radio Liberty, the service for the Soviet Union, and put them in Radio Free Europe. Simple

"There's been a vacuum in independent leadership among conservatives on Capitol Hill during the past 10 years."

symbols of public diplomacy like these—Reagan celebrating Captive Nations Week is another—were very important in giving people behind the then-Iron Curtain the will to continue, to see that there really might be an end to their travails.

P.R.: **No domestic issue is more important for conservatives than the overall level of federal spending and taxation. Is it therefore a sign of conservative failure that federal spending in 1991 is 25 percent of GNP, the highest it's been since World War II?**

Feulner: This is the major failure of the conservative movement. We have failed in our education efforts to get across to the American people, who are being constantly bombarded by the news media and by Congress about the supposedly draconian Reagan budget cuts, that, in fact, federal spending increased steadily during the 1980s. We failed to get across that OMB Director Dick Darman lied about the supposedly tough spending caps in the 1990 budget agreement. Perhaps even more important, before the summit negotiations, conservatives failed to drum up nationwide political support for alternatives to a tax increase, such as enforcement of a Gramm–Rudman–Hollings sequester.

The conservative coalition is a paper tiger on taxing and spending issues: we can talk about the incredible influence of the business community, but half the time the business community is split in three different directions. Even when the business community is marching in lockstep, there's very little conservative grass-roots mobilization. I wish that some of the Washington-based taxpayers groups would organize individuals across the nation as effectively as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Business mobilize their own members. A conservative organization with grass-roots capabilities in some 250 congressional districts—ignoring those that are most liberal and the 50 or so that are already rock-solid conservative—could make a tremendous difference in Congress. But I don't see anybody doing this, at least not on our single most important domestic issue.

In the heat of the battle last year, it was very easy for us to pick on President Bush—and he deserved it. But as Newt Gingrich has pointed out, the president was trying to do some things right and we didn't give him the backing he needed. One of the things the president was trying to do right was lower the capital gains tax. And it ill behooves us as conservatives to attack him for not having pushed that hard enough if we failed to deliver the grass-roots support needed to back him up.

We should have waged an all-out offensive, building grass-roots support for capital gains tax cuts, and opposing those leaders, particularly in the Senate, who had staked their careers on beating Bush on this issue. By "we," I mean not just Heritage, I'm talking about the conservative movement. We didn't do that very well. That's to our discredit, and I think the president has a legitimate complaint there.

P.R.: **Another high priority for conservatives has been the deployment of defenses against strategic missiles. Yet eight years after the establishment of the SDI program, not a single missile-defense system has been deployed. What should strategic-defense supporters be doing differently to be more effective?**

Feulner: The problem for SDI has always been that it threatens the existing defense establishment. Our hope was that when they set up the separate organization within the Department of Defense, with General James Abrahamson in charge, that it would develop its own counter-bureaucratic weight within the Pentagon. We also hoped that Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney would renew the strong commitment that Ronald Reagan and his defense secretary Cap Weinberger had to SDI. Cheney has been preoccupied with Desert Storm, but he hasn't been completely rock solid on SDI even when it's been called to his attention. I hope he becomes as committed as Vice President Quayle, who's really been outstanding on SDI.

SDI is yet another example of how technology moves faster than bureaucracy. SDI has overcome most of its serious technical difficulties, but it still hasn't overcome the internal bureaucratic obstacles within the Pentagon, or the opposition of members of Congress who would rather keep an obsolete base in their district than give Americans some protection against a ballistic missile attack.

As for members of Congress, the pain of opposing SDI simply has to be increased, particularly for guys who masquerade as being pro-strong defense. Again, that's not Heritage's job. Heritage can point out what the best SDI system is and how best to deploy it, or what's wrong with the current ABM Treaty and how to get rid of it. Through our reports and updates we can keep people

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informed in layman's language of the state of technology. But ultimately it comes back again to the conservative grass roots and building effective coalitions. Ironically, it was the moderates and not the conservatives who had the most influence on the Senate's decision this summer to commit to a timetable for at least some ground defenses.

The conservative movement has formed a number of issue coalitions over the past two decades. They bring together activists, think-tank people, congressional staffers, and others. And yet there is no sense of priorities at most of these conservative coalition meetings. Typically you have six subjects for an hour and a half, and you give each one of them 15 minutes, which means the latest SDI battle receives equal treatment with a visit by the chairman of some minor committee of the Republic of Moldavia. Such a visitor is to be commended and saluted, but his appearance is simply not of the same order of magnitude as the most recent development in SDI. Not all issues are equal; SDI is a cutting-edge issue that we've got to stay on top of, and I'm afraid conservatives are losing political momentum on it.

P.R.: **The Reagan coalition always consisted of an uneasy alliance of economic, social, and foreign policy conservatives. Are you worried by growing frictions between economic and social conservatives, and are there any steps each group could take to strengthen their relationship with the others?**

Feulner: The main concern I have is a lack of civility, a meanness, a questioning of motives that didn't used to be present. In the old days we had different strands of the conservative movement. There were profound differences among say, the Southern Agrarians, the Right-to-Work people, the libertarians, the Free China crowd, and the ex-Communists such as Frank Meyer. Twenty-seven years ago, the Philadelphia Society was formed specifically to let conservatives talk to each other in a civilized way, to air their differences, to try to come together, but at the same time to admit that there are fundamental differences in the different parts of the movement. That civility seems to be gone these days—and that concerns me—whether it's some of my friends inside the Washington Beltway carping and criticizing, or whether it's some of those on the outside criticizing those of us inside the Beltway. Heritage has always held its door open for all brands of conservatism and made itself a meeting place where they could come together; it's not a melting pot, because, again, there are some differences that are not going to be diminished by simply talking them through, but at least hopefully they'll be understood.

Social and economic conservatives still share fundamental values and are natural coalition partners. Most members of the conservative movement long ago discarded the notion of "economic man"; they realize that a strong America, and indeed a vigorous economy, depends on strong families and communities. And I think most social conservatives realize that the government's economic policy can have an important impact on the social fabric. There's a broad consensus,

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"Heritage is like a special team in football. We come on after the rest of the conservative movement has done its best to move the ball up the field."

too, among conservatives that an increase in the dependent tax exemption, or even tax credits for children, is desirable because of the depreciated value of the exemption as the result of inflation. But I'm concerned that some family groups now seem willing to finance a larger increase in the dependent tax exemption by increasing taxes somewhere else. Conservatives should be aiming to take a tax cut wherever they can get one, but not by trading it for a tax increase elsewhere.

Conservatism is going to have to involve coalitions between people who don't always agree with each other if it is going to be a broader-based movement and become a governing majority for the future. You don't build a majority by writing off a large chunk of individuals who ought to be part of your movement. Successful politics consists of addition and multiplication, not subtraction and division. Conservatives have always considered the Ku Klux Klan, Nazis, and other hate groups as beyond the pale. Otherwise the conservative movement ought to be broadly inclusive, including everyone who fundamentally believes in the basic principles of individual freedom, a strong national defense, the primacy of the market as opposed to government intervention, and traditional values.

P.R.: **You've always argued that conservatism is a "big tent" and have tried to make conservatives of different stripes feel comfortable at Heritage. How do you respond to efforts by certain neoconservatives and members of the Old Right to expel each other from the movement?**

Feulner: I think it's insane—on both sides. Pat Buchanan is not anti-Semitic; I think he's made some foolish statements about Israel and its supporters (and Heritage has always considered itself a strong supporter of Israel), but he is an important asset for the conservative move-

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ment. Nor should some of our friends in the Old Right who want an isolationist foreign policy or advocate protectionism be completely written out of the conservative movement because of some kind of ideological deviation. There is room for disagreement on these questions, as long again as there's a subscription to a certain fundamental set of beliefs.

It's just as crazy to try to drive out the neoconservatives. They bring new intellectual vigor to conservative debate. They force the Old Right to think through some of their assertions and their arguments. They're an appealing intellectual force manning the ramparts in liberals' greatest bastion—New York City. They belong most appropriately under this broad tent that we call the conservative movement. If we were to drive them out into the arms of some kind of paleo-liberal movement or the Progressive Policy Institute, we would only be hurting ourselves.

"Pat Buchanan is not anti-Semitic; he's made some foolish statements about Israel and its supporters, but he is an important asset for the conservative movement."

One foolish notion bandied about is that neoconservatives are simply anti-Communist liberals who will have no contribution to make once the Cold War is completely over. Their ideas will still be valuable as we move toward a new international order. And the contribution of neocons such as Irving Kristol and Midge Decter has never been limited to foreign policy anyway. They have made significant contributions to social and cultural policy as well.

***P.R.:* You've disagreed with certain libertarians on foreign policy and drug policy. What has been the nature of your disagreement?**

Feulner: Libertarians will always supply much of the intellectual firepower of the conservative movement because of their rigorous definition of economic arguments and their unflinching commitment to liberty. I'm proud to say that of the three modern conservative thinkers who have had the greatest impact on my own thought—Russell Kirk, Friedrich von Hayek, and Milton Friedman—Hayek and Friedman are essentially libertarians, although Hayek rejected that particular label.

At the same time I've had strong disagreements with many libertarians on foreign policy and drug policy. I believe the federal government does have certain fundamental roles, and that one is to make the nation safe from external threats. In this era of the technological revolution, with 20 countries possessing ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, external threats can come from enemies located far away. The United States has world interests that need to be protected, and a minimalist, isolationist foreign policy simply isn't realistic.

I disagree with libertarians on drug policy for a different reason. Individual rights don't mean license. Certain behaviors are not just individually debilitating but socially destructive and socially unacceptable. The use of drugs is one of those.

***P.R.:* Whatever happened to the former closeness between conservatives and the business community, especially big corporations?**

Feulner: There are many major American companies who stand up for conservative principles, but I am very concerned by two aspects of the business community's relationship with the conservative movement. First, we apparently suffer a credibility problem with the top corporate leadership, in terms of the validity of our ideas at corporate headquarters. Sometimes this is because of the filtering process where corporate support goes through a corporate contributions office, which tends to be controlled by individuals who aren't very sympathetic to the conservative philosophy. Other times, it comes from the conventional wisdom on subjects that corporate CEOs are not aware of first-hand, so that a Lee Iacocca arguing in favor of national health insurance will find some blind support among his colleagues in the Business Roundtable, just because they haven't thought the whole question through, or they haven't been exposed to the range of alternatives, including the Heritage plan. We have to remind ourselves that business is not always in favor of free enterprise.

The second problem I have is that corporations expect total allegiance from organizations like Heritage; if they don't get it, we are the first to suffer with a cutoff of funds. This has happened numerous times on issues ranging from free trade to our stand on specific weapons systems. Many corporations expect Heritage and other conservative organizations to approve of their agenda 100 percent, but then give 10 times as much money to a university or college that gives them one-tenth the support on the issues that we do. As long as this double standard exists, I'm delighted that we have such a broad base of support from individuals that we can take a hit from a corporation when we disagree with it on a particular issue.

***P.R.:* The Republican Party has spent $1 billion on national elections over the past decade, and yet it has fewer senators and representatives than it did in 1980. What have been its most important mistakes?**

Feulner: The problem with the Republican Party in the 1980s hasn't just been the billion dollars that it has spent; it's been the concentration of its resources here in Washington. The party organization is much weaker at the precinct level than it was in the late '70s and

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

"The three modern conservative thinkers who have had the greatest impact on my own thought are Russell Kirk, Friedrich von Hayek, and Milton Friedman."

early '80s. Grass-roots efforts were growing rapidly then, but they have since been allowed to atrophy.

The national party bears some of the blame. First, the national party's direct-mail fund-raising has siphoned off money that could have gone to the local party. Obviously, not all that money would have ever gone to the local party, so I don't begrudge it to the national headquarters; but you'd think that the national headquarters would share more of these revenues with state and local party organizations.

The second problem is that national political patronage is no longer a party reward but a presidential prerogative. John Jones is appointed ambassador somewhere because he gave to Team 100 or was involved with Bush for President a dozen years ago, not because he's a Republican state chairman or he did something for the party. So that means that the eager beavers who want to get ahead politically at the national level, or who are looking for some kind of political reward in terms of a job, are much more likely to get involved in specific candidates' campaigns rather than in party activities. That is not good for the party system for the long haul.

Finally, too often the party misses real opportunities. Let me go back to Heritage's New Majority Project. We've done the basic work, yet there's little consistent and imaginative effort by the party to reach out to black, Hispanic, and Asian voters with a Republican conservative message. If GOP Senate candidates got 20 percent of the black vote instead of 10 percent, the Republicans would control the Senate.

***P.R.:* Have conservatives made a mistake by identifying so closely with the GOP?**

Feulner: Let me answer this as a conservative, not as president of Heritage, which is nonpartisan and which will work with any politician of any party who agrees with our ideas. As an unabashedly, unashamedly conservative institution, Heritage works most of the time with Republicans, but we work frequently with conservative Democrats, and occasionally with moderate or liberal Democrats when they see the light on specific issues—whether it be Pat Moynihan on payroll tax cuts or Lloyd Bentsen on certain health care issues or Bill Bradley on economic subsidies to the Soviet Union.

Conservatives have not made a mistake identifying closely with the Republican Party, because the GOP has become the more conservative party. Moreover, the prospects for the Republican Party look very promising. I'm not just talking here about the transient numbers of who's registering as Republican versus who's registering as Democrat. The fundamental fact is that Americans want to get ahead. I hear this all the time from liberals making their way up the economic ladder who say, "Hey, when Jack Kemp talks to us about tax policy, he really makes sense because I want to be a millionaire someday myself." Well, the more people who have that entrepreneurial drive, the more future there is for the Republican Party as a conservative venture because those individuals tend to identify with our conservative values.

The Democratic Party has traditionally considered itself the representative of the oppressed working class. The problem for the Democrats is that there isn't much of an oppressed working class any more, which is also why the relevance of the American trade union is declining so rapidly. So, the future for the Republican Party—and also the future for conservatism as the driving force in the Republican Party—is unlimited, assuming the GOP reinvigorates its grass-roots operation and sticks to its articulation of conservative principles.

***P.R.:* Are conservatives in Congress weaker, both numerically and organizationally, than they were a dozen years ago?**

Feulner: Partly because the White House has been dominated by either Right or Center-Right presidents, there's been a vacuum in independent leadership among conservatives on Capitol Hill during the past 10 years. Many of the younger members who came in with Reagan, particularly in the House, assumed that the executive branch would be sending up its legislative priorities, and their main role was to rubber-stamp them, or at most to change them at the margin. But the notion

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that all conservative legislative ideas have to flow from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is a failure of imagination and a misunderstanding of our political process.

Perhaps a more serious failure of leadership among conservatives on the Hill during the past decade has been their inability to develop much specialized expertise. Everyone wants to be an "instant expert" on every subject. A member will introduce a major economic reform bill one week, and then two weeks later think, "Well, what have I done lately? Maybe this month I'd better do something on SDI, or the next month I'd better do something on welfare." Lost along the way is the idea that a single member can make an enormous difference if he focuses for several years on a specific, limited objective—and that six or eight members could have an even greater impact if they each became an expert on a separate important issue.

"Conservatism is going to have to involve coalitions between people who don't always agree with each other if it is going to become a governing majority."

I like to recall my experience some 20 years ago as a staffer for Representative Phil Crane. He was then only a junior minority member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, but he was able to overcome the opposition of almost the entire Washington establishment and re-secure for individual citizens the right to own gold. His amendment was overwhelmingly defeated at first, then just badly defeated, then marginally defeated. Finally, when it was introduced as an amendment to the right pieces of legislation, it went through, basically because of his specialized knowledge and dogged determination. All this was under Republican presidents who opposed Crane's objective and a Congress overwhelmingly controlled by the Democrats.

I think there are some hopeful signs. The Wallop–DeLay economic recovery bill this year was very significant. So is Senator Wallop's outspoken stand on SDI—threatening to withdraw his support for SDI if the administration doesn't push for an early-deployment decision. But even this is a good example of the conservatives' problem on the Hill. Yes, Wallop is chairman of the Senate Steering Committee, the coordinating group for conservatives, but that doesn't mean he has to be the primary sponsor on both the economic bill and the SDI salvation bill. Where are the other 20 or 25 conservative leaders? They ought to be parcelling out these issues, taking their assignments seriously, and not trying to be an expert on everything that comes down the pike.

***P.R.:* What are the most important steps needed to get more conservatives elected?**

Feulner: The best way in the short term would be for President Bush and his managers to be less concerned in his 1992 campaign with how many states he's going to carry, or how many electoral college votes he's going to take, and more concerned with getting Republicans elected to Congress. That means running with bold themes that can be endorsed by members of both the House and Senate on a unified ticket, and being willing to give the other party hell. Bush seems reluctant to do this. Because of redistricting, there won't be another opportunity to pick up as many seats for some time.

I share the frustration of so many conservatives about the advantages that incumbents give to themselves to get reelected. We have to change the congressional pension system and other perks. We also have to look at the whole problem of what we call "congressional administration." Congress has changed dramatically in the past 20 years, with the biggest change being the immense increase in the power of congressional staff. Term limitation may be helpful, but I don't think, by itself, it will solve all of these problems.

***P.R.:* Where would you like to see Heritage in 1998, on its 25th anniversary?**

Feulner: Heritage has been successful because we know our role, and we stick to it. On our 25th anniversary, I would like to see Heritage with a much broader membership base, say, 500,000 members. That would be an extraordinary sign of the vitality of Heritage as an institution and of the conservative movement broadly. It would also be a powerful sign to people on the Hill, because it would mean our membership consisted of a thousand people per congressional district. That won't necessarily change a congressman's vote, but it will ensure that he or she takes our analyses of the issues seriously.

By our 25th anniversary, I hope people will view Heritage as a permanent institution, not unlike their college or university, and not unlike their church or synagogue, that will be around for the long haul—for future generations—and that will represent their interests in Washington. And I hope people will look on Heritage as an institution that stands for certain basic principles, and that those principles are the same as those we stood for back when we were founded, and that Heritage will stand for the same principles 25 years later.

In policy terms, I hope America will have a free-trade zone from the tip of Alaska to the tip of Chile; a top marginal tax rate of 20 percent; educational choice plans in all 50 states; empowerment for the poor; a deployed SDI system; and 15 independent nations where there once was a single Soviet Union.

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

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The Politics of Virtue

A Strategy for Transforming the Culture

Heather S. Richardson

Why was American society so unsuccessful relieving crime, poverty, dependency, and illiteracy over the past 25 years?

It's not that we didn't try hard enough, or spend enough money. Rather, at least in part, we misunderstood the dynamics of these problems. The social engineers approached our social ills as one would cost–benefit analysis, or similar economic formulas. What the purveyors of public policy forgot, or never understood, is that ours is what Michael Novak calls a trinitarian polity. The underpinnings of this country are not merely a productive economic system and a representative political system, but also a system of moral and cultural values.

The only changes in behavior policy-makers sought were those that responded directly to incentives. But as James Q. Wilson has compellingly argued, our country's domestic "problems do not seem to respond, or respond enough, to changes in incentives." What has been missing from the public policy debate is the appreciation of *character*, and the analysis of how the values that inform and define character can change given different circumstances and policies.

Thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Madison to Engels and Weber have all recognized that genuine public morality and ethical behavior in the community spring from private morality. Otherwise, displays of ethics become specious, guided by the letter of the law, rather than by internal codes of behavior.

Without internal codes and values that transcend convenience, no free society can thrive for long. Without certain values—notions like responsibility, accountability, moderation, hard work, deferred gratification, sacrifice, integrity, civic-mindedness, commitment to family and education, an acceptance of risk, and individual initiative—free markets and self-governance cannot work. When kids kill each other for sneakers, or go wilding for fun, or when young men genuinely can see no responsibility in fathering a child, we have lost the basis for a free society.

Look at the people of Eastern Europe. Their greatest concern is not technology transfer, or capital infusion, or which economic or monetary system they're going to have, or which form of democratic government they should choose. The crisis that concerns them most, and is the topic of every clutch of people gathered in the cafes, is whether, after 40 years of totalitarian rule, they have the cultural wherewithal to engage in democratic capitalism. Can they escape, for example, the egalitarian notion that if an individual enjoys just slightly greater success than his neighbor, even through his own efforts, that his success is somehow morally heinous? As long as that antithetical idea is commonplace, a democratic capitalist system cannot work.

Bankruptcy of Great Society

I am associated with a foundation that has long dealt with public policy issues. Over the years I have become convinced that if we don't get the underlying values right, all the tinkering with specific domestic policies won't make a bit of difference in the long run. So I am attempting to create a program to address cultural values, those attitudes and beliefs that enable a society such as ours to flourish. Such a program would not have been possible 20 years ago because of the intellectual hegemony of the ideological Left. But I believe the time is ripe now for three reasons.

First, the bankruptcy of so many of the Great Society policies that are in place is finally evident. Conservatives knew all along they wouldn't work. But now even the Left acknowledges that these policies have failed. In this environment, we can form new coalitions of opinion, and promote ideas such as the "New Paradigm," which are based on the recognition that the status quo is bankrupt.

The second factor is the general feeling, however complacent, that we have won the wars of democracy and capitalism. This victory inclines us to turn inward, to be a little more introspective—or kinder, gentler—in the coming decade.

The third reason is demographic. The baby-boomers,

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who have so completely defined the tenor of the last three decades—in terms of our attitudes, our preferences, our cultural values, and even our aesthetic taste—are now reaching their late 30s and early 40s. (God help us once they reach mid-life crisis, complete with motorcycles and trophy wives!) These people are having kids, and those kids are growing up. If there is a seismic event that's going to change how baby-boomers view culture, it's having their kids grow up in it.

These factors point to a coming cultural shift. But how can we make sure it shifts in the right direction? It's a rather daunting task if you proceed head-on. But it becomes a little more manageable if instead of asking: "How do we change culture?," we think backward, as Newt Gingrich suggests. We begin instead by asking, "Where do we want to be?" and "How do we get there?"

Death of the Work Ethic

In understanding where we want to be, it may help to define where we've come from. Culture, which includes morals, beliefs, art, laws, and habits, defines the community's purpose for being. Culture, in turn, stems from environmental, economic, societal, ethnic, and psychological factors. "The formation of culture," writes British historian Christopher Dawson, "is due to the interaction of these factors. It involves in varying degrees a community of work and a community of thought as well as a community of place and a community of blood."

In his judgment, "any attempt to explain social development in terms of one of these to the exclusion of the rest leads to the error of racial or geographical or economic determinism or to no less false theories of abstract intellectual progress."

The primary influence on our nation's culture was the Protestant work ethic. As Christopher Lasch writes in *The Culture of Narcissism*:

> America's reputation as a land of opportunity rested on its claim that the destruction of hereditary obstacles to advancement had created conditions in which social mobility depended on individual initiative alone. The self-made man, archetypical embodiment of the American dream, owed his advancement to habits of industry, sobriety, moderation, self-discipline, and avoidance of debt.

Thus, when examining where and why modern culture has veered into self-defeating notions, it helps to break down our concepts into three areas: philosophical, definitional, and structural. By philosophical I mean those concepts that inform our notions of the higher laws that affect the proper ordering of society. By definitional, I refer to the roles we see and expect for ourselves and others within the larger context of our society, affecting everything from the language we use to the attitudes we espouse. And structural refers, of course, to mediating structures, those institutions that form the framework of our lives.

Private Virtue and Public Policy

In the philosophical area, I would start with the idea of reconnecting the importance of private virtue and public policy. James Q. Wilson's 1985 *Public Interest* article, "The Rediscovery of Character: Private Interest and Public Policy," is an excellent analysis of the problem. How do you get character back into the debate? How do you make sure that character and behavior are considered when assessing public policy proposals, and the effect each will have on the other? For example, if you're evaluating the Welfare Reform Act of 1988, which gives incentives to unwed mothers to get on AFDC in order to get the benefits of getting off AFDC, you should anticipate that you will create a perverse behavior pattern. You should also realize that once a mother has gone on AFDC, her attitudes about welfare will tend to shift, and once her attitudes have shifted, it's going to be much more difficult to wean her from a subsidy.

In another area, for example, we need to better define in the public mind the difference between rights and entitlements. And we need to reconnect the synergy between rights and responsibilities. Let me give you two contrasting examples. Parents accept all the government benefits available for their children yet object to being held accountable for their child's dropping out of school or committing a crime or getting pregnant. Witness the uproar over Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson's proposal to lower welfare benefits for parents whose kids have chronic absences from school. Contrast this with the situation of a land owner in California, for whom it is virtually impossible to evict a squatter and yet who is held fully liable should that trespasser in any way harm himself while on his land. In the first case, you have all the rights, no responsibilities, and in the other you are saddled with all the duties and obligations and very little in the way of rights. This twisted logic has been carried to extreme in New York City where a man who unsuccessfully attempted suicide by jumping in front of an onrushing subway successfully sued the city on the grounds that the motorman should have stopped sooner. When you disconnect rights and responsibilities, you lose the key to a rational society.

Free markets and self-governance cannot work without values like responsibility, civic-mindedness, and a commitment to family and education.

Cult of Victimhood

Moving to the second category, what are the values by which we define ourselves and others in society? In

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Photofest

The message in recent movies like "Mermaids" is that men are entertaining, but in no way essential to the kids being happy or to the family's integrity or to the success and viability and completeness of the woman.

this area, I would include such notions as "political correctness," or P.C., which is best described in Orwellian terms that some ideas are so ludicrous that only an intellectual can believe them. Even people who are Center to Left are finding suddenly that P.C. is not simply an academic issue, but impinges on what they can talk about, even what phrases they can use, muddying clarity and thought. "Handicapped" is out. "Differently abled" is in. "Pet" is out. "Animal companion" is in. "People of color" is in; "colored people" is hopelessly politically incorrect. "Dirty old man" is out. Now I think that "dirty old man" is a useful expression, but it's heterosexist, and it's agist, and I guess it's dirtyist.

Another area of divisiveness is multiculturalism, which maintains that all cultures are equal and that the Western intellectual tradition has no more to offer than—or worse, is inferior to—say, aboriginal cultures of Southeast Asia. Multiculturalism, far from studying other cultures objectively, has degenerated into oppression studies, and has exacerbated ethnic separatism.

The whole idea of a "politics of victimization," the area that probably concerns me most, has had an enormous influence on our society, particularly on the underclass. As Shelby Steele puts it, "It binds the victim to his victimization by linking his power to his status as a victim." The victim looks to society, the source of all his woes, and thus not to himself, as the agent of change. This, in turn, fosters failure and creates dependency. The ramifications go beyond the underclass, which represents only 10 percent of the black community. The politics of victimhood have permeated the impression of the entire black community and certainly affects the impression of the politics involved.

This is an area where conservatives have missed many opportunities. Certainly Republicans should have been more supportive of blacks during the civil rights movement. We lost their support, and I don't think we are doing enough now to be credible. As Jack Kemp says, people don't care what you know until they know that you care. We need to show that we care; we need to have a plan, not just criticisms. And that plan should concern itself not only with quotas and color-blindness, but with dependency and the politics of victimization.

The cult of victimhood has been taken up by other groups as well, and has led to a sort of "new segregationism," or balkanization of America. Feminists have been among the most vocal. Feminism started by trying to eradicate our differences and make us all androgynous. Now it has moved into what Martha Bayles calls "superiority feminism," best summed up in the line, "When God created man, She was only joking." I know all women have days when we worry that this is actually true. But there are a lot of men out there, and it's not culturally healthy to disenfranchise half the population; we would do well to squelch our suspicion that the superiority feminists may be on to something.

Certainly their views have a popular resonance: You see the attitudes of superiority feminism reflected in two fairly recent films, Cher's "Mermaids" and Woody Allen's "Alice." The message is that men are fine, men are nice, they're even kind of entertaining, but they're in no way essential to the kids being happy or well-adjusted, or to the family's integrity as a whole, and certainly not to the success and viability and completeness of the woman.

Conservatives need to counter this image, not with a neanderthal return to the "barefoot and pregnant" stereotype, which is what many people assume conservatives want, but with a moderating vision of the many rewarding options open to women and the important role of men in the family.

We need to reinject the ideas of personal responsibility, and allegiance to and reliance on the broader community, so that people won't view themselves first as a member of a group or an ethnic or racial or sexual minority. That kind of "New Tribalism," as Checker Finn calls it, leads to divisiveness, bitterness, and hate. Few things are more antithetical to the American ideal: the strength of our system rests in a belief in personal responsibility, and a belief that we are a community that accepts and transcends individual differences.

Hypocritical Media

The last subcategory for desirable value changes is mediating structures. Roughly defined, there are five of them: media, religion, education, government, and, above all, family.

We have a hypocritical media that views an hour of glamour-violence programming as having no effect on the behavior of viewers, while selling for hundreds of thousands of dollars 30-second spots, or a glimpse of a product in a film, because of the impact those precious seconds ostensibly can have on attitudes and consumer preferences.

We have religious communities that are more concerned with establishing a value-free society than with propagating moral absolutes. And we have the Catholic bishops who have taken their traditional notion of subsidiarity and turned it on its head. That is, instead of addressing social problems at the logical and lowest level in the community, they would much rather testify to Congress that charity and family well-being are now the

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government's responsibilities. They'd rather worry about world peace (although they can't define "just war") and liberation economics.

Our educational establishment resists any attempts to test for and require minimal levels of academic competence in its graduating charges, and further eschews any assessment of the proficiency of its own members. Even accreditation of universities may be at risk; "diversity" in its most arching and irrelevant form is occasionally the standard, not what—and whether—anything is taught.

Government, to paraphrase David Osborne, needs to be retaught that it is good at steering the boat but pretty rotten at rowing. If we can redirect government's focus to enabling those who can row to do so effectively, then we will all be better off.

As for the family, David Blankenhorn, who runs the Institute for American Values, summed up the problem of the family rather neatly when he said: "It's not perhaps that we have a good crew on a troubled sea, but rather that the crew is now smaller, and the compass is no longer so good." How does one counter attitudes about divorce once kids are involved, or the prevailing view that one should be eternally questing for the perfect marriage, instead of making do with a merely good one?

Fortunately, the area in which conservatives are having the greatest success right now is family policy. Many groups traditionally on the Left have come out with position papers that are very sympathetic to Heritage's positions, as did, for example, the Progressive Policy Institute last year with "Putting Children First: A Progressive Family Policy for the 1990s." The National Commission on Children, chaired by Senator Jay Rockefeller, put out its report this June, which actually comes out in favor of two-parent families! Even though the commission's calls for greater government involvement in the family should warm liberals' hearts, the commissioners will probably be accused of being heterosexist and familist. But that's the hazard of moving with the Zeitgeist. Despite these rhetorical victories, however, there are still plenty of skirmishes ahead on the family.

We have religious communities that are more concerned with establishing a value-free society than with propagating moral absolutes.

Four Steps of Agitprop

It's pretty easy to come up with *what* theories, attitudes, and institutions need to be changed; things get a bit messier when it comes to *how* you actually go about changing them. How do ideas and attitudes move from being held by a few to being the widely accepted, reflexive habit of the community at large? (An almost Aristotelian definition of virtue.) Unfortunately, there are no blueprints.



Meredith Bishop

"Aha!" books turn the light bulb on. They need to be followed by empirical studies, consensus building, and policy implementation.

My own conclusion breaks down the process into four steps, with one important factor constant throughout—"agitprop" (short for "agitation propaganda"), or the continual discussion of what is wrong and popularization of the ideas, analysis, and solutions that might apply. In our media- and communications-conscious age this becomes particularly crucial.

As I outline my four steps, I want to make it clear that the process of the movement of ideas is not linear. There can be gaps, and the process can be incomplete. But by and large, these four means are key: "aha!" books, empirical studies, consensus building, and policy implementation.

The first, **"aha!" books**, are publications that turn the light bulb on. They're not necessarily new, or original, but often they take something that we all understand—at least partially—and create a new vocabulary for it. Or they put together concepts in a way that we hadn't quite thought of before. Books in this category would include Jude Wanniski's *The Way the World Works*, Charles Murray's *Losing Ground*, Shelby Steele's *The Content of Our Character*, and Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind*. These and other publications affect how people think about various issues. And, as a result, they've affected public policy.

The second way to effect change, **empirical studies**, is important for two reasons. Because they come, at least ostensibly, without ideological bias, empirical studies are often widely reported. Studies can bring a problem to attention and act as a springboard for debate.

They can also directly change individual behavior as well as influence public policy decisions. The zero-population growth studies of the '60s, for example, influenced people not to have the third, second, or even first child. In the 1940s, studies told mothers that they were grossly irresponsible if they didn't spend all their time with their children, and so they did. These studies were countered by studies in the 1960s that averred that

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

Terrence McCarthy

To counter dependency, we need to build on Shelby Steele's *Content of Our Character* with studies of inner-city success stories and coalitions with natural allies in the black churches.

parents were pretty much fungible, and further it was unhealthy to spend that much time with your kids anyway. It should be noted that a study needn't always be right or accurate, simply that it helps to say what people are ready to hear. Margaret Mead's popular *Coming of Age in Samoa*, for example, was a best-seller in the 1920s but today is discarded as academic fraud.

Building Coalitions

The third way to change the culture is through **consensus building**. This should be broken down into three sub-categories: informing through networks, developing policy proposals, and creating coalitions. Whether one is on the offensive or defensive will affect which aspects are pursued. Let me give you two contrasting examples.

Tax reform was basically a pet project of the loophole-closing Left throughout the '60s. In 1963, if you remember, many Republicans opposed the Kennedy tax cuts. Republicans and conservatives were generally dismissed as shills for the oil companies and other special interest groups.

Then in the early '70s Jude Wanniski took a sabbatical from the *Wall Street Journal* to write a book—an "aha!" book. That book, *The Way the World Works*, put forward the idea that marginal tax rates were important, an idea that hadn't really taken hold before, thus popularizing the Laffer curve. The book was backed by numerous empirical studies. Since this was a new idea in the political sphere, conservatives needed to go on the offensive to promote it. We developed networks to disseminate these ideas. We created politically feasible policy proposals. Finally, we built coalitions to push these proposals. This concerted effort created consensus and momentum; and it enjoyed dramatic effect.

Contrast this with the right-to-life movement, which has primarily pursued a defensive agenda in reaction to *Roe* v. *Wade*. Although strategies have recently changed somewhat, overall there has been little development of empirical data or "aha!" books. Nor have pro-lifers developed many politically viable policy proposals around which broad coalitions could be formed. As a result, the right-to-life movement has not had nearly the success, I think we would all agree, that the supply-side revolution has enjoyed.

The first three steps mean nothing, however, without the fourth step: **policy implementation**. As my grandfather put it, turn ideas into action. While it is all well and good to talk about problems and policies, if we don't actually put them into place, it isn't worth our time and breath. One scholar couldn't understand why we hadn't won the National Endowment for the Arts battle. A deft political strategist gave him about 10 reasons, all on the practical side of waging a political campaign, from forming unusual coalitions to counting noses. "But," protested the scholar, "I wrote the definitive article on the issue!" As in so many instances, being right is not enough. Coalition building—having a broad spectrum of voices pushing on an issue—is crucial. By defining the broad bands of debate, you can shift the perception of what constitutes the moderate, reasonable center. In short, we should pay far more attention to the actual process of getting attitudes changed and policy implemented.

Putting It All Together

Now that we have some idea of "where?" and "how?", the problem is to harness the change you wish to effect to the process by which ideas develop consequences. One good way to go about developing our strategy to change the culture is to first create a matrix. Take the four steps to changing the culture—aha! books, empirical studies, consensus building, and policy implementation—and paint them across the top of a big box. Down the left side, write the philosophical constructs, definitional attitudes, and mediating institutions we want to change—dependency, P.C., feminism, the family, education, and so on. What you get is a grid, which may cause you to pose questions you might not have thought of before.

Let me give an example in the area of the politics of victimization/dependency. How do you counter it?

If you wanted a book, you've already got one with Shelby Steele's *Content of Our Character*. Now we need a second, follow-up volume, one which makes a broader political case.

In terms of studies, we need one that asks a different question—not "Why do inner city kids fail?" but "Why do those who succeed despite the odds do so?" What is it about the 50 percent of those who grow up in the ghetto and still manage to get through school, get jobs, and start intact families that enables them to persevere?

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Then, how do you disseminate this information, create a leadership that reflects this reality instead of the vicious political cycle of blame and dependency? Finally, how do you create coalitions that better tap natural allies, such as the black church leadership, so that they can militate for a change that reflects their self-help philosophy and play a more effective leadership role?

Mythical "Good Old Days"

It is important to remember that when I talk about changing the culture, I am not talking about rolling back the clock. I am not thinking of moving back to some mythical "good old days" when everything was wonderful. There are certainly elements of the past that we should strive to emulate. But we need to remember that, by and large, the past changed because someone was ill-served by it. What we suffer from, in great measure, are the by-products and excesses of generally well-intentioned but misguided policies put into place to satisfy some half-right idea.

We need a response that articulates a forward vision, not a regressive one, a vision of inclusion and promise, one that calls on the excellence in each person. We need a political movement that pushes for the possible, wherever possible, and not one that simply, smugly, consoles itself on its uncompromising purity in defeat.

Finally, we need a philosophy that understands the need to develop long-term ideas and the need to develop and encourage the broad acceptance of those ideas, so that we can propel change even further forward. We need to pursue long-term projects in a thoughtful, systematic way. And we've got to be conscious when we draft our messages that they are phrased in ways that are appealing. We have to get better control of language. The Left understands all of this; so should we.

We also need to understand the mutual importance of both the philosophical and the practical case made for ideas. The paleoconservatives have done a magnificent job outlining the principled vision of the moral case for conservative policies. Yet it was only when the neoconservatives came on board, with their empirical studies, emphasis on research and data, and capacity to say to the Left, "I've been where you are, and now I know better," that coalitions formed and our cause took off.

Government needs to be retaught that it is good at steering the boat but pretty rotten at rowing.

We are faced with a challenge, and that challenge takes three forms. First, we have to understand what the process is. Second, we each have to find our role within that process. Whether we work in congressional staffs, think tanks, academia, business, or foundations, whether we're activists implementing policy or thinkers creating the base of ideas from which policy flows, the key is to find the synergies that tie in with the larger chain. That's the final challenge: to make it work.

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Uncle Samurai

America's Military Alliance with Japan

Seth Cropsey

There were no aftershocks of alarm in Tokyo when Iraq invaded Kuwait a year ago. The Japanese, who rely on Middle Eastern imports for two-thirds of their energy, figured that oil is oil, and that it would find its way to market whether or not Kuwait was a sovereign nation. The land of the rising sun lay low.

Bush administration requests for Japan's assistance in transporting troops to the Persian Gulf aboard chartered airplanes elicited no response from Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's anxious cabinet, and polite refusals from both Japan Airlines and All-Nippon Air. By early September, however, the issue could not be avoided. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady arrived in Tokyo to ask Kaifu to provide frontline countries in the Gulf and the U.S.-led coalition with $4 billion in assistance. Japan began to realize that the nations arrayed against Saddam Hussein were watching its response to the growing crisis very carefully.

Eventually, Japan contributed $14 billion to Operation Desert Storm, and after the war was over, it sent four naval vessels to the Persian Gulf to help clear mines. Meanwhile, Japan's Asian neighbors shifted about uncomfortably at the thought of Japanese involvement once again in significant events beyond its borders. The political debate that occurred in Japan over what its role should be as a contributing member of the responsible international community continues today. As the preeminent Pacific power, as Japan's largest trading partner, and as its effective military protector, there is no nation with a keener interest in the outcome of that debate than the United States.

The United States and Japan have a common interest in maintaining the current military partnership. From it Japan derives the principal source of its security, the umbrella of U.S. military force deployed in the western Pacific. The United States, meanwhile, gets a base in Japan for protecting American influence in a region of the world whose importance will increase with time. America's superior, and Japan's subordinate, role in this security partnership are essential to the regional and global peace that both nations seek. As such, U.S. policymakers should resist isolationist and budget-driven pressures to diminish American influence in Asia. Japan's leaders, meanwhile, should hold fast to the American military umbrella by contributing to its technological and financial support as actively and greatly as possible.

The Scorch of the Rising Sun

The Asian solar system has a binary star for its center. China, the primary sun, has the greatest mass. It and the smaller Japanese star revolve around one another, affecting with their combined gravitational force the movement and rotation of all the lesser Asian planets. Beginning with the last quarter of the 19th century, Japan's pull has been so strong that it is impossible to discuss Asian security relationships without noting how the Japanese have altered everyone else's paths. This is especially true in Asia where, owing perhaps to the unusual antiquity of its recorded events or the deep animosity between its peoples, history is remembered in detail and called upon routinely as a lesson for the future. For its neighbors, Japan's obvious historical fact is its aggression.

Closer to Japan than any other neighbor, Korea was the first Asian country to encounter an aggressively hostile Japan. Intending to pass through and invade China, Hideyoshi Toyotomi, a 16th-century warlord attacked Korea in 1592 and again five years later.

As the 19th century drew to a close, Japan resumed its active interest in Korea. Japanese policy successfully edged out Chinese claims, and then by warfare in 1905, Russian control over the Korean Peninsula. When Japan decided soon after to bypass formalities and govern Korea directly, the subjugated people rose up. Japanese forces put their villages to the torch and killed 12,000 Koreans in a year.

Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and moved quickly to erase Koreans' sense of their nationhood. Newspapers were banned, schools closed, history rewritten, and Japanese treaties substituted for Korean ones. Occasional demonstrations against Japanese rule, such as the peaceful one that took place when the old Emperor Kojong

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died in 1919, were answered with club, bullet, and handcuff. In Seoul, 6,000 demonstrators were killed, 15,000 wounded, and 50,000 arrested.

For the next three-and-a-half decades until the end of World War II, Japan ruled Korea with increasing severity, enforcing worship of the Japanese Shinto religion, ending primary school instruction in the Korean language, and forcibly assigning nearly 5.5 million laborers to help support Japan's war effort.

"Bestial Machinery"

In late summer 1931 Japan overwhelmed Manchuria, a province of China in which elements of the Japanese army had been stationed since defeating the Russians in 1905. Initiating their military campaign with a manufactured provocation, Japanese soldiers attacked Chinese troops in the city of Mukden. Japan's forces in China, known as the Kwantung Army, then conquered all of Manchuria and several thousand square miles of neighboring inner Mongolia before the year was out.

A skirmish between Chinese and Japanese forces near Beijing in July 1937 led immediately to general warfare. By August the fighting had reached Shanghai. In December the Kwantung Army advanced up the Yangtze river valley and captured Nanjing, the Chinese capital.

Japanese military commanders were determined to discourage military and civilian opponents alike from any thought of resistance. They turned Nanjing into a charnel house, killing 200,000 civilians and prisoners of war in the first six weeks of occupation. Japanese military authorities failed to discipline their forces who looted and burned what could not be raped or slaughtered. Nazi Germany's ambassador to China cabled home describing the Japanese army as "bestial machinery."

The sharp gears of this violent instrument were engaged again as Japan turned it upon the Philippines. Japanese aircraft operating from bases on Formosa struck at American military targets on Luzon within hours of the Imperial Navy's attack on Pearl Harbor. After General MacArthur was forced to leave Corregidor in early March 1942, Japanese occupation closed upon the Philippines like a fist. The conquerors' policy was direct: exploit the land for resources to aid Japan's overall war effort.

The Japanese military unleashed its characteristic ruthlessness. A special unit of the Imperial Army's military police known as the Kempei Tai was responsible for upholding law and order in the immediate vicinity of its bases. Individual accounts of those who survived the Kempei Tai tell of the random shooting (and burial alive) of children, incineration of live victims' sexual organs, beatings with baseball bats, the burning of prisoners lashed to a rotating spit, and other forms of torture that are unprintable.

When Manila fell in March 1945 the Japanese naval defense commander, Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi, gave orders for retreat that resulted in the beheading, rape, and shooting of numerous Filipinos who had thus far survived.

Japan's armed forces stalked across Asia duplicating this record. Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya—there is hardly a country in the region that escaped the harsh

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Japan has been a bulwark against Soviet aggression in the Pacific.

treatment. The collective effect of this memory forecloses any possibility in the immediate future that Japan could peacefully assume a significant military position in Asia.

Asian Powderkeg

Japan's enormous national wealth, unsurpassed manufacturing capability, technological prowess, and personal industriousness would likely produce, if harnessed, an exceptionally well-organized military armed to the hilt with the most advanced equipment. Yet Japanese rearmament would cause such upheaval throughout the rest of Asia that it is almost certainly not in Japan's own interests.

Were Japan seriously to embark upon a major plan to rebuild their national defenses today, other Asian countries that have already been occupied in ambitious armament programs for the last decade would redouble their efforts. A hot market in weapons would be trans-

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

Ships of the World

Japan's neighbors shifted uncomfortably as Japan sent four ships to the Persian Gulf to clear mines after Operation Desert Storm.

formed into a furnace. The apprehension caused by a remilitarizing Japan would be further sharpened by the Bush administration's continuing reductions in American military strength, especially its intention announced in 1990 to decrease troop levels in Asia from 135,000 to 120,000 by 1993. Asia would become a powderkeg as Koreans, Chinese, and other Asians fear a resurgence of Japan as the region's preeminent military power.

Tempting as the prospect of a Japan wholly responsible for its own defense is to those in the United States who would slash the Defense Department or spend its budget on domestic priorities, it is not an option so long as a stable Asia that can go on creating wealth while it moves toward democracy remains, as it should, the U.S.'s overall policy goal for the region. Nor would rearmament be practical for the Japanese.

Because Japan also remembers. Since its absolute defeat at the end of World War II, Japan has eschewed arms as passionately as it once embraced them. Article Nine of Japan's constitution, enacted in November 1946, "forever renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes."

Successive Japanese governments have interpreted the article to allow national possession of only those weapons that are minimally necessary for self-defense. Excluded are such weapons as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and aircraft carriers, which are deemed offensive. Under this strict interpretation Japan has not, until this past spring, deployed any armed forces outside its borders. It has forsworn the right of collective defense, *i.e.*, coming to the aid of allies under attack, and has steadfastly refused to export weapons—to anyone.

Japan's defense budget of $30 billion is comparable to those of Britain, France, and Germany, but small relative to its GNP and its global economic importance and interests. It is also deliberately unassuming. Rejecting even the slightest appearance of military ostentation, the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) does not speak of its component parts as an army, navy, and air force, choosing instead to call them the ground, maritime, and air self defense forces (GSDF, MSDF, ASDF). Together they number about 249,000 active-duty troops, a little larger than the total active and reserve strength of the United States' smallest military service, the Marine Corps.

With 156,000 men, the GSDF is the largest component of Japan's military. It fields one armored and 12 infantry divisions, and would constitute the nation's final defense against a successful invasion of Japanese soil. The MSDF and ASDF divide the other 93,000 troops equally in carrying out their defensive missions. Roughly one-third of the ASDF's 365 combat aircraft are committed to the support of ground troops, with the balance assigned to defending Japanese airspace. The MSDF is built around

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a core of surface warships and submarines. Its principal mission is to defend the sea-lanes through which Japan's vital commercial shipping passes up to 1,000 miles from the mainland.

Beyond the 1,000-mile boundary, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which is homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, along with its premier capital ship, the aircraft carrier USS *Independence*, assumes responsibility for patrolling the vast waters of the North Pacific and keeping open the sea lines of communication that link Japan with much of the rest of the world.

Japan's Strategic Value

Japan has benefited richly from the United States' defensive umbrella since the end of World War II. Released from the burden of acquiring a military commensurate with their dependence on the seas for delivery of raw materials and export of finished goods, the Japanese have stood out among the free nations in the relative puniness of their defense budgets. It was, for example, only in 1987 that Japan reversed a decision made 11 years earlier by Prime Minister Takeo Miki's cabinet to keep defense spending below 1 percent of gross national product. In terms of GNP, this is by far the smallest of the 20 top defense budgets in the world.

The yen saved may have contributed to the Japanese economy's position as the second largest in the world. But the use of Japan as an American base roughly 200 miles off the eastern coast of the Soviet Union has been of incalculable strategic value to the United States throughout the Cold War, and is certain to remain so unless some great event divides the two nations.

Since 1905, when the Russians were defeated in their war with Japan, Moscow has been unable to turn its complete attention to Europe, serene in the knowledge that its easternmost Asian approaches were secure. Over the years, Kremlin rulers may also have recalled that the Japanese troops who landed at Vladivostok in December 1917 were the first of many sent by foreign powers to crush the Bolshevik Revolution. Japan did not act out of a fear of Communism; the chance to seize territory at fire-sale prices was simply irresistible.

As tensions grew with China in the 1950s, Soviet anxiety heightened. By the 1980s the very low-technology threat of mainland China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) had tied up as many as 50 Soviet divisions at a time in Asia.

Qualitatively superior to that of the PLA, the U.S. presence in Japan has had a similar effect on Moscow. To keep the Soviets from concentrating their attention on Europe and to hold before them the daunting prospect of a two-front war, the United States could not have asked for a more favorable position than that offered by the main Japanese islands. They sit conveniently across the Sea of Japan from Vladivostok, which is the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Soviets' chief warm water port, and the logistical center of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern theater of military operations. The presence of major U.S. armed forces at the USSR's back door speaks to the Kremlin in a clear and powerful language that needs no translation.

Japan's security thus has been assured without the self-effort that would have destabilized all of Asia, the United States has gained power and influence in the western Pacific while deterring war with the Soviets, and the world has been a safer place. The relationship has been mutually—and universally—beneficial.

Still a Bear Not to Cross

It is extremely important to remember that while the climate between the United States and the Soviet Union is more temperate now than ever, Soviet capabilities in the Far East have kept expanding as though this sea-change had taken place in an undiscovered ocean. Both the intentions and capabilities of a potential opponent must be weighed when trying to peer into the future. Intentions can change over a night or two. Capabilities take years to develop. Since President Gorbachev assumed power the Soviets have continued to modernize their forces in their Far Eastern theater.

Although the Defense Department expects overall reductions in the number of Soviet tanks deployed in the Far Eastern theater, modern and more powerful models such as the T-80, T-72, and upgraded T-72 will replace many of the older ones. As a result, firepower will be retained. The same is true for tactical air forces. As older planes are withdrawn, new models such as the Su-24 Fencer-E and MIG-29 Fulcrum will preserve combat capabilities. The addition of some newer aircraft, like the Su-27 Flanker will provide Soviet commanders with a long-range escort role that will actually increase the threat to Japan and the U.S. forces based there.

Similarly, the fighting capability of Soviet Pacific Fleet surface forces is expected to grow significantly throughout the 1990s. The Defense Department estimates that surface-to-surface missile capacity aboard Soviet warships will increase by 100 percent, surface-to-air missiles by 50 percent, and the number of ships with long-range anti-submarine warfare weapons by 40 percent. With the addition of the ability to project power ashore to this swelling armada, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is predicted to increase its capacity to transport amphibious troops from the current level of 50 percent of the naval infantry (marines) assigned to the fleet, to 80 percent by the year 2000.

Japanese rearmament would cause such upheaval throughout the rest of Asia that it is almost certainly not in Japan's own interests.

Still, there have been cutbacks in the Soviets' Asia-based ground forces. Symbolic ones were announced in April 1991 when President Gorbachev visited Tokyo and declared his intention to reduce the military division

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based on the contested Kurile Islands by one-third. The rest of the 325,000 troops in the Far Eastern theater, according to Soviet figures, who are focused on Japan and U.S. forces in Asia, remain where they were.

. The real reductions in the Soviets' Asian forces have come from their army divisions facing China from which, since 1988, nearly 120,000 troops have been withdrawn. Leaving aside speculation about what opportunities Beijing thinks the Soviet withdrawal may have unearthed for them, practical-minded Japanese are wise to note, as one defense expert did this past June, that "If the Soviets say their Far Eastern forces are not focused on the Chinese, then there are only the Japanese and the U.S. left."

Signs that Moscow's interest in Japan and the Far East is not restricted to the old regime were plain last spring. Mikhail Gorbachev's rival, Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin, and no friend of the Soviet Imperium, effectively claimed the Kurile Islands as Russian territory. On the eve of Gorbachev's historic trip to Japan, Yeltsin warned him not to cut any deal with the Japanese without first obtaining the Russian Republic's approval.

Japanese defense officials are appropriately wary. In their 1991 annual White Paper, Japan's Defense Agency called the situation in the Soviet Union "still unpredictable and untransparent." Their skepticism is justified both by the Soviets' continued arms buildup in the Far East, and by their response to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement Moscow signed with Washington last November. Required to decrease force levels in Europe, the Soviets simply transported an enormous quantity of weapons east of the Ural mountains. Those weapons can be shipped further east.

Providing for Common Defense

In fact, Japan's appreciation of the Soviet threat has long been sound. It is reflected not only by the efforts mentioned above at self-defense, and the gradually accelerating percentage of GNP Japanese leaders have devoted to the military budget, but by Tokyo's record of growing financial support over the years for U.S. troops based in Japan, and by several other important but generally unknown facts.

Japan's defense budget of $30 billion is comparable to those of Britain, France, and Germany, but small relative to GNP.

Between 1985 and 1989, and under steady diplomatic pressure, Japanese payments for facilities and equipment on U.S. bases rose by 45 percent. During the same period Tokyo's annual payments for items such as water, electricity, construction, and a part of the salaries of Japanese nationals employed on U.S. bases grew by 176 percent. Japan's level of support is today far greater than that of any other nation that is host to U.S. armed forces. By 1995 Japan has promised to pay 73 percent of the total cost of the U.S. military presence on Japanese soil, minus the salaries of U.S. armed forces personnel and civilian Defense Department employees.

Japan has also increased active defense cooperation with the United States. In 1983 at the request of the Reagan administration, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's government reexamined Japan's Three Principles on Arms Export, which, since their declaration in 1967, had effectively prevented the sale abroad of any equipment remotely connected with military technology. Nakasone waived the rules exclusively for the United States, allowing transfer of military technologies for naval and selected surface-to-air missile application.

Other gauges record similar progress. Among all nations, Japan is second only to Turkey in the amount by which its government increased total defense spending during the 1970s and '80s. From 1971 to 1989 Japan's defense budget grew by 165 percent (the United States by comparison increased its defense spending during the same period by 20.5 percent).

Undesired Guest

Kokusai-koken is shorthand for Japan's still-to-be-defined contribution to the emerging world order. The Gulf War helped concentrate the attention of Japanese leaders on the question. American policy-makers should anticipate and debate the issue seeking to guide its resolution.

For the United States the first principle is to maintain American influence in the western Pacific and Asia. The forward-based units of the American military are essential for U.S. leverage, and the bases Japan provides and helps to provision are still central to America's military presence in the region. So long as Moscow retains powerful armed forces capable of seriously threatening vital U.S. interests around the world, American sailors, marines, soldiers, and pilots should remain in Japan as a strategic reminder to Kremlin leaders of their vulnerability to a second front. Moreover, the Soviets are still modernizing their military capabilities in the Far East. U.S. forces in Japan offer the strongest bulwark in the region against that expanding threat.

The second reason for preserving the U.S. defense relationship with Tokyo is economic. Japan is the heart of the Asian market that holds the fastest-growing and most dynamic economies in the world, and to which the center of international trade is shifting from the North Atlantic. As America's commerce with Asia grows, so does its interest in Asian stability. U.S. forces based in Japan assure that stability, first by protecting Japan, and second, by saving Tokyo the military exertions that would agitate other nations in the region. The rotating presence of the Yokosuka-based Seventh Fleet throughout Asia offers genuine hope for that quarter of the world's continued prosperity and its eventual progress toward democracy.

The foundation on which U.S. military presence in Japan rests is sound. Both nations benefit greatly. The fact that Japan now recognizes the need to increase its

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participation in shaping international events dovetails with American popular opinion that Japan should assume an even greater share of responsibility for its own defense. It should not be regarded as the first step in a reverse march of history.

Today, Japanese energies are absorbed commercially. Japan's military occupies a place in society much like the presence at a rich banquet of an unimportant and vaguely undesired guest. Recruiting is difficult. This year one-fifth of the National Defense Academy's graduating class turned down commissions, largely to accept more lucrative offers in business. Prestige is low; it was only after Noburu Takeshita became prime minister in November 1987 that military officers were once again allowed to wear their uniforms in the chief of government's office. And, the military's voice within the government carries little weight. In fact they are represented by the Finance Ministry, and have no direct control over budget decisions.

In short, while the chance of a relapse into the warrior-dominated society that precipitated Japan's behavior in the decades before and during World War II cannot be dismissed, signs of it are scant. *Kokusai-koken* should be welcomed by the United States as an opportunity to encourage Tokyo to expand its contribution to our mutual security.

Getting Japan to See It That Way

That will require persuasion. In a recent poll of Japanese corporate leaders, 75 percent believed that the Gulf War forced Japan to consider the extent of its cooperation with the United Nations. Only 35 percent thought that the issue raised had been the nature of the U.S.–Japan relationship. Japanese politicians and intellectuals have reacted similarly. Those who favor a more active role in the world have focused on measures such as mediating Third World disputes, using foreign aid as a more effective lever to advance peace, and stepping up participation in internationally sanctioned peace-keeping operations.

These initiatives can be useful, but they are bound to have a marginal effect on immediate dangers to peace: rulers such as Saddam Hussein or North Korea's Kim Il Sung. Nor can such economic or diplomatic measures protect Japan from the fallout of more distant international explosions: a possible cataclysmic splintering of the Soviet Union, major civil unrest in China, atomic exchanges in the sub-continent or the Middle East, or nuclear blackmail as powerful weapons and the means to deliver them proliferate.

As a great commercial power, Japan has to prevent the turmoil in marketplaces and unavoidable disruption in seagoing commerce that such upheavals would cause. Japan's clearest foreign policy interest is in continued international stability. The most dependable guarantor of that equilibrium is U.S. willingness to lead other nations in coalition efforts like Desert Storm or, if necessary, to act by itself. And that fact links the former basis of the U.S.–Japan security relationship with its future.

Where the foundation of the relationship was once the common need to guard against potential Soviet aggression, Japan in the future stands to gain just as much, and perhaps more, from the U.S. ability to protect international order. For the United States, though, with Soviet aggressiveness in remission, Moscow is more likely to pose a regional than a global threat. The emphasis on Japan's strategic value has shifted from the geographic to a mixture of technological and economic. Japan's technology with military application, its industrial prowess, and its wealth will become the chief benefits to the United States of our mutual security relationship.



Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos

Aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* off Okinawa. Japanese bases are central to America's military presence in Asia.

That shift alters slightly the balance of the security relationship between the two nations, giving a United States relieved of having to cope with the Soviets' most troublesome aggressiveness a slight edge over a Japan that must still face the localized reality of Moscow's well-armed forces. As much as Washington would like to draw upon Tokyo's know-how and wealth, Japan has a more urgent requirement for America's defensive umbrella.

U.S. policy-makers should remember that fact as debate over the future of the U.S.–Japan security relationship takes shape. The leverage it offers should not be wielded to threaten Japan with termination of U.S. defensive protection, but rather to build upon and strengthen the framework of the relationship that already exists between the two nations.

Greater Burden-Sharing

One part of that structure that has already been improved almost as much as possible is Japan's direct financial support for U.S. forces based on its soil. Here and there a significant U.S. expense can still be identified

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UPI/Bettmann

Fifty years after Pearl Harbor, the United States and Japan are close friends with common defense interests.

that the Japanese could reasonably be expected to pay. One such example is the 5.3 million barrels of ship fuel the Seventh Fleet burned last year and which cost American taxpayers roughly $200 million.

The Japanese should divide that bill equally with the United States. But the list of military expenses Tokyo does not share with the United States is finite, and close to exhaustion. It cannot be lengthened without changing fundamentally the idea of burden-sharing, and that would have a negative effect. For the foreseeable future, the current of Japanese pacifism will run strong, not dictating the country's foreign and defense policies, but certainly influencing them. Any agreement Japan could make to recompense the United States for defense costs beyond those that clearly apply to Japan would inevitably foul and probably diminish the defense relationship between the two nations.

A small yet fertile and untilled field that offers more opportunities for Japan to increase its level of support is in operations alongside the U.S. military. To note a couple of examples, Japanese naval supply ships could help reprovision U.S. naval vessels, and Japanese command-and-control aircraft could work together with Seventh Fleet aircraft carrier battle groups. Because it is likelier to produce results quickly, the Bush administration should step up its efforts quietly to persuade Japanese politicians to pass legislation that would allow the SDF to conduct joint operations with the United States.

A far more profitable area for cooperation, however, and one in which there are tremendous possibilities for growth is technology. The Japanese government's 1983 decision to allow the export of military technology to the United States creates the potential for increased availability of leading-edge technologies, significantly reduced production costs, and substantial decreases in the long intervals the Pentagon routinely experiences between the completion of research and development for weapons systems and their actual production.

There are today three committees, staffed by American and Japanese officials, that are working to reach agreements on the transfer of advanced Japanese military technologies to the United States, and another two that would move selected U.S. technologies in the opposite direction. Gaining access to Japanese excellence in technology that greatly improves a missile's

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ability to locate and destroy its target, in certain areas of magnetic field research, and for ceramics used to strengthen and lighten internal combustion engines are the U.S. objectives in these discussions. In their dealings with Japanese officials, the Defense Department should elevate the importance of reaching timely agreements that produce meaningful, tangible results.

SDI Cooperation

The United States should expand considerably the scope of this effort so that the entire spectrum of Japan's applicable manufacturing industry is brought to bear in support of the armed forces that protect both nations. Japanese commercial successes in micro-processing, electro-optics, and advanced steel technologies, to name a few, can and should be harnessed to serve the interests of both nations by improving the combat capabilities of the U.S. military.

More to the point, the United States should consolidate in one office of the Department of Defense responsibility for all government efforts to identify and then negotiate with Japan to obtain technologies that could substantially improve U.S. combat capabilities. Right now that effort is diffuse. In the Defense Department, for example, officials of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Defense Technology Security Administration, and in the undersecretary for Acquisition's office are all involved. At the Departments of State and Commerce efforts are also underway to draw upon Japan's technological skills. The issue is important today and will surely grow enough in the future to deserve the concentrated energies of the arm of government responsible for defense.

Finally, and most important, Japan's industry and wealth should become a primary engine in the effort to build an effective space-based defense against ballistic missiles. Then-Prime Minister Nakasone laid the groundwork for such cooperation with his 1986 agreement to participate in SDI research. Fleshing it out to produce real, practical results should be accomplished as soon as feasible.

Japan's ability to play a major role in the development and production of SDI is plain. The research laboratories of the nation's great manufacturing corporations labor smoothly and efficiently alongside the production facilities they support. Both respond speedily to decisions taken by the central government in Tokyo. Engineers, the human building blocks of a massive technological project like SDI, abound in Japanese society. Their talents have already been indicated by the award of contracts let by the U.S. Defense Department's Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to Japanese corporations in areas such as superconductivity and magnetic field technology. And, of course, Japan has the wealth to shoulder a large portion of this burden.

Persuading Japan that it has the interest to do so should be the object of the Bush administration. Easing that task is the suitability of SDI, a defensive weapon, to Japan's constitutional limitations, its experienced aversion to nuclear attack, and its nearly total vulnerability to the ballistic missile-borne weapons of mass destruction that will before long find their way into more and more hands.

SDI cooperation is suitable for Japan's constitutional limitations and its vulnerability to nuclear attack.

Complicating the task of convincing the Japanese will be their urge to turn to the checkbook when threatened. Tokyo's recent discussions with the North Koreans over possible reparations from World War II are a good example. They come at a time when Pyongyang is probably trying to complete plans for the production of nuclear weapons. A fundamental issue in the U.S.–Japan security relationship's future is not whether Japan will remilitarize, but whether it chooses to become an active, influential participant in shaping world events. Can this powerful ally resist the temptation to employ the wealth that is the source of its power to solicit neutral nations and placate hostile ones? The United States must agree upon the means, and then persuade Japan to employ them in demonstrating its confidence that working together with friends is the straightest path to mutual security.

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NORTHERN DISCOMFORT

The Ills of the Canadian Health System

EDMUND F. HAISLMAIER

Charles Coleman was 63 years old when his doctors told him that, unless he underwent coronary bypass surgery, he might die. In the four months that followed his diagnosis, Coleman's surgery was postponed 11 times; doctors at Toronto's St. Michael's Hospital cited a bed shortage in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) as the cause of the delays. At one point, Coleman waited in the hospital 13 days before being discharged without surgery.

Although the surgery was finally performed, members of Coleman's family said that the long ordeal had so weakened him that he had become "a broken man" who had lost his will to live. He died eight days after his surgery.

This sad case, although dramatic, is not remarkable in Canada, where the health care system has been fully nationalized for the past two decades. In a 1989 cover story entitled "Sick To Death," the Canadian news magazine *Maclean's* described Coleman's case, as well as numerous other examples of a national health care system in crisis. Dr. Phil Gold, then-chief physician of Montreal General Hospital, complained, "I'm living from hand to mouth and waiting for disaster each day....I don't know when someone will die for lack of a bed or the proper equipment."

Yet, in spite of its flaws, the Canadian system is the very model frequently proposed as a solution to the health care problems in the United States. Proponents of this view contend that the Canadian system provides access to health care for all its citizens at a lower cost than in the U.S., and with the same or better quality. Furthermore, they claim, a U.S. version of Canada's system could retain the freedom of choice currently enjoyed and valued by Americans, while hospitals and physicians would be free to practice medicine with less interference or oversight from government regulators than many providers face today.

Presented this way, it is perhaps no surprise that Canada's system looks quite attractive to many Americans. Indeed, it registers considerable support in U.S. public opinion polls, far exceeding support for the existing system. According to a recent *Wall Street Journal*/NBC News poll, 69 percent of voters polled supported a Canadian-style system, including 60 percent of conservatives and 62 percent of those with household incomes exceeding $50,000. Legislation now pending in Congress and several state legislatures would, if enacted, replicate the Canadian health system in the United States or in particular states. But in reality, the Canadian system is far less attractive than it appears at first glance.

Before examining why this is so, it is necessary to first dispel some basic misconceptions many in America hold about the Canadian system.

Similar Provincial Plans

To start with, the Canadian "national" health care system is not national in the sense of being funded or administered by a central government. The system is actually a collection of separate, although very similar, provincial systems. Each of Canada's 10 provinces and two territories administers its own universal health plan and pays for most of its costs. Historically, the role of the Canadian federal government primarily has been to provide partial financing of the provincial health systems and to set broad structural guidelines to which the provincial plans must adhere if they are to receive federal financial support.

Those national guidelines were developed over several decades, leading to the establishment of similar systems in all Canadian provinces by 1971. In 1984, the federal guidelines were revised and consolidated in the Canada Health Act, which forms the basis of the current system. Under this act, provincial health plans are eligible for partial federal funding if they meet the following five requirements:

Universality. The plan must cover all residents of the province under uniform terms and conditions. For new residents, the waiting period prior to entitlement must not exceed three months.

Portability. The plan must provide continuous coverage for residents who are temporarily absent from the province and for individuals who move to another province until they qualify for that province's plan.

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Comprehensiveness. The plan must cover all hospital and physician services deemed "medically necessary" by the federal government. Other items can be covered at the discretion of the provincial plan under terms set by the provincial government. Such discretionary items include: outpatient services provided by non-physician practitioners (such as basic dental and eye care, prescription drugs, physical therapy, and chiropractic services), and non-medically necessary services or amenities (such as cosmetic surgery or private hospital rooms).

Accessibility. The plan must provide all residents with reasonable access to care without financial barriers, such as out-of-pocket costs, and provide reasonable levels of compensation to physicians.

Public administration. The plan must be operated and administered by a nonprofit, public authority accountable to the provincial government.

Prior to the 1984 act, provincial plans could charge patients user fees for services, although these were generally quite low and did not cover actual costs. Moreover, doctors were permitted to charge patients more than the fixed reimbursements provided by the provincial plans, a practice known as "extra billing." In 1983, extra billing was estimated at CN$100 million, or 0.3 percent of Canadian health spending; this figure is equal to approximately CN$4.00 per capita. The act effectively ended such practices by stipulating that federal payments to provincial plans would be reduced by the total amount of any user fees and extra billing paid by patients for the federally required basic services. Since 1987, all provinces have eliminated user fees, and extra billing is illegal throughout Canada for the basic services. Provincial plans, however, may still set user fees, or limit coverage, for any additional services they cover.

Doctors Self-Employed

While the Canadian federal and provincial governments control the financing of health care, they do not directly control or manage the delivery system. Most physicians are self-employed and are paid on a fee-for-service basis according to fee schedules periodically negotiated between the provincial governments and physicians' associations.

Similarly, most Canadian hospitals are in private hands, although virtually all of them are operated on a nonprofit basis. Out of a total of 1,243 hospitals, only 61 (or fewer than 5 percent) are operated on a for-profit basis by private owners. These do not participate in the provincial plans, and as a result their patients must pay all costs directly out-of-pocket. Most of these hospitals are really nursing homes. Another 49 hospitals are owned and operated directly by the federal government to serve patients in programs such as those for veterans, defense personnel, immigrants, and prison inmates.

The remaining 1,133 hospitals are "public," meaning that they operate on a nonprofit basis, participate in their respective provincial health plans, and serve the general public. Of these, 57 percent are privately owned by either religious orders or secular voluntary organizations, with the remaining 43 percent owned by provincial or municipal governments.

The operating expenses of all public hospitals are financed by the provincial plans on the basis of "global budgets." This means that each hospital negotiates each year with the provincial plan for its total (global) operating budget for the coming year. The money then is disbursed to the hospital in periodic, lump-sum installments throughout the year.

Most of a hospital's capital budget, used for acquiring new equipment or facilities or upgrading existing ones, also is provided by the provincial government. This budget is kept separate from the hospital's operating budget. While hospitals may, and usually do, raise private funds for capital expansions through bonds or donations, those funds are controlled indirectly by the provincial governments as well. If the authorities do not agree with a planned capital outlay, they will refuse to provide the additional funds in the hospital's operating budget needed to staff or operate the new facilities or equipment. Thus, in practice, the provincial plans use the operating budget to limit the ability of hospitals to expand or offer new services. By exercising their "power of the purse" in these ways, the provincial governments seek to control total health spending. In the delivery of health care, however, doctors and hospitals still retain considerable discretion to run their facilities and treat their patients as they judge best.

The Canadian system appears to provide universal health insurance coverage at a lower cost than our present system, which leaves 31 million Americans uninsured.

Finally, the Canadian system is not, as many in the United States assume, universal in the sense that it covers all medical care or health spending. Nor, in fact, are nationalized health systems in other countries universal in this sense either. Of total health care spending in the United States, 42 percent is funded through federal, state, and local governments. The share of Canada's health spending funded through its federal and provincial governments is 74 percent. This point is worth noting because virtually all proposals to replicate the Canadian system here would, in fact, significantly exceed the scope of the current Canadian system, entailing government funding of 90 percent or more of U.S. health spending.

Mythology of Cost Control

What its U.S. proponents find most attractive about the Canadian system is that it appears to provide universal health insurance coverage at a lower cost than our present system, which leaves 31 million Americans uninsured.

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

Comparison made in constant 1981 dollars using OECD purchasing power parity exchange rates. **Source:** Edward Neuschler, "Canadian Health Care: The Implications of Public Health Insurance" (Washington, DC: The Health Insurance Association of America, June 1990).

Canada's net per-capita health spending remained at 75 percent of America's both before and after the start of Canada's national health system in 1971.

In the early 1960s, before Canada moved to a national system, it was spending a slightly higher percentage of its GNP on health care than was the United States, roughly 6 percent versus 5.5 percent, respectively. After 1971, however, when the main elements of Canada's system were introduced in all provinces, costs began to diverge, with Canada spending considerably less of its GNP on health than its southern neighbor. In 1989 U.S. health care spending was 12 percent of its GNP. In contrast, Canada's health care spending was only 9 percent of its GNP.

The simple conclusion, drawn countless times from these data by experts and laymen alike, is that Canada significantly limited the growth of health care spending once the government took control of health care financing. This leads to the assertion that the United States would achieve similar results if it adopted a Canadian-style system. In fact, however, this simplistic comparison of relative health spending as a percentage of GNP is misleading, and the popular conclusions drawn from it are invalid.

A closer examination of health care spending in both countries between 1967 and 1987, the most recent 20-year period for which data are available, shows why this is so. Between 1967 and 1987, real (inflation-adjusted) per capita health care spending increased at an average annual rate of 4.58 percent in Canada, versus 4.38 percent in the United States (both figures are in local currency). But GNP growth was, on the average, higher in Canada than in the United States during the same period. Between 1967 and 1987, again measured in local currency, Canada's real per-capita GNP grew 74 percent, while the real growth in U.S. per-capita GNP was only 38 percent. Canada, in short, has done no better than the United States in controlling the growth of health care costs, but our northern neighbor's health care/GNP ratio has remained lower because of its more rapidly rising GNP level.

When figures for both countries' real per capita health spending are converted into the same currency, they show that Canada has consistently spent about 75 percent of what the United States spends on health care, both before and after the introduction of universal government funding in Canada. Why this disparity exists is a matter of some speculation. What is clear, however, is that the introduction of a government-financed health system in Canada generated no measurable change in the real rates of Canadian health care spending relative to that in America.

Perverse Results

While Canadian federal and provincial governments have failed to control the growth of health care spending by any meaningful measure, their attempts to do so have generated perverse results. This is due to how the system pays doctors and hospitals.

Ironically, the same payment methods that cause the problems are viewed by many as one of the system's most attractive features because of the freedom they allow both patients and providers. Patients may choose from any doctor or hospital participating in the provincial plan. Although doctors and hospitals must accept government fees or budgets, they are free to manage their facilities and practice medicine as they see fit, without the detailed oversight and stifling bureaucracy that characterizes the U.S. Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance systems, or even some other nationalized systems.

In contrast to some other nationalized systems that pay doctors flat salaries or a fixed annual amount per patient, a Canadian doctor is paid a fee for each service provided, with the schedule of fees negotiated annually by the provincial government and the provincial medical association.

The problem, however, is that in any fee-for-service system where patients do not purchase care directly, or even buy their own health insurance, there is no financial reason for them to question physician decisions. This leaves doctors free to compensate for reduced government-set fees by increasing the volume of services they provide. According to a recent article in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's *Technology Review*, Canadian provinces cut physician fees by 18 percent between 1972 and 1984, but doctors' total billing claims rose by 17 percent during the same period. When Quebec froze medical fees from 1972 to 1976, causing a drop of 9 percent in their real-dollar value, doctors increased their billings by 8.3 percent. Similarly, in spite of a 1984 freeze on medical fees in Alberta, the province's doctors increased their incomes by 12 percent that year. "Hit with a fee cut, doctors simply see more patients and provide more services," the MIT report concluded. Most of these services are unnecessary and simply push up health care spending needlessly.

Obsolete Equipment

Confronted with this new problem, at least one province, Quebec, has responded by placing limits on the amount it will pay individual doctors each year—strongly discouraging them from providing additional

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treatments. But it is hard to see how this differs, in practice, from simply making doctors salaried employees of the government.

Other Canadian provinces are now either considering or introducing similar changes. Some are also looking at adopting U.S.-style utilization review and control methods. But each of these trends will increase bureaucracy and drastically curb the vaunted clinical freedom of Canadian doctors.

Canadian doctors and hospitals see their clinical freedom restricted in other ways, particularly as a result of global budgeting for hospitals and government controls over hospital spending on capital improvements. Many Canadian hospitals were built in the 1950s and 1960s. But since the nationwide health system was put into place in 1971, hospitals have found it increasingly difficult to obtain the funding they need to replace obsolete or worn-out equipment or facilities. In essence, Canada's hospitals have been living off their existing capital for 20 years, and more of them are gradually exhibiting the obsolescence and decay found in many British National Health Service hospitals.

The provincial governments also sharply restrict the availability of medical equipment outside of hospitals, forcing doctors to conduct most procedures in a hospital, where they can be both more closely monitored and controlled. This practice produces perverse results as well. "The dramatic shift to outpatient diagnostic testing and outpatient surgery that has taken place in the United States has not been replicated yet in Canada," observed Ed Neuschler, of the Health Insurance Association of America, in his study of the Canadian system. "For example, all Canadian computerized tomography (CT) scanners are located in hospitals and, in Ontario, this has been made a legal requirement. Keeping major medical procedures in hospitals, which are under their direct budget authority, allows provinces to better manage total costs by controlling supply." In other words, to control physician practice patterns and patient demand, Canada forgoes the potential cost savings and quality improvements these new outpatient technologies would otherwise generate in a true free market.

These practices also have an adverse effect on patient care. For example, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machinery is now widely used in the United States in the treatment of joint, spinal, and neurological disorders; over 2,000 MRI machines exist in U.S. hospitals, clinics, and diagnostic centers. But Canada possesses only 15 MRI scanners, and all of these are located in hospitals, making these tests much more difficult to obtain. This calls for tough decisions on the part of doctors, who must decide what constitutes a priority case for MRI screening. "A person with a quickly progressive paralysis qualifies as an emergency and promptly obtains a spinal scan to determine the source of the problem. But patients awaiting operations for brain tumors or confined to bed by ruptured disks are considered to be merely urgent and wait one to six weeks," a recent *New York Times* article reported. One physician at Jewish General Hospital in Montreal put the dilemma in graphically personal terms: "These people are watched very carefully, but imagine being 30 years old and sitting around with a brain tumor growing, even very slowly, in your head."

The most serious consequence of hospital global budgeting is the outright denial of medical care it encourages. To stay within budgets, hospitals have resorted to closing beds for part of the year or limiting the number of operations they perform. Yet at the same time, while Canada has only a 5.2 percent higher rate of hospital admissions than does the United States, Canadian hospitals, compared with their U.S. counterparts, have: 29 percent more beds per 1,000 population; a 27 percent higher bed occupancy rate; a 52 percent longer average length of stay rate; and, 63 percent more patient days per 1,000 population.

Longer Stays

What are all these people doing in hospitals? To some extent, the lack of alternative outpatient care in Canada forces many individuals to enter hospitals for services that would be provided in a doctor's office or clinic in the United States. But more significantly, hospital administrators, under a global budget, have a strong incentive to keep patients longer rather than serving more patients with shorter hospital stays.

Imagine you are the administrator of a U.S. hospital. The more beds you fill, the more revenue you receive, which means the more profit you generate. If the hospital is a for-profit one, some of that profit will go to expanding services, and some will go to stockholders. If it is a nonprofit hospital, all the extra funds can go to expanding services. In either case, your board of directors will be pleased.

> **"The best way to stretch a fixed hospital budget is by keeping sick people out and healthy people in."**

However, the people paying the bills (usually the insurance companies) want you to treat patients quickly and then, as soon as possible, send them home or elsewhere to recuperate in a less costly setting. These conflicting pressures push you to make the hospital a more efficient treatment center with short patient stays and a high turnover rate. But now imagine that, instead, you are the administrator of a Canadian hospital. Your budget is fixed by the government, and treating more patients won't bring you any more revenue. Instead, it will simply eat up your budget. Furthermore, treating patients with costly illnesses will consume your budget even faster.

You certainly won't look like a competent manager to your superiors if you use up your entire budget before the end of the year. On the other hand, if you don't treat any patients, you won't use up your budget—but you won't look competent either. How do you respond to this very different set of conflicting pressures?

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

Canada possesses only 15 MRI scanners, which are widely used in the United States for diagnosing joint, spinal, and neurological disorders.

To start with, you know that when patients enter a hospital, regardless of their condition, most of the cost of treating them comes from providing expensive medical services in the first day or so. After that, they use fewer medical services and more of the hospital's much cheaper "hotel" services. So the answer presents itself. Avoid admitting patients who are costly to treat, unless of course it's a life-threatening emergency, in which case turning them away is going to look very bad indeed. Instead, admit less costly patients, treat them, and then keep them in the hospital. As one doctor put it, "The best way to stretch a fixed hospital budget is by keeping sick people out and healthy people in."

Such practices inevitably produce both full hospitals and long waiting lists for major medical care. If complaints are then raised about waiting lists to enter the hospital, the administrator can credibly claim that he does not have enough funds to meet the demand. He then will either receive more money from the provincial government, or he will have effectively bucked the problem up the chain of command to his political superiors. The administrator wins either way. Indeed, this practice of lengthening patients' stays is so common that Canadians have dubbed such long-stay patients "bed blockers," meaning they are blocking someone else's access to a hospital bed.

Maple Leaf Drag

As with any nationalized health system, when unlimited demands for perceived "free" care collide with limited government budgets, shortages result and more people must take a number and wait for treatment. The resulting problems and horror stories have provided much grist for the press.

The same *Maclean's* article that related the story of heart patient Charles Coleman also reported: "Hospitals in some cities have had to institute unusual, and sometimes humiliating, economic measures. Patients in the maternity ward of Toronto's North York General Hospital are required to bring in their own pillows, while elderly patients in some Montreal hospitals are being kept in diapers because nurses do not have time to help them go to a bathroom." At the same time, at New Brunswick's Moncton Hospital, "some patients are kept in hallways and even closets, while a total of 2,300 people were on the waiting list for surgery last month."

In April 1989, one Ontario paper reported, "There are currently 1,600 people in Ontario waiting for heart surgery and the list is steadily increasing." The same month, another Ontario paper published the news that, "Kitchener-Waterloo Hospital will be closing at least 43 beds, laying off or cutting back the hours of at least 70 staff members, capping the hemodialysis program, and discontinuing lens implant procedures at the hospital."

From the *Winnipeg Free Press* came the report in July 1989 that, "Doctors and nurses at Brandon General Hospital lashed out yesterday at bed closings that have left 91 patients, including cancer victims, waiting up to six weeks for urgent surgery. Most of the patients have cancer of the breast, large bowel, or lungs, chief of staff Dr. Michael Taylor said. He blamed the funding woes and bed closings on a Health Department policy introduced by the former government that forbids deficit-financing and forces hospitals to balance their budgets."

On September 14, 1989, the *Toronto Sun* reported, "The Princess Margaret Hospital has announced it won't accept new cancer patients requiring radiation treatment for a six-week period starting September 30 to clear up a 300-patient backlog." Last year the *Edmonton Journal* stated, "The only hospital doing cardiovascular surgery in northern Alberta now has 210 adults and children on its waiting list. The average wait is six months, although some people have been waiting as long as a year, said a hospital spokesman."

The U.S. political structure is fundamentally unsuited to effectively administering a national health system like that in Canada.

Yet in spite of these problems, the system remains extremely popular with the general Canadian public. Indeed, opinion polls show that most Canadians believe their system is without rival. But increasingly that popularity is derived not from any inherent virtues of the system, but from the inevitable calculus of political economics. As in other nationalized systems where money is eliminated as the means of allocating goods and services, the Canadian system increasingly allocates health resources on the basis of votes, not on the basis of need. For the lucky majority who are reasonably healthy, they will continue to find ready access to routine, low-cost medical services. But for the unfortunate minority with serious conditions, they will increasingly be expected to take a number and wait.

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$190 Billion in New Taxes

If all of this is not enough to dissuade U.S. policymakers from instituting a Canadian-type system, the projected costs definitely should be. While several detailed analyses of the cost of adopting a Canadian-type system in the United States have recently been conducted, they only confirm what quick, back-of-the-envelope calculations yield. Present U.S. health spending is over $600 billion per year, of which the federal, state, and local governments account for 42 percent, or roughly $250 billion. Thus, expanding the total government share to the 74 percent found in Canada would necessitate about $190 billion per year in new government spending. Expanding the government share to around 90 percent or more, as would occur under most pending legislation to adopt the Canadian system, would push total new government spending into the $300-billion-per-year range.

Economists Gary and Aldonna Robbins have estimated that funding such a total health care nationalization program would require either: Increasing the combined employer-employee payroll tax from its current rate of 15 percent to 29 percent; raising income tax rates across the board by 14 percent; or, imposing a new national sales tax of 10 percent.

Furthermore, the U.S. political structure is fundamentally unsuited to effectively administering a national health system like that in Canada. Unlike other countries with nationalized systems, the United States does not have a parliamentary system of government. The U.S. system not only separates the executive and legislative functions, but even within the legislative arena congressmen and state legislators more closely represent the narrower interests of their constituents, have much more power to alter legislation, and are much less subject to party discipline than are their parliamentary colleagues in other countries.

Because of these significant political differences, any national health system in America likely would quickly degenerate into pork-barrel politicking and legislative micro-management. Indeed, one does not have to look to obsolete military bases, farm subsidies, public works programs, or dubious research projects to find examples. There is already one graphic example in the U.S. health care system of what would happen nationally with a Canadian-style system: namely, the medical system run by the Department of Veterans Affairs. That system labors under chronic budget problems, and constant restrictions and special-interest requirements imposed by Congress. In fact, congressional interventions have kept any obsolete V.A. hospitals from being closed over the past 26 years.

Alternatives to the Canadian Plan

There is a lesson in the Canadian experience that Americans should take to heart.

In reforming our own system, we should avoid confusing means with ends. All the attention focused on the uninsured in the United States has led many to seek universal health insurance coverage through a nationalized system. Yet the real goal should be to provide all Americans with adequate medical care. Health insurance is only one of several means of achieving that goal, and many times it is not the best means.

Rather than instituting a government-run system of universal health insurance, Americans should pursue reforms designed to ensure that all citizens have access to adequate medical care. Such reforms should have two fundamental objectives:

First, to empower consumers by giving workers and their families direct control over the money used to purchase their medical care and insurance, thus unleashing market forces and consumer choice to control health care costs and bring efficiency to the system.

Second, to restructure existing health care tax policies and government programs to provide the poorer and less healthy members of society with the extra purchasing power they need to obtain necessary medical care and insurance in a freely functioning market.

Pursuing reforms based on these principles offers the best hope for America to create not only a better and less expensive health system, but also a system that achieves the goal that has eluded Canada: affordable access to medical care for all its citizens.

Indeed, perhaps the ultimate irony of the Canadian system is that it is evolving into what Canadians sought to avoid: a two-tiered system. While all Canadians have access to health insurance, fewer of them are receiving access to needed medical care.

Canada's system serves well the majority who are reasonably healthy. But people with serious conditions will increasingly be expected to take a number and wait.

As the problems in their health care system grow and deepen over the coming decades, Canadians may eventually find themselves turning toward market-based reforms of the kind now being instituted in the older national health systems of Britain and Sweden.

Then again, the crisis may be nearer at hand. As Ontario kidney specialist Adam Linton told the *New York Times* in April, "We have not yet had to kill anyone by not providing dialysis or a transplant, but the issue is at a flash point."

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Food Fight

How Hungry Are America's Children?

Robert Rector

"A startling number of American children are in danger of starving...one out of eight American children is going hungry tonight." So began a CBS Evening News broadcast last March. This headline-grabbing charge came from a survey conducted by the Food Research Action Center (FRAC), a liberal food advocacy group, sponsored by the Kraft Corporation, one of America's largest food-processing companies.

CBS got it wrong. FRAC actually reported that one out of eight children in the United States had been "hungry" at some time during the prior year, not each night as the network reported. This shocking statistic has since passed into media and political folklore as just the latest example of the plight of poor children under the Reagan and Bush presidencies. The *New York Times*, the *Boston Globe*, the *Washington Post*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and *USA Today* all gave the FRAC report saturation coverage.

All of these media accounts ignored the FRAC study's lack of scientific basis. In contrast to numerous other studies of nutrition in America, FRAC did not measure actual food or nutrient consumption. Instead, FRAC asked American families subjective questions about whether they would like to have more or a wider variety of foods. The FRAC survey was deliberately so vague that it actually "discovered" that large numbers of middle-class children were hungry as well.

FRAC's startling assertions of widespread hunger in America are flatly contradicted by scientific surveys conducted by the Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture and the Centers for Disease Control of the Department of Health and Human Services. These surveys, which measure actual food consumption and physiological status in the U.S. population, show little evidence of hunger or insufficient calorie and protein intake among poor children or poor adults. Vitamin and mineral consumption are in most cases well above recommended norms and little difference is found between the level of nutrients consumed by poor and affluent children. Overall, government research finds no significant health problems among the poor caused by general food shortages. Rather, the top nutrition-related health problem among poor Americans is not hunger and undernutrition—but obesity.

Similarly inaccurate is FRAC's identification of the politically correct cause of hunger: "spending cuts during the Reagan presidency." Like FRAC's discovery of widespread undernutrition, these spending cuts are purely fictitious. In reality, constant-dollar spending on food programs, and on welfare programs in general, increased under Ronald Reagan. After peaking during the recession of the mid-1980s, aggregate constant-dollar federal and state food assistance spending remained at $24.4 billion in 1990. Adjusted for inflation, this was 15 percent higher than spending in 1980 and 68 percent higher than spending in 1975. In inflation-adjusted terms, government food aid per poor person in 1987 equalled $687, compared with $529 in 1975.

Big FRAC Attack

The FRAC study claimed that 40 percent of poor children suffer hunger, which it defined as "a physical condition that comes from not eating enough food due to insufficient economic...resources," and as a state of "chronic mild undernutrition." This is a reasonable definition of hunger; but what are the actual facts about undernutrition and malnutrition in the United States?

For over 50 years the federal government has painstakingly surveyed food and nutrient consumption within the United States. In each decade since the 1930s the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has conducted at least one "food consumption survey," using extensive interviews with representative samples of households to determine the actual amount of food consumed by each household on various days throughout the year. These surveys permit comparisons of average food and nutrient consumption in households from different socioeconomic strata.

The USDA food consumption surveys provide the government with preliminary data to identify potential nutritional problems within the general population and

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various socioeconomic sub-groups. The government then follows this preliminary data with periodic targeted physiological and anthropometric (body structure) surveys that provide a far more precise assessment of nutritional status within the population. Past surveys include the Health Examination Surveys of the early 1960s (HES I and HES II) and the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) of the early 1970s. Between 1976 and 1980, the Centers for Disease Control conducted NHANES II, collecting hematological, biochemical, anthropometric, and other medical data from a representative sample of tens of thousands of Americans. The NHANES II data are critical to an accurate assessment of protein, vitamin, mineral, and caloric deficiencies.

Neither the USDA food consumption surveys nor the NHANES II study found evidence of malnutrition among poor children. In fact, they show very little difference in the nutritional content of food consumed by low-income children compared with those in affluent American families.

Overabundant Protein

One of the most serious forms of malnutrition is protein deficiency. Proteins are amino acids that act as the fundamental building blocks of life. Without a sufficient intake of protein, humans suffer growth retardation, impaired mental functioning, and fatigue; a very severe deficiency can lead to death. Fortunately, protein is abundant in many food sources including meat, milk, poultry, fish, soy, nuts, corn, and beans. Although protein deficiency still plagues developing nations, it is essentially non-existent in the United States.

As part of the NHANES II survey, CDC offices analyzed serum albumin levels among Americans. Low levels of serum albumin, the most common protein in the blood, are the clearest indicator of protein-caloric malnutrition. Of a total representative sample of 15,457 persons, however, only 19 individuals, or less than one-tenth of 1 percent, showed signs of protein deficiency. Moreover, there were no differences between races or between poor and non-poor persons.

A 1985–1986 USDA food consumption survey likewise found no signs of protein deficiency among young children. Preschool children from families with incomes below 75 percent of the poverty level ($8,242 for a family of four in 1985) consumed 54.4 grams of protein per day, compared with 53.6 grams for children in families with incomes above 300 percent of poverty (roughly $33,000 for a family of four in 1985). Black preschool children consumed 56.9 grams of protein, compared with 52.4 grams for white children. Surprisingly, protein and calorie consumption was slightly higher among children in the central cities than in the suburbs. On average, protein intake of both poor and upper-middle-income children exceeded 200 percent of U.S. recommended standards.

Thus, as the *Nutrition Monitoring Update*, a summary report prepared jointly by the Department of Health and Human Services and the USDA, concluded in 1989: "Protein is not considered to be a current public health issue...there is no evidence of health problems associated with deficiency or excess." Where protein deficiency does occur, it is not linked to poverty. Indeed, poor as well as affluent Americans of all ages have diets rich in meat and protein in comparison with the rest of the world, and greatly exceed recommended daily requirements.

From A to Zinc

As Table 1 shows, consumption of essential vitamins and minerals among both high- and low-income preschool children also generally exceed USDA standards, often by more than 50 percent. In only a few instances does nutrient consumption fall below recommended levels. The few shortfalls that occur among poor children appear among higher-income children as well. The USDA data show not only that the average nutrient consumption of poor and higher-income children was very similar, but that the variation (or statistical spread around the average) was quite similar in both groups as well. Moreover, since the recommended USDA standards for consumption of vitamins and minerals are conservatively set above the levels needed for good health for most persons and USDA underestimates the nutrients in some foods due to lack of information—an average deficiency of a nutrient does not necessarily indicate a significant nutritional problem.

For example, the 1985 USDA study of pre-schoolers showed that average zinc consumption fell below recommended standards for both poor and higher-income children by some 25 percent. But the NHANES II hematological study found only 2 to 3 percent of all children had low serum zinc levels. Low serum zinc was only slightly more common among poor children. Zinc aids in the metabolism of protein. Severe deficiencies can lead to stunted growth, increased susceptibility to infection, and mental lethargy, and may even contribute to sickle cell anemia. Peanut butter, meat, poultry, seafood, cheese, milk, and whole-grain cereals are all good sources of this trace mineral.

On average, protein intake of both poor and upper-middle-income children exceeds 200 percent of U.S. recommended daily requirements.

Similarly, while USDA surveys found that higher-income school-aged children consume much higher levels of fruit and fruit juice, the lower consumption of fruit among poor children did not result in vitamin C deficiency. The NHANES II hematological survey found no evidence of low levels of serum vitamin C among children under age 11. Between 1 and 2 percent of American teen-agers were found to have low serum vitamin C levels, but this was more common among non-poor than poor

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

Reuters/Bettmann

Eat your broccoli. It's high in vitamin C, calcium, and vitamin A.

teen-agers. Although vitamin C is abundant in fruits, especially oranges, lemons, and strawberries, it can be found in a number of other foods as well, including green peppers, brussel sprouts, tomatoes, and potatoes. Scientists are still not sure exactly how vitamin C is utilized by the body, but it does play a role in metabolizing protein. It also works to strengthen the immune system. A serious vitamin C deficiency can cause bleeding gums and reduce the body's natural ability to heal wounds. A complete lack of vitamin C in the diet is potentially fatal; it is also almost unheard of in modern times.

Calcium, which makes up 2 percent of the body weight of an adult, is another vital mineral. Not only does it build up teeth and bones, calcium also aids in proper nerve function, blood clotting, and muscle contraction, among other functions. Calcium deficiencies can lead to osteomalacia, a softening of the bones, or osteoporosis, a brittling of the bones. Fortunately, it is fairly easy to get through food sources an adequate amount of calcium. Two cups of milk a day for adults fulfills RDA requirements; three cups of milk takes care of the greater needs of adolescents. Broccoli and mustard greens are also good sources. The USDA consumption survey discovered that among preschoolers average calcium consumption for both poor and high-income children was slightly below recommended levels. Symptoms of calcium deficiency appear among middle-aged and older women, but are generally unrelated to economic class.

Better Eat Your Wheaties

The most common nutritional shortfall among Americans appears to be iron deficiency—a problem we share with most other developed nations. As a key component of hemoglobin, iron is essential to the blood system's ability to absorb and deliver oxygen to the body. Periods of rapid body growth, such as infancy, adolescence, and pregnancy, increases the likelihood of iron deficiency, which can cause fatigue, impaired mental activity, and increased susceptibility to infection. Deficiency can be countered by eating foods rich in iron such as liver and other organ meats, egg yolks, raisins, dark leafy vegetables such as spinach, and legumes such as kidney beans, or by taking an iron supplement.

During the early 1970s there was concern that iron deficiency was causing high rates of anemia among poor young children. In 1974, the Centers for Disease Control began monitoring anemia among low-income preschool children deemed to be at high nutritional risk. Among this group the prevalence of anemia has been more than halved, falling from 7.8 percent in 1975 to 2.9 percent in 1985. The anemia rates for poor children are now quite low, although still slightly higher than the anemia rates for middle-class children.

Part of the decline in anemia is a result of the expansion of the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) food program over the past two decades. However, the CDC data show that between 1975 and 1985 the most dramatic reductions in anemia occurred among poor children prior to enrollment in WIC. Similar reductions in anemia occurred among middle-class children not eligible for WIC. These dramatic changes were the result of improvements in iron levels in the general food supply as well as changes in food selected for young children. These improvements included: greater frequency and duration of breast feeding, increased substitution of iron-fortified infant formula for non-fortified milk, and increased use of iron-fortified cereals.

Moreover, while CDC data from the mid-1970s show significant declines in anemia among poor children after those children began participation in WIC, CDC data from the 1980s show WIC playing a diminishing role. The difference in anemia rates among poor children prior to enrollment in WIC and the anemia rates of poor children after participation in WIC shrank between 1975 and 1985. This suggests that the improved level of iron nutrients provided to children in general has meant that WIC has played a less significant, although still important, role in reducing iron deficiency among the poor in recent years.

Honey, I Shrunk the Kids

The effects of malnutrition are evident not only in blood chemistry but in a child's body structure as well. Thus, surveys of body structure are useful additions to food intake and biochemical studies as tools to detect malnutrition. Body weight relative to height, for instance, is the best indicator of adequate caloric intake. A child suffering from serious caloric underconsumption will exhibit low body weight relative to height—known as "thinness" or "wasting."

The CDC began monitoring wasting among poor children at risk of malnutrition in 1973. The CDC data show that thinness is not more common among impoverished children than among the general population. *Nutrition Monitoring in the United States*, produced jointly by the USDA and the Department of Health and Human

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Services in 1986, concludes that "wasting does not constitute a significant health problem" among impoverished children in the United States.

In NHANES II, the CDC also measured general body fat among poor and non-poor children through a "skinfold test." In this test a specific width of flesh is pinched together to produce a skinfold. The width of the skinfold is then measured with calipers that give a specific measure of the individual's body fat level.

Skinfold tests show that poor girls, on average, are plumper than non-poor girls. Poor boys, on the other hand, have slightly less body fat than more affluent boys. But even in the case of poor and non-poor boys, the average difference in skinfold thickness is roughly one one-hundredth of an inch. This amounts to a difference of around 2 percent or one-tenth of a standard deviation—a minute difference detectable only with very precise measurement.

The NHANES II survey did find that poor children were roughly 1 percent, or a half-inch, shorter than non-poor children of the same age. However, the survey found no consistent evidence linking this lower height to lower levels of nutrition. The *Nutrition Monitor Update* cautions that many factors other than food consumption may contribute to the relative shortness of poor children. For example, parents' height, genetically transmitted to their offspring, is the strongest determinant of a child's height. Poor children, on average, have shorter parents than non-poor children. Emotional disturbances due to unstable family structure also tend to slow a child's growth, and family instability is also more common among poor households. Smoking by a mother during pregnancy and exposure to parental smoking in the home during childhood can be an additional cause of a child's stunted growth; both practices are more common among poor households. And low birth-weight, which is more common among poor children, has an effect on a child's height in subsequent years.

Eschewing the Fat

The most striking feature of the extensive government nutrition research on poor persons is, surprisingly, the high prevalence of obesity among poor adults. Nearly 45 percent of all poor adult women are overweight compared to 28 percent of non-poor women. The socioeconomic pattern of obesity in the United States is mirrored in all other developed nations: obesity is most common among low-income groups and declines as income rises. By contrast, in developing economies this pattern is reversed: as an individual's socioeconomic status increases, the probability of obesity increases as well. Within developing nations, economic constraints limit the food available to lower-income persons; as individuals climb the socioeconomic ladder within these developing societies the economic constraints diminish and the rate of obesity rises. But in developed societies, food is abundantly available in all income classes; obesity is controlled by a self-conscious discipline that occurs more often among higher socioeconomic groups.

Excessive weight or obesity is a serious medical problem. Obesity contributes to high blood pressure, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and some types of cancer, which can all significantly reduce life expectancy. The poor suffer from these problems disproportionately. By contrast, there is no indication among the poor of any prevalence of the medical problems caused by consistent caloric insufficiency.

TABLE 1

Average Per-Capita Consumption of Nutriments as a Percentage of Recommended Daily Allowances Children Under Age 6 in 1985

	Family Income Below 75% of Poverty Threshhold	Family Income Above 300% of Poverty Threshhold
Protein	211	213
Vitamin B-12	211	164
Thiamin	192	152
Vitamin A	186	230
Vitamin C	179	164
Riboflavin	181	182
Folacin	149	158
Niacin	138	145
Phosphorous	120	127
Vitamin B-6	113	133
Vitamin E	113	102
Magnesium	105	126
Calcium	94	99
Zinc	76	73

Source: USDA, Low Income Women 19-50 Years and Their Children 1-5 Years, 4 Days, pp. 64-65, 72-73

It is possible, of course, to be overweight and undernourished. Indeed, a common political explanation for the high prevalence of obesity among poor adults is that lack of money forces the poor to consume too many "empty calories," in products such as potato chips or Twinkies. There are two flaws to this argument. First, the "nutrient density" (nutrients per 1,000 calories) of foods eaten by the poor in general is only 4 percent lower than that in foods consumed by high-income persons. Second, nutrient intakes of poor and non-poor adults are quite similar, and there is no clinical or hematological evidence of widespread deficiencies. Deficiencies that do occur, such as calcium and iron intakes among poor women, occur to a very similar degree among higher-income women as well. In fact, there is no evidence that obese poor adults eat more calories than the average person; the more probable cause of obesity among the poor seems to be lack of adequate exercise.

There is also no evidence that poor families are forced by financial pressures to eat cheap and unhealthy foods. The USDA food consumption surveys show that poor households actually purchase foods quite efficiently, in general obtaining more protein and other nutrients per dollar of food expenditure than typical affluent households. Moreover, poor households generally do not eat more total fat or saturated fat as a share of total diet than do non-poor households. And poor households

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Among the 20 percent of poorest households today, consumption of vegetables, meat, poultry, and fish actually exceeds consumption among the general population in the mid-1950s.

actually eat slightly more complex carbohydrates—a healthy food item—than do affluent households, and less unhealthy cheap simple sugars.

As **Table 2** shows, poor persons, moreover, actually have lower levels of serum cholesterol relative to higher-income persons of the same gender, age, and race. And dangerously high levels of serum cholesterol are more common among the non-poor than the poor.

Better Than Ozzie and Harriet

Historical data show a consistent "upscaling" of the diets of low-income Americans over time. Today, among the 20 percent of households with the lowest incomes, consumption of vegetables actually exceeds consumption among the general population in the mid-1950s. Low-income Americans today consume about 20 percent more meat, poultry, and fish than did the average citizen in 1955. And current low-income consumption of meat, poultry, and fish is nearly 70 percent greater than the average per-capita consumption of these items in urban households in 1948.

Beef consumption, often considered a symbol of diets of the prosperous middle-class, has shown a similar increase. Current per-capita beef consumption among low-income households exceeds average consumption in the U.S. in 1955 by 35 percent. Most strikingly, per-capita beef consumption among the current lowest economic quintile tops beef consumption among the most affluent 5 percent of urban households in 1948 by nearly a third.

Consumption of frivolous items such as soft drinks is 100 percent greater among low-income persons today than among the general population in the mid-1950s. By contrast, inexpensive foods such as potatoes, bread, and flour are consumed by low-income individuals today at rates 25 to 50 percent below that of the general population in the 1950s.

The increasing levels of meat consumption and declining levels of grain consumption among the poor are further evidence that these households are not suffering from recurring hunger. Poor persons on average eat roughly the same amount of meat, poultry, and fish as do higher-income persons, with resulting protein intakes well above recommended levels. As noted, poor children actually consume more meat products than do higher-income children and have average protein intakes 100 percent above recommended levels.

While meat is a good source of protein, it is an extremely expensive source of calories. Calories provided through inexpensive meats still cost roughly five times as much as calories obtained from grain products. It is simply not plausible that poor families would maintain the same level of meat consumption as high-income families while suffering, as FRAC contends, from recurring empty refrigerators and empty stomachs. If so, the empty stomachs could readily be filled through a slight reduction in meat purchases and an increase in less expensive although still healthful bulk foods. Indeed, many nutritionists would argue that reducing meat and

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increasing grain consumption would actually be healthier for most Americans, rich and poor.

Land of Milk and Honey

In general, poor Americans, young and old, are well-nourished. The poor do not suffer from food shortages nor are they forced by penury to consume less healthy foods than the rest of Americans. There is no evidence of widespread hunger and undernutrition. To the contrary, the *Nutrition Monitoring Update* summary report, issued by USDA and HHS in 1989, concludes that among persons at all income levels: "The principal nutrition-related health problems experienced by Americans continue to be related to the overconsumption of some nutrients and food components, particularly food energy [*i.e.*, calories], fat, saturated fatty acids, cholesterol, [and] sodium." The report identifies five nutrition-related public health problems affecting U.S. citizens: obesity from excess calories; high serum cholesterol from excess consumption of fat, saturated fats, and cholesterol; hypertension promoted by high sodium intake; osteoporosis (loss of bone mass) from low calcium consumption; and anemia from low iron consumption. With the possible exception of iron-deficiency anemia, which is slightly more frequent among the poor, none of these health conditions can be attributed to poverty-induced undernutrition.

Moreover, even in the case of nutrient shortfalls among the poor like calcium and iron, it is unlikely that the broad expansion of food assistance programs, promoted by FRAC and other liberal organizations, would alleviate the specific nutritional problems. There are two reasons for this. First, providing food aid does not necessarily increase the amount of money a family spends on food. Research by the Congressional Budget Office has shown that if the average family is given $100 in food stamps it will decrease its cash spending on food by $43. Thus $100 in food aid results in only $57 in increased food expenditures. Second, an increase in food spending does not necessarily lead to an increase in consumption of specific nutrients because there is no guarantee the funds will be spent to buy foods that have high levels of those nutrients. This is particularly true in the case of nutrients, such as calcium, zinc, and iron, that tend to be underconsumed by both high- and low-income families.

The top nutrition-related health problem among poor Americans is not hunger and undernutrition—but obesity.

A more effective way to address potential specific vitamin or mineral deficiencies among poor persons would be to increase the levels of these nutrients provided through existing food programs. Example: calcium and iron deficiencies among poor mothers could be addressed by providing mineral supplements to these women as part of the WIC and Food Stamp programs. Potential iron or zinc deficiencies among poor children could be addressed by raising the level of these nutriments in foods provided through the WIC and School Lunch programs. Equally important, poor persons must be more effectively informed of the health hazards of obesity, and high fat and sodium consumption.

TABLE 2

Percentage of Adults with High-Risk Serum Cholesterol

	Income Below Poverty	Income Above Poverty
Males		
Age 25-34	24.7	18.9
Age 35-44	13.5	21.3
Age 45-54	13.9	21.3
Age 55-64	12.6	23.2
Age 65-74	13.4	19.0
Females		
Age 25-34	15.9	17.8
Age 35-44	12.4	13.5
Age 45-54	23.0	22.5
Age 55-64	29.3	36.3
Age 65-74	29.6	35.5

Source: USDA, Nutrition Monitoring in the United States, 1986, p. 320

Best-Nourished Generation in History

At the turn of this century, as many as 10,000 Americans died annually from pellagra, a disease caused by vitamin B deficiency. Such diseases caused by undernutrition have today all but disappeared in this country. Nutrition-related health problems in the United States today are caused by obesity and consumption of unhealthy foods, not by food shortages.

The current generation of American children—even poor children—is undoubtedly among the best nourished in human history. Yet poor children do face devastating problems: escalating crime, disintegrating families, communities where the positive role models of working adults are often missing, and government schools that can no longer physically protect let alone educate them. But chronic hunger and widespread undernutrition are not problems for poor children. Perhaps the most regrettable consequence of FRAC's bogus hunger survey is that it distracts public attention from the overwhelming real problems facing poor children, problems desperately in need of creative solutions.

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The Russians Are Coming

Millions of Soviet Refugees Will Be Fleeing to the West

Leon Aron

The largest-ever peacetime migration of ethnic Russians to the West has begun, and is likely to accelerate as a result of the democratic revolution that followed the unsuccessful hard-line Communist coup. The scale of the exodus may surpass even the emigration of 1918–1920, when, in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, nearly two million Russians left their motherland. West European specialists on migration estimate that as many as seven million will flee the Soviet Union within the next two years. Polls from within the USSR indicate that from as few as two million to as many as 11 million may emigrate from the Russian Republic alone.

The Russians are fleeing the Soviet Union for a variety of reasons: poverty, economic collapse, the disastrous state of the public health care system, and the severe shortage of housing. Another important factor is the collapse of the Soviet domestic empire and the forced repatriation of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians from such outlying non-Russian ethnic republics as Azerbaijan, Tadzhikistan, and Uzbekistan. Some 60 million Soviet citizens, including 26 million Russians, live in republics dominated by another nationality. And with the dizzying breakup of the Soviet Union, they are finding themselves in newly created independent states that they consider foreign.

For many Russians, heading West may be a matter of survival. And if the Soviet government upholds a recently enacted law that gives the right to emigrate and travel freely beginning January 1, 1993, many will indeed go West.

Eastern and Western Europe will be the first stop for the Russian exodus, but the United States is the country of choice for many prospective Russian immigrants. Attracted, like the rest of the world, by the American dream of dignity and prosperity, millions of Russian emigrants will try desperately to get to America—legally or illegally.

The United States must prepare itself for the incoming wave of refugees. Europe alone will be unable to cope with the Russian exodus; the United States, with its vast land mass and economic resources, will have to handle the overflow. No other country is capable of accommodating several hundred thousand refugees. Moreover, Soviet freedom to emigrate has come about largely through U.S. pressure; in some ways we have a moral responsibility to welcome the refugees. To achieve greater efficiency and lessen human suffering, the U.S. should make plans now to cope with this flood.

Food Shortages

Several factors push Russians to emigrate. One is the low standard of living. The Soviet Union's personal consumption is ranked 77th in the world, and its people are among the poorest in the industrial world. Compared with the average American, for example, the Soviet citizen has to work 10 to 12 times longer to buy meat, 18 to 20 times longer to buy poultry, three times longer for milk, seven times longer for butter, 10 to 15 times longer for eggs, and two to eight times longer to buy bread.

More than 100 million Soviet citizens, or about one out of three people, have less living space than the meager Soviet "sanitary minimum" of nine square meters, or 97 square feet, per person. (By contrast, the households classified as "poor" by the U.S. government have 405 square feet per person.) The lack of prospects for improvement and the ability to travel more freely make the urge to emigrate stronger still. As more and more Soviets visit the West, the affluence they see tempts many of them to leave.

The economic collapse, which Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has expedited and sharpened through half-hearted and inconsistent economic reforms, aggravates the already miserable standards of living. The economic interregnum, in which the stick of the command economy is already gone, but the carrot of the market has not yet materialized, has produced only further impoverishment, including shortages of food and galloping inflation. For example, the food prices in the farmers' markets in September 1990 grew by 34 percent over the previous year. This past January, a pound of beef cost approximately 15 rubles at farmers' markets in St. Petersburg—almost one-tenth of the

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average Soviet monthly salary of 200 rubles a month. Even such staples as eggs, butter, milk, and cooking oil are either not available at all or can be purchased only after several hours of standing in line.

The situation is especially bad in Russia. While food shortages have plagued the Russian heartland for six decades, now the shortage has spread to such showcase cities as Moscow and St. Petersburg. The latter introduced food rationing in December 1990, restricting each person's monthly allotment to 3.3 pounds of meat, 2.2 pounds of sausage, 2.2 pounds of cereals and pasta, 1.1 pounds of butter, and 10 eggs. Moscow introduced rationing at about the same time, including the sale of vodka. According to Stephen Miller at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 1991 brought hints of proposed new rations for Moscow that were below the levels allocated in 1942, when Hitler's army was deep inside Soviet territory and the system was stretched to its limit.

Bloodshed in Central Asia

While poverty and a free-falling economy provide a backdrop for the emigration from the Soviet Union, the decisive factor pushing Russians to leave for the West is the likely dissolution of the Soviet internal empire.

According to the latest Soviet census, taken in January 1989, 25.7 million ethnic Russians live outside Russia. There they increasingly feel like unwelcome foreigners. This is especially true of the 9.7 million ethnic Russians in the Central Asian Moslem republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan, and the 475,000 Russians in Azerbaijan. In the past decade, 1.6 million more people left the Soviet Central Asian republics than moved in. Apart from several hundred thousand ethnic Germans in Kazakhstan who went to West Germany, most of those who left were ethnic Russians and Ukrainians.

Following the Central Asian republics' passage of a number of legislative measures since 1989 to increase their political, economic, and cultural independence from Moscow, the outflow of ethnic Russians has increased sharply. For example, anticipating a law making Farsi the state language of Tadzhikistan, more than 10,000 Russians moved out of that republic to Russia in the first half of 1989.

Millions of Russian emigrants will try desperately to get to America—legally or illegally.

Ethnic violence also contributes to the migration. Riots in January 1990 in Baku, the Azerbaijan capital, and in Dushanbe, the Tadzhikistan capital, a month later, swelled the flow of Russians from Central Asia to Russia. Russian speakers were reported "besieging" the employment office in Dushanbe demanding jobs in Russia after the February riots. A special society called "Migration" was established in Dushanbe to help Russians leave. Russian Parliament Deputy Ilya Konstantinov disclosed last year that the parliament was swamped by letters from ethnic Russians "requesting help in moving to [the Russian Republic] and finding work there." Following the 1989 and 1990 bloody riots in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, 80,000 ethnic Russians were reported to have left Uzbekistan for Russia by the fall of 1990. So many Russians tried to leave that the waiting list for railroad containers, in which household effects are shipped, was reported to be "many months" long.

The Russian expatriates are right to be frightened. In Dushanbe, for example, rioters demanded the expulsion of all non-Moslems from Tadzhikistan. "The local authorities 'forgot' about the Russians and threw us to the wolves. There was a veritable hunt for...the Russians," wrote an eyewitness of the Dushanbe riot. A Russian who had lived in Dushanbe for 30 years wrote in a local newspaper: "We are reminded: you are in a foreign country, and from now on this factor is going to determine your existence here."

Conflict among ethnic groups in Central Asia is certainly nothing new. In the Osh region in Kirghizia, for example, a protest by Uzbeks against housing for Kirghiz in a predominantly Uzbek area resulted in at least 186 dead. A rumor that Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan were receiving priority in obtaining apartments in Dushanbe caused a clash among workers, students, and the unemployed. Twenty-two were killed and 568 were injured. There has been at least one reported case of angry mobs of nationalists attacking and burning ethnic Russians.

The Kazakh Tide

In March 1990 then-Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated the total number of internal Soviet refugees to be 500,000. This included Russians from the non-Rus-

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sian republics and Armenians who had fled Azerbaijan. Two months later, Chairman of the Coordinating Committee for Refugees of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Peter Rudev reported 600,000 *bezhentzy*, or refugees. People's Deputy of the USSR Galina Starovoitova said last November that there were over one million domestic refugees in the Soviet Union.

The flow of internal Russian refugees could swell to mammoth proportions in the coming months. For example, 38 percent of the Russians polled in the Ukraine last fall were against the republic's secession from the Soviet Union. This means that of the 11.3 million ethnic Russians in the Ukraine, 4.3 million may choose to leave the Ukraine and return to Russia if the Ukraine becomes independent.

Anti-Russian feelings in the Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan, meantime, have intensified so much that ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan now talk about the "Solzhenitsyn solution." It is so called because last year, the exiled Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn suggested in an essay entitled "How Should We Make Russia Livable?" to split the territory of the republic into two separate entities: Russian North and Kazakh South. If the 1947 division of formerly British India into Hindu India and Moslem Pakistan, during which millions were forced to flee their homes, is any lesson, Russia should expect at least a few million refugees out of Kazakhstan's six million ethnic Russians.

No Room for Internal Refugees

On the verge of economic collapse, plagued by unemployment, poverty, and shortages of everything, Russia is utterly incapable of accommodating the hundreds of thousands of refugees pouring in from Central Asia.

The exodus is likely to accelerate as a result of August's democratic revolution.

By far most difficult is the problem of housing. In Moscow, where many of the refugees come seeking food and shelter, the housing waiting list already contains 344,800 families. These families account for 12 percent of the Soviet capital's population. The Moscow city council is preparing to ration food and clothing.

Today a refugee arriving in Russia is given a one-time assistance of 100 rubles in cash and 200 rubles' worth of clothes and footwear. With state stores empty, a carton of ten eggs in the market now costing 12 rubles, a pound of meat 15 rubles, and winter boots 600 to 800 rubles, it is no wonder that a year ago *Pravda* called the refugee assistance "puny."

Refugees are left to sleep in government offices or sent to live in children's summer camps, which lack heat, hot water, and often indoor plumbing. The Ministry of Defense has placed in the barracks the families of soldiers and officers evacuated from such dangerous places as Baku. There were already 35,420 families living in barracks in early 1990.

The notorious Soviet red tape makes the refugees' lot harder still: over 60 local and all-Union ministries are responsible for helping refugees. A law on refugees has been discussed in the Soviet parliament since January 1990, yet still has not been passed. Laments the popular weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta*: "Our poverty-stricken state has gone to pieces and is incapable of fulfilling its obligations to its own citizens."

The last straw prompting the displaced ethnic Russians to leave the Soviet Union may be psychological: the bitter feeling that they are not welcome in Russia. As one Russian refugee who had fled ethnic riots in Baku told the *New York Times* in March this year: "They always yelled at us [in Azerbaijan], 'why don't you go back to your Russia,' though we were born there, and our fathers were born there. When we came to 'our' Russia, everybody says, 'We don't need refugees; go back to where you came from; we can't help you.' I'm afraid to say I'm a refugee, honest to God." A Russian from Central Asia said, "In Tadzhikistan we are foreigners but in Russia we are not needed."

An All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion poll taken a year ago in Moscow found that only 21 percent of the respondents thought that refugees are entitled to special assistance from the state. The Muscovites expressed fear that the refugees will deplete the Soviet capital's already dwindling resources, especially housing and food. The pro-reform *Moscow News* sadly commented on the situation: "A state which is reluctant to bear any responsibility for those who have become refugees in their own country...is naturally bound to lose its people."

The Russian republic recently passed legislation to provide assistance to refugees in and around Moscow who fled from outlying republics. But given the severe shortage of housing, it is clear that the Russian republic will be all but helpless to help most of its internal refugees.

Free to Go, But Where?

Fortunately, the state has made it legal for these refugees to leave for a better life elsewhere. In May 1991, the Supreme Soviet, after two years' discussion, passed by a vote of 320 to 37 the "freedom-of-movement" bill. The measure, which is not to take full effect until January 1, 1993, sets specific time limits for issuing passports and gives strict guidelines for refusing permission. The "Law on Exit and Entry of the USSR Citizens" gives every Soviet citizen the right to a foreign passport valid for five years for travel anywhere in the world for any reason. Only the narrowly defined "risks to national security," such as work on classified government projects, may delay emigration. (And even in those case, the government's decision may be appealed in courts.)

Concerns about a mass exodus of the "best and the brightest" had initially held up passage of the measure. Soviet opponents of the bill argued that passage would

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lead to the departure of as many as eight million within the first year. Supporters of the bill said such claims were greatly exaggerated, put the number at about 500,000 emigrants a year, and stressed the need for the bill from a human-rights perspective and as a provision for gaining most-favored-nation (MFN) status from the United States.

If present application rates are any indicator, supporters of the freedom-of-movement bill may have greatly underestimated the number of potential emigrants. According to *Moscow News*, 500,000 Soviet citizens applied for exit visas in the first six months of 1990, but only 203,000, or 41 percent, were allowed to leave because Soviet law at that time recognized "family reunification" as the only legal basis for emigration. The *New York Times* estimates that the number of emigration permissions reached 400,000 by the end of 1990. Under the present rate of rejection of 59 percent, this means that a total of one million Soviets applied to emigrate in 1990. The overwhelming majority of the 400,000 allowed to leave were Jews, Germans, and Armenians; the rest of the applicants, over 600,000, were ethnic Russians.

Then-Chairman of the Soviet State Labor Committee Vladimir Shcherbakov estimated last November that up to three million Soviet citizens would search for work in the West this year. Much higher is the estimate given a year ago in a broadcast of the "Television News Service," a Moscow television program, which projects that there will be eight million emigrants in the year following the passage of the Law on Emigration.

First Stop Europe

The inevitable exodus of ethnic Russians from the Soviet Union poses a serious moral and political dilemma for the West. Western democracies are unwilling to use force to prevent illegal immigration. As a December 1990 *International Herald Tribune* article reports, "People claiming to be refugees almost never get sent back because governments cannot face the outcry in the media and sympathy in the public, so what can you expect when Soviets turn up, partly as a result of Western pressure on Moscow to let Soviets travel?" Indeed, with full European economic integration only one year away, replacing the Soviet-made barbed wire fences with those of Western making is something the West European governments are loath to do.

The experience of Germany proves the futility of police measures. Excluding ethnic Germans, who repatriated legally, almost 200,000 immigrants from Eastern Europe came to Germany to seek asylum in 1990. So far only 5,000—mostly Jews—are from the Soviet Union, with 10,000 more reported awaiting approval of their visa applications at the German embassy in Moscow. This number undoubtedly will grow several-fold overnight once everyone—not just Jews, Armenians, and ethnic Germans—can leave the Soviet Union permanently.

Germany once could have easily absorbed many of the incoming refugees. But reunification has proved costlier than first thought. In order to pay the skyrocketing bills, Germany raised its income taxes by 7.5 percent; the average German now pays nearly 45 percent of his annual income in taxes, and in eastern Germany, more than one in three workers is unemployed.



AP/Wide World Photos

Homeless refugees from Azerbaijan. Almost 26 million Russians live in Soviet republics outside Russia. They increasingly feel like unwelcome foreigners.

Germany is not the only nation likely to see a massive influx of ethnic Russian refugees. Trying to circumvent legal immigration procedures, refugees will travel to the West by trains, buses, and cars through the Eastern European states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The latter shares a 540-mile border with the Soviet Union and is for this reason especially attractive to Russian emigrants. *Izvestiya* reported in April that in the first two months of 1991 alone, of the 517,000 Soviet "tourists" to visit Poland, 40,000 did not return. Most of them stayed behind to work in the underground economy as manual laborers, at wages between $40 and $150 a month, which in real terms is four to 15 times the average Soviet wage. Preparing for a massive flow of immigrants, the head of Poland's Office of Refugees, Colonel Zbigniew Skoczylas, said last December: "We are making arrangements for this as though it were a second Bolshevik Revolution. We expect the Russians to come marching barefoot across the snow...as they did in 1917."

Such fears led ministers from 24 member states of the Council of Europe to gather in Vienna last January to discuss migration from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Austria has already deployed 4,000 soldiers

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Russia's best and brightest, like dancer Mikhail Baryshnikov, can make a substantial contribution to America if given the chance.

along its borders with Czechoslovakia and Hungary to control the wave of immigrants from the East.

America's Moral Responsibility

While the first waves of the great Russian migration will burst upon Western Europe, they will soon reach American shores. The infatuation with America and things American that permeates Soviet society assures that the United States will be many Russian immigrants' country of choice. If Russians cannot gain permanent residence legally, they will resort to the same ruses that would-be Americans from all over the world have practiced for decades: illegally overstaying tourist visas or student visas, creating fictitious relatives and spouses to obtain residency permits, and even crossing over into the United States from Mexico and Canada, as did the Poles in the 1980s. The numbers of Poles overstaying their visas has grown so large that the U.S. Department of State will no longer give visas to Polish males aged 20 to 40.

The exodus to the United States already has begun. Soviet citizens have picked up so many emigration forms from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that they have become scarce. Enterprising black-marketeers now photocopy the forms and sell them for a handsome price. As of June 1991, the Washington Processing Center in Rosslyn, Virginia, established specifically for the purpose of processing immigration applications from the Soviet Union, had 404,000 applications for emigration from Soviet families. This represents approximately 600,000 men, women, and children.

For years the United States demanded freedom of emigration from the Soviet Union. The 1975 Jackson–Vanik Amendment, for example, denies the Soviet Union MFN trade status until it liberalizes its immigration policy. Now that free emigration from the Soviet Union will soon become a reality, the U.S. should take concrete measures that would help Russian immigrants to settle in the United States.

First, Washington could work to develop a joint U.S.–West European immigration strategy. While the Russian emigrants' country of choice may be America, it is Western Europe that will bear the initial brunt of the exodus because of its proximity to the Soviet Union. If denied entry to the United States, most emigrating Russians would try to settle, legally or illegally, in Western Europe. It would serve West European interests to coordinate their immigration policies with the United States.

This could be done by cost-sharing. Until now, the United States alone provided financial support for former Soviet citizens who left the Soviet Union and waited for their U.S. visas in Vienna and in Rome. The average cost of providing food, housing, and transportation to the United States is $2,600. In the coming months the number of Russian emigrants in Western Europe may increase dramatically and most of them will want to come to the United States. If the U.S. decides to accept them, the West European governments should help by financially supporting the Russians while they wait for entry to America. The West European financial assistance could pay for food, housing, and a plane ticket to the United States. Since Germany is likely to have more illegal Russian emigrants on its territory than any other country of Western Europe, the German government's contribution to the resettlement of the Russians in the United States should be the largest.

Open the Gates

Congress could help alleviate a Russian emigration crisis through the creation of a special immigration category for such countries as the Soviet Union that have restricted emigration. As it stands now, there is a backlog of applications. Soviet Jews have filled so many of the allotted slots for refugees from the Soviet Union that there is at least a five-year waiting period before a non-Jewish Russian can schedule his first U.S. immigration interview.

With the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress raised the total number of immigrants allowed to settle in the United States from 270,000 a year to 700,000 for 1992–1994 and 675,000 from 1995 onward. Yet would-be Russian immigrants are not likely to benefit from this increase because 70 percent of the new immigration quota is allocated to those with family members in America, and another 20 percent for those with rare labor skills. Few prospective Russian emigrants have either relatives in this country or skills that would qualify them for the entry.

Representative William O. Lipinski, the Illinois Democrat, introduced a House bill in January 1990 to allot 200,000 immigration visas per year for five years to "prospective immigrants from countries that, since World War II, have traditionally denied freedom of emigration." These immigration visas would not reduce the number of immigrants from other countries, but would be given in addition to the normal number of immigrants permitted to settle in the United States.

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Although the bill died in the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, the Immigration Act of 1990 did establish the so-called diversity immigration category. Created to "diversify" the immigrant population in terms of the country of origin, this category gives preference in immigration permits to citizens of countries from where no more than 10,000 people a year come to the United States. There may be different reasons for the small number of immigrants from a particular country to the U.S., but in most cases it is due to a country's restrictive emigration policies. As a result, citizens of those countries have little or no family ties to the United States, which disqualifies them as immigrants. The "diversity" program was designed to correct the situation. However, the total number of immigrants that could enter the U.S. with "diversity" visas is very small: 40,000 for 1992–1994 and 55,000 from 1995 onward.

To assure an orderly and legal entry of Russian immigrants, Congress needs to use the "diversity" precedent and create a special immigration category. It could be what the Refugee Policy Group, a Washington-based, nonprofit private organization, calls "humanitarian immigrants." Eligible for this category would be citizens of nations, such as Russia, that for decades prevented their citizens from immigrating to the United States. Within a designated nation, additional qualifying factors may include hardship due to the loss of livelihood and shelter, as is the case with Russian repatriates driven from the national republics.

Not a Burden

If the experience of 15 years is any indicator, it is unlikely that the new wave of Russian emigrants will be a long-term burden on the United States. Refugees from the Soviet Union adjust extremely well to life in the United States. One of the indicators of their success is the high rate of eligibility for permanent residence, which the Immigration and Naturalization Service determines. Of the former Soviet citizens who entered the U.S. in 1987–1988, the INS judged 95 percent to be eligible for permanent residence in 1989. This is the highest proportion of permanent residents of any major refugee group.

Another indicator of rapid adjustment is economic success. Here, too, former Soviet citizens did very well. According to a 1989 survey, two-thirds of adult Soviet refugees were working within a year after their arrival in the United States. The median household income of

For years the United States demanded freedom of emigration from the Soviet Union. Now it has a moral responsibility to take the refugees.

Soviet refugees who arrived between 1977 and 1981 was $34,000 in 1988. This means that half of all families surveyed earned that much money or more. (By comparison, the 1988 U.S. median household income was $29,000.) Thus half of all refugee families from the USSR generate at least $7,750 a year in direct federal taxes.

Most of those surveyed were ethnic Jews. But these Soviet Jews are highly assimilated and much like well-educated and skilled urban Russians—precisely the category that would be the first to leave outlying republics for the United States. Leading the Russian exodus from Uzbekistan in 1990 were 30,000 college graduates between 22 and 30 years of age.

Opening the door to Russian immigrants, driven from their land by political upheaval, poverty, ethnic strife, and lack of economic opportunity, means continuing the American tradition of letting people from all over the world partake in the American dream. If given a haven in the United States, the Russians will enrich America with the same resourcefulness and hard work as other refugee ethnic groups. They will take jobs that Americans will not take, create new jobs, provide new or better services, and pay hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes. Perhaps even more important, they will make America richer with gratitude and the love of freedom. ☎

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PILGRIMS' PROGRESS

America's Tradition of Conservative Reform

GEORGE H. NASH

As the unifying and invigorating struggles of the 1980s recede from consciousness, disturbing signs of sectarianism have begun to afflict the conservative movement. One thinks of the increasingly feisty "exchanges of views" among certain neo- and paleoconservatives. One thinks of the well-publicized differences among leading conservative commentators over the Gulf War and the objectives of American foreign policy. Even as the overall infrastructure grows, generating a neverending flow of conferences and policy studies, one wonders at times whether we are witnessing a laudable division of labor in the mold of Adam Smith or a subtle process of parallel fragmentation. Each ideological tendency in the movement now has its own network of scholars, foundations, think tanks, and periodicals. But few conservative institutions, it seems, embrace and attempt to unite these sometimes fractious components of the Grand Alliance. No wonder that more than one observer has openly suggested that conservatism's moment of glory has passed.

During the first decades after World War II, the emerging intellectuals of the American Right were repeatedly obliged to establish their historical legitimacy—to demonstrate that the American heritage they presumed to defend was authentically conservative. During the 1970s and 1980s, this preoccupation with the past gradually subsided. As conservatives came to influence public discourse, they found it less and less necessary to validate their claim to be indigenous. Whatever their roots or lineage, they were, undeniably, achieving results in the intellectual and political marketplace. Their very success was proof enough that they "belonged."

Now, however, the wheel of good fortune seems to be stalling, as the battles over Judges Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas make clear. For what the judges' opponents are really asserting is that Bork, Thomas, and by implication the entire conservative intellectual movement are marginal, eccentric, and dangerous—not part of the mainstream at all. To the opponents of these nominations, the American political tradition evidently consists of only two legitimate forces: "progressive" liberalism, entrenched in the courts and elsewhere since 1933, and the "pragmatic" accommodating Center, willing to ratify liberalism's victories with the doctrine of *stare decisis*. Aware that he who controls the past controls the future, the cultural commissars of "political correctness" now seem intent on constructing an image of the past that equates conservatism, and American civilization itself, with racism and oppression. If they succeed, tomorrow will be theirs.

For all these reasons, it seems appropriate to reexamine the American experience and contemporary conservatism's relationship to it. More particularly, I wish to identify some of the core values of our past—values that American conservatism ought to stand for. Perhaps by stepping back from the current tumult and reflecting anew upon what America has meant, today's conservatives can regain both perspective and purpose.

First New Nation

From the days of the Puritans to the age of Ronald Reagan, a sense of uniqueness and of destiny has infused the American character. On board the ship *Arbella* as it sailed for New England in 1630, John Winthrop admonished his Puritan brethren: "...we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us." A century and a half later, Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, a Frenchman who had settled in New York, pronounced in a classic little book a famous question: "What then is the American, this new man?" And he prophesied: "Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world."

On the back of our one-dollar bill is a replica of the Great Seal of the United States. One side of the seal features a majestic bald eagle holding arrows and an olive branch in its talons. The reverse side of the seal, however, is less familiar—and, I think, more revealing. It shows a pyramid—an unfinished pyramid—with the date 1776

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If the old modernity is not to succumb to the relativism and anti-religious nihilism of the new, it will have to draw on transcendent, pre-modern sources—on religious faith—to infuse our lives with meaning.

engraved in Roman numerals on its base. Below the pyramid is a motto: *Novus Ordo Seclorum*—"A New Order of the Ages."

Adopted by the Continental Congress in 1782, the Great Seal of the United States symbolized America's self-image as it embarked upon nationhood. America, the seal suggested, was not simply another nation-state; it represented something novel in history. Moreover, it portended the future—"a new order of the ages," a break with the past. The Old World, with its kings, oligarchies, and regimes of oppression, was to be left behind forever. Now, in a vast and nearly empty land, there would be constructed a republic "conceived in liberty," as Lincoln later put, and dedicated to a proposition, a creed, a set of truths held to be self-evident. America was to be a polity created by conscious design, an unprecedented experiment in self-government on a continental scale.

From its inception in 1776, the American republic has been identified with the hopes and future of mankind. The United States, to borrow a phrase from Seymour Martin Lipset, was "the first new nation," and Americans and Europeans alike have probed the implications of this event. Said Alexis de Tocqueville in *Democracy in America* in the 1830s: "I confess that in America I saw more than America; I sought there the image of democracy itself...." For Tocqueville, as for so many observers, America exemplified the contours of the future.

In other ways than the political, America has long been perceived as an untraditional society. To millions upon millions of immigrants through decade after decade of our history, America has been a land of opportunity, a refuge from the constricted, decadent, stratified, class-bound, traditional societies of Europe. Is it surprising that during our Civil War the British aristocracy was sympathetic to the "feudal" South, while the British working class favored the more "modern" North? America has beckoned precisely because it appeared to be different from the Old World.

Stupendous Social Energy

What has America promised? It has promised freedom: free land, upward mobility, equality of opportunity, a chance to start over. It has been a land of stupendous social energy, a land wherein has flourished, as in no other society before or since, the social type known as the self-made man. Benjamin Franklin is said to have remarked that America is a country where we ask of a person not "Who is he?" but "What can he do?" In our commitment to a society based on individual merit and equality of opportunity, we Americans have adopted two of the core values of modernity.

Still another way in which America has exhibited its

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The Great Seal of the United States symbolizes America's self-image as a "new order of the ages."

modernity is in its dedication as a society to progress—or, to use a better word, to "improvement." Implanted deep in the American psyche is a conviction that social conditions around us do not have to be that way—that if evils exist we can eradicate them, that if, for example, corrupt politicians hold office we can throw the rascals out, that we are the masters of our fate and the captains of our souls. Passivity and fatalism are not a part of our national character. If we encounter obstacles that seem insuperable, our creed tells us that we can move on. This is one reason, I suspect, why California and more recently Alaska have held so much allure for the American imagination: they are states where, all else failing, we can go and start over. We are a restless people; half of us change residences every five years. Has there ever been a society as mobile, as kinetic, as our own?

Impulse for Improvement

This relentless American impulse for improvement—of society and of oneself—has taken the most various forms. Think of the extraordinary edifice of higher education that Americans in two centuries have established: from small liberal colleges to behemoth universities. Think of the assumptions about human nature behind this commitment, and think also about its expansiveness: Americans increasingly seek education not just for a privileged elite but for ever broader segments of the population. A far higher percentage of Americans attends college than in any other country in the world. And consider this: has there ever been a society as incessantly productive of reform movements as our own? I refer not only to such preeminent crusades as those for emancipation of the slaves, universal suffrage, and regulation of the trusts, but also of such causes as temperance, prison reform, aid to the Indians, the creation of orphanages, abolition of child labor, even the health food movement. "What is man born for but to be a Reformer...?" wrote that enormously popular American philosopher, Ralph Waldo Emerson. We are, I repeat, a restless people, and many of us believe that even our inner selves can be re-formed. It is a remarkable, and remarkably modern, notion.

Let me offer another example. As a nation Americans have long been enamored of entrepreneurship, invention, and technology. From Eli Whitney to Thomas Edison, from Henry Ford to Charles Lindbergh, from the Wright brothers to the astronauts, from the automobile to the home computer and VCR: no other society has honored science—above all, applied science—as lavishly as has ours. I do not know how many inventions have been patented in the United States in the past hundred years, but I would not be surprised if the total exceeded that of all other industrial nations combined.

The American Dream

This interest in technology, in gadgetry, and in shaping and reshaping our environment reflects another aspect of the American temperament. We Americans like to think of ourselves as an optimistic, problem-solving people. During the election campaign of 1980, Ronald Reagan repeatedly denounced the drab, defeatist notion that America's challenges were insuperable, that our expectations must be lowered forever, that the "era of limits" had arrived. It was a theme that was persuasive to millions. In his inaugural address, Reagan declared:

> The crisis we are facing today [requires] our willingness to believe in ourselves and to believe in our capacity to perform great deeds; to believe that together with God's help we can and will resolve the problems which now confront us.
>
> And after all, why shouldn't we believe that? We are Americans.

Surely it is significant that in our discourse we speak of something called the American Dream. No one ever talks about the British Dream, the Russian Dream, or the Japanese Dream. But the American Dream—that is something else. Instinctively, we comprehend what it means: it means opportunity—opportunity to achieve, to ascend the ladder, to transcend our origins, however humble. We sense that this is distinctively an American dream, that it is inextricably interwoven with our self-definition as a people. We sense further that ours is a land where dreams, often enough, find fulfillment, and that our society is unusual because of it.

Tom Paine and Herbert Hoover

This belief in American uniqueness and destiny, then—of America as a trailblazing society—has been deeply embedded in our historical consciousness. It is not the sole property of the Left. Consider this quotation:

> It was not because it was proposed to establish a nation, but because it was proposed to establish a nation *on new principles*, that July 4, 1776, has come to be regarded as one of the greatest days in history. [emphasis added]

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Who said this? Tom Paine? William O. Douglas? No; it was Calvin Coolidge in 1926. Now consider these words:

> By a classless America our forefathers meant far more than a sociological expression. There were to be no stratifications in life that handicapped the rise of any boy from the bottom to the top. The human particles should move freely in the social solution....This idea of a fluid classless society was unique in the world. It was the point at which our social structure departed from all others.

Who wrote this paean to a classless America? Hubert Humphrey? Eugene Debs? Jane Fonda? No: it was Herbert Hoover in 1940.

Or consider the following poem, written many years ago and delivered, significantly enough, at the Republican national convention in 1980:

> 'Tis great to see the old world and
> wander up and down
> Among historic palaces and
> the cities of renown
> And admire crumbly castles,
> and the statues of the kings,
> But now I think I've had enough
> of antiquated things,
> So now it's home again and home again—
> America for me.
>
> My heart is turning home again and
> there I long to be,
> In the land of *youth* and *freedom*
> beyond the ocean bars
> Where the air is full of sunlight and
> that flag is full of stars.
> . . . . . .
> I know that Europe's wonderful,
> yet something seems to lack,
> The *past* is too much with her,
> the people looking *back.*
> But the glory of the present
> is *to set the future free.*
> We love our land for what she is and
> *what she is to be.*
> So it's home again and home again—
> America for me. [emphasis added]

America is different: it represents youth, freedom, energy, a better future: this is a vision that has been central to our national identity.

Europe: The Burden of History

Several years ago, I participated in a conference of German and American conservatives held in Bad Godesberg, West Germany. The subject was the "Reagan Revolution" and its implications for the Atlantic alliance. I was fascinated, during those four days, by the differences in outlook and temperament between the American delegation and its European hosts. The Americans tended to be ebullient and practical, filled with specific suggestions for getting things done. Do we want to advance the cause of conservatism? Then, the Americans would say, let us organize: set up conferences, establish think tanks, found journals and newspapers, work from the grass roots. The Germans, in contrast, seemed much less "activist," more constrained by a sense of limitation, and elitist rather than populist in their approach to institutions and mechanisms of social change.

Above all, I was struck by the differences in attitudes toward history among the conferees. For most Americans at the meeting, history seemed to begin with the Carter administration, and when answering questions, Americans focused quickly on the present. When the Germans answered questions, their remarks might begin with learned references to the revolution of 1848 and work down gradually (sometimes very gradually) toward the present. For the Americans, the past was prologue; for the Germans, it was a weight. As one German intellectual said to me during the conference, "Our [German] history is a burden and a curse." I returned home with a deeper appreciation of the distinctiveness of the American experience.

Perhaps by now you discern the point I am making. If, as the social scientists tell us, the process of modernization entails social mobility, economic freedom, and

Has there ever been a society as incessantly productive of reform movements as our own?

the breakdown of class barriers; if it means equality of opportunity, increased popular participation in politics, and equal justice under the law; if it means a social order that is not static and hierarchical but dynamic and future-oriented; if it means technological innovation and a spirit of improvement, then America for 200 years—at least in its own self-understanding—has been a modernizing, not a traditional, society.

Eloquent Dissenters

There have been dissenters from these trends, to be sure, and sometimes the dissenters have been eloquent. In his bicentennial history of Illinois, Professor Richard Jensen has even reinterpreted American history as in substantial measure a conflict between "modernizers" and "traditionalists." Mark Twain, for instance, scorned the American penchant for uplift. "To do good is noble," Twain observed. "To instruct others in doing good is just as noble and much easier." Among 20th-century American critics of the modernizing ethos, one thinks above all of Albert Jay Nock, H. L. Mencken, and the Southern Agrarians who published *I'll Take My Stand* in 1930: "superfluous men," Robert Crunden has called them, brilliant men, but men whose dissent only underscored the prevailing orthodoxy of their time. Most

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

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Thomas Edison in his laboratory. No other society has honored entrepreneurship, invention, and technology as much as ours.

Americans—at least most Americans who got things done in this society—saw themselves as creators of a modern, progressive civilization. The quintessential American, a British visitor shrewdly remarked in 1898, is "a highly electric Anglo-Saxon." Until well into the 20th century, America was predominantly, in more than one sense of the term, a Yankee nation.

Now I am generalizing broadly, of course. And you will note that I am dealing with perceptions and ideals. But the "most potent force in society," Herbert Hoover once reminded us, "is ideals." From the late 18th century to the early 20th, the dominant American ideal has been (to use a current term) "democratic capitalism." And in the long perspective of Western history, democratic capitalism has been a virtual synonym for modernization.

We must now examine an unsettling paradox. Today, over much of the earth, the ideals of the American experiment—political equality and participation, entrepreneurial freedom and economic growth, social fluidity and equality of opportunity—enjoy immense prestige, as the suicide of Communism accelerates. And yet these same ideals are also mocked and despised, and nowhere with more intensity than in certain enclaves in America itself.

Defection of the Intellectuals

The profound defection of many of the West's most distinguished intellectuals from the American ethos of democratic capitalism is one of the most stunning and disturbing features of our time. It is a phenomenon that has many roots—far more than I can analyze here. But clearly it is linked to the rise, within the last century or so, of a new conception of modernity. Unlike the modernizing principles to which I have referred earlier, this "new modernity" (as I shall call it) has not been primarily political or economic in its orientation. It has been, at bottom, literary, aesthetic, and, in a way, spiritual. The pioneers of this consciousness are familiar enough to us all: names like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Sartre; Ibsen, Gide, and Baudelaire; Pound, Picasso, and the early Albert Camus. Again, I must generalize and simplify, but few will deny that at the heart of this new modernity was a sense of relativism, negation, and despair. Where the "old modernity" asserted that certain truths were self-evident, the new modernity denied that universal truths exist. Where the old modernity was bourgeois, the new modernity was bohemian, contemptuous of bourgeois culture. Where the old modernity tended to be optimistic (after all, would not tomorrow be better than today?), the new modernity was not. Where the old modernity tended to be rationalistic, the new modernity explored the irrational and the absurd. Where the old modernity offered liberation from external constraints—from the barriers of class, race, national origin, and arbitrary government—the new modernity preached liberation from inner constraints—from traditional morality, from artistic convention, from rationality itself. Where the old modernity concentrated on getting ahead in the world and was relatively indifferent to questions of ultimate meaning, the new modernity was haunted by the conviction that life has no ultimate meaning, that God (as Nietzsche put it) is dead.

There is little doubt that this "new modernity" or modernism, as some have labeled it, has penetrated very deeply into our civilization. How is it that this counterculture has become so pervasive? Writing more than 20 years ago, Jeffrey Hart offered one answer:

> During the past [generation] there has occurred a sort of cultural explosion: paperbacks, Eliot reading his poems to 50,000 students in a Midwestern football stadium, LP records,... Mailer and Genet and de Sade appearing in mass circulation journals, the op-art and pop-art and porno phenomena.
>
> All of these things, along with affluence, the GI Bill and the assumption, implicit in democratic theory and increasingly the premise of government action, that absolutely everyone must go to college, have now given rise to a vast student proletariat. Twenty-five years ago, about 10 percent of the college-age population attended college; today the percentage approaches 50 and it will continue to climb. Much of this proletariat absorbs the attitudes of the adversary culture....

Clash of Modernities

Looking back at my own education, I can attest to the acuity of Professor Hart's remark. Attending college in the 1960s, I was exposed to books like Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd* and Norman O. Brown's *Life Against Death*, to plays like *Waiting for Godot* and the *Marat/Sade*. Teaching at Harvard in the early 1970s, I had a student tell me one day that all values are without rational foundation, that one can only choose arbitrarily among them. This was pure existentialism, of course, but where had he acquired such ideas?

And as the "new modernity" has percolated down through our culture, the values of the "old modernity" have come increasingly to seem old-fashioned. Listen to the voices that dominate our public discourse. Listen carefully the next time someone uses the term "Protes-

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tant ethic" or "middle-class values" or "equality of opportunity" and see whether you do not detect a note of irony or condescension. Surely it is significant that the political embodiment of these values in America at present is the Republican Party, the conservative party. It is in the Republican Party and among people called conservatives and neoconservatives that one still hears the rhetoric of upward mobility and achievement, of liberty and free-market capitalism as the hope of all nations. The ideals of modernity—of the old modernity, that is—have become the property of the conservatives.

Now does this clash of "modernities" really matter? Does it matter that the ideology of modernism has become a virtual orthodoxy among the secular intelligentsia? Does it matter that, as Midge Decter once observed, there is spreading through our society a conviction that "nothing is worth dying for"? Yes, it does matter, for two reasons. First, few men and women can live in a spiritual vacuum for long. If their society seems meaningless, they will in rage and frustration find or create meaning somewhere, even in violence, decadence, and revolution. Second, no society can survive without some sense of its own goodness. If many Americans no longer believe in our system, there are others in the world who believe in theirs—and are willing to enforce their beliefs at gunpoint.

Now is there a historical relationship between the "two modernities?" I have presented them as antagonists, but could there be some dialectical process by which the one inexorably gave birth to the other? Is there, in other words, an inevitable declension from democratic capitalism to socialist nihilism? There is a verse by Goldsmith that my New England ancestors used to recite:

> Ill fares the land
> To hastening ills a prey
> Where wealth accumulates
> And men decay.

More recently, Joseph Schumpeter, Daniel Bell, and others have suggested that capitalism creates the intellectual class that will ultimately destroy it—indeed, that capitalism generates its own fatal "cultural contradictions": that capitalism, with its ceaseless incitements to instant gratification of every taste, no matter how debased, eventually destroys the cultural matrix of decency, sobriety, and self-restraint upon which it—and republican self-government—depend.

Is this thesis true? Is the "new modernity" the necessary offspring of the old? In short, is the American way of life inherently and irremediably flawed?

Religious Roots

I do not believe that it is. But if I am correct, it is because of a fundamental constitutive element of the American ethos that I have not yet mentioned. Consider again the Great Seal of the United States. It contains, as I have said, the motto *Novus Ordo Seclorum* and the image of an unfinished pyramid. But hovering above the pyramid is a symbolic unblinking eye: the eye of God. And placed above that is another Latin motto, *Annuit Coeptis*, meaning "He has favored [our] undertaking." Americans, I said earlier, are a restless people, but as Tocqueville long ago recognized, we have not been restless in everything, particularly in the realm of our formative philosophic and moral beliefs. And a powerful reason for this remarkable constancy amidst so much flux is that America, since the beginning, has evolved within a context of Christian religious belief.

I am not saying that the Founding Fathers sought to establish a Christian commonwealth or that America's public institutions have been explicitly religious in character. I am saying that the impulses described earlier in this essay—the impulses that I have called the "old modernity"—have operated, at least until recently, within a predominantly and persistently religious culture. If the "new modernity" has not yet triumphed among us, it is because American culture has been molded and guided by the non-modern and profoundly civilizing force of our Judeo-Christian religious heritage. In short, if the American polity and economy are in some sense modern, American culture—at the level of ultimate beliefs about God and man—has been and perhaps remains primarily conservative.

The American polity and economy are modern, but American beliefs about God and man have been conservative.

The United States, then, is a modern nation. But it is not only a modern nation, and in this fact may lie the fate of the American experiment. Liberty, said Alexis de Tocqueville, "cannot be established without morality, nor morality without faith." If America is to survive, its indisputably modern elements must be conjoined with what Russell Kirk has called the "permanent things," spiritual things and the institutions that sustain them. Without this fusion, the American experiment may fail—not because it is a regime of liberty but because liberty alone cannot instruct us how to live. It is what we *do* with our liberty that will determine our country's future, and for that guidance we must turn outside the marketplace and the polling booth. If the old modernity is not to succumb to the relativism and anti-religious nihilism of the new, it will have to draw on transcendent, premodern sources—on religious faith—to infuse our lives with meaning. Edmund Burke said it well:

> Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.

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It is the duty of conservatives—even while accepting and celebrating the ideals of the "old modernity"—to forge the internal checks and balances that will channel those ideals toward the "permanent things" and thus give spiritual substance to the "opportunity society."

Blessings of Liberty

It is not, perhaps, commonplace for you to hear a conservative scholar celebrate the ideals of the "old modernity" and invoke it as a paradigm of value against its detractors. Still, if any of you are tempted to say that democratic capitalism is not worth purifying and preserving, or to conclude that the American experiment is too "modern" for your taste, I would ask you to indulge in a little act of imagination. Imagine that when you leave this room you will be arrested and perhaps tortured for unlawful assembly; in large portions of the world at this very moment, this would be your fate. Imagine that you could not obtain employment because of a government whim; it happened to Lech Walesa. Imagine that if you could not find a job, you would be expelled from the city where you are now living; only yesterday this was the case in the Soviet Union. Imagine that if you were a school teacher and identified yourself as a Christian, you were then assigned to a dead-end job far from home. It is happening in China today.

The American heritage of which we are the heirs has bequeathed us the "blessings of liberty." Freedom—to worship, to travel, to select and change careers. Freedom—to write, to publish, to attend meetings like this. Let us not lightly disparage these blessings. Even as new hope germinates in the liberated nations of East Central Europe and the crumbling internal empire of the Soviet Union, let us remember: free societies are a rarity in human history, and as the Kurds and Kuwaitis can tell you, they have their merits still.

American conservatives must defend and civilize, not repudiate, the free society they have inherited.

American conservatives, then, unless they wish to live lives of reclusive despondency, must defend and civilize, not repudiate, the free society they have inherited. It will not, I believe, be easy; at times it will entail, in Whittaker Chambers' unforgettable metaphor, "a dance along a precipice." But in a culture of spreading nihilism and incivility, American conservatives must cherish their roots and perceive their true enemies with clarity. Against the disparagements and competing mythologies of the Left, they must affirm the vitality and validity of the American Dream. ☎

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

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
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Pork Chop

Budget Questions for Your Congressman

Scott A. Hodge

Every $1 million reduction in federal spending would provide $3,000 in tax relief to 333 households. Every $1 billion reduction in federal spending would provide $3,000 in tax relief to 333,000 households. An appropriate question for every line-item in the federal budget is therefore: "Is this program so important that the dollars spent on it cannot be given as tax relief for hundreds of families?" Congress is primarily responsible for spending decisions, and hence for rising federal taxes. To help your congressman evaluate whether programs are genuinely needed, it helps to ask him some additional questions along the way.

Question: Does the program serve localized or special interests rather than the nation as a whole?

Congress funded a $250,000 project through the Cooperative Extension Service to assist in the expansion of the Toledo Farmers' Market. This program clearly benefits solely the Toledo area although every working American is taxed to pay for it. This program should be funded at the local level.

** Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 83*

At a cost of well over $100 million, members of Congress each year fund dozens of "highway demonstration projects" that have nothing to do with demonstrating new construction techniques and everything to do with showing how well they can bring home the bacon. Last year, for example, members spent $10.2 million for an off-ramp and access road to a private sports stadium in Milwaukee; $3.4 million for improvements on Fifth and Sixth Streets in Waterloo, Iowa; $9.35 million for an "Urban Highway Corridor and Bicycle Path" in Macomb County, Michigan; and $3.7 million for a railroad crossing in Springfield, Illinois.

**Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 33,500*

This year, members of Congress will force the National Park Service to spend $150,000 to study the century-old Hatfield–McCoy feud in Matewan, West Virginia; $320,000 to purchase the home of President William McKinley's in-laws and donate it to the state of Ohio; and to give out $2 million in Urban Park Grants to such needy cities as Chicago. Eliminating these and similar parochial projects forced upon the National Park Service would save taxpayers over $10 million.

**Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 3,300*

Question: Has the program failed, fulfilled its mission, outlived its usefulness, or simply become irrelevant?

The Small Business Administration is often cited as a classic example of a program that has failed completely. The SBA loses approximately 12 percent each year on the $3 billion of loan guarantees it issues. As many as 20 percent of SBA direct loans default. Only two-tenths of 1 percent of all small businesses in the nation receive SBA loans, yet every American taxpayer—including other small business owners—are required to pitch in $318 million a year to pay for it. The SBA should be abolished.

** Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 106,000*

Enacted in 1955, the federal wool and mohair subsidy program was intended to insure a consistent source of wool and mohair for military clothing. Both of these items were taken off the Pentagon's list of strategically critical materials in 1960. Yet taxpayers continue to chip in $175 million per year to subsidize these products. The wool and mohair subsidy program should be eliminated.

** Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 58,300*

The Rural Electrification Administration was created in 1935 to bring electricity, and later telephone service, to rural areas of the country. The REA is one of the few major federal programs to fulfill its mission. Today, 99 percent of rural Americans have electricity and 97 percent have telephone service. Yet REA still gives out nearly $2 billion in loans annually at a cost to the taxpayer of almost $160 million. It is time REA companies became self-sufficient.

**Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 53,500*

Question: Does the program duplicate, contradict, or nullify the mission of other programs?

The Trade Adjustment Assistance program is intended to provide unemployment benefits to certain workers who were displaced as a result of foreign competition. Determining the status of workers who became unemployed due to foreign competition, domestic com-

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

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Just three federal programs that could be eliminated: the federal Helium Reserves, which were started in 1929 to insure a consistent supply of helium for blimps; the National Park Service's $150,000 study of the feud between the Hatfields and the McCoys; and the Arkansas "Poultry Center of Excellence," which receives $3.8 million a year.

petition, or a host of other reasons has always been difficult. Yet, once given this recognition, these workers are eligible for greater benefits than other workers without this distinction. Eliminating TAA cash benefits would make all unemployment insurance programs fairer and save taxpayers $95 million.

** Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 31,600*

The Appalachian Regional Commission was established in 1965 to foster economic development in the Appalachian region of the United States. Since its inception, the federal government has spent nearly $7 billion in this economically distressed region, two-thirds of this on investment on roads. At a cost to taxpayers of about $130 million per year, the ARC duplicates 14 federal rural aid programs provided by the Departments of Transportation, Labor, and Agriculture.

** Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 43,300*

The Department of Agriculture's Conservation Reserve Program offers farmers an incentive to voluntarily remove "highly erodible cropland and other environmentally sensitive land from production for a period of 10 years." At an annual cost of over $1.6 billion, the CRP has encouraged farmers to enroll 35 million acres of land (equivalent to the size of the state of Illinois). Most of this land was highly marginal cropland to begin with and probably would not have been in production had it not been for the myriad other crop subsidy programs. This program should be canceled and the other subsidy programs should be reviewed for their effect on encouraging wasteful farming practices.

** Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 533,000*

Question: Does the federal program compete with private commercial enterprises?

The federal Helium Reserve program was started in 1929 to insure a consistent supply of helium for blimps. The program will incur losses of over $121 million in fiscal 1992 and has lost over $225 million in the past two years. There is a thriving private-sector market in helium and there is no reason for the government to compete with this industry. Selling the assets of this program to the private sector could generate $465 million.

** Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 155,000*

Question: Does the program benefit businesses or income groups with more than sufficient means to help themselves?

Three federal child nutrition programs—the School Lunch Program, the School Breakfast Program, and the Child Care Food Program—all provide benefits to families with incomes of over $25,000 per year, or 185 percent of the poverty level. Eliminating the $1 billion in annual subsidies to these income groups would not adversely affect the poor. On the contrary, it would ensure that scarce federal resources would be targeted to those in need.

**Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 333,000*

The government spends roughly $3 million annually to support a catfish research farm in Stuttgart, Arkansas. The findings of this research is intended to benefit the thriving $200-million-per-year catfish industry. Just down the road is the Arkansas "Poultry Center of Excellence," which receives $3.8 million annually from the federal government to the benefit of the $14.9-billion-per-year poultry industry.

**Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 2,260*

The U.S. Fruit and Vegetable Lab in the state of Washington cost taxpayers over $5 million last year. Yet, the beneficiaries of that research, the fruit and vegetable growers in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, have annual sales of $1 billion.

**Number of households provided $3,000 tax relief: 1,600*

Implementing just the few recommended cuts cited here could give $3,000 in tax relief to nearly every household in Austin, Texas; Buffalo, New York; Des Moines, Iowa; Fresno, California; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Rockford, Illinois. If your congressman voted for these programs, he should be prepared to explain why they are so important that he wants to deny tax relief to hundreds of thousands of Americans.

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Land of Promise

Restoring Israel's Economic Miracle

Joel C. Rosenberg

President Bush told Congress and the nation last March that one of the greatest challenges of the post-Gulf War Middle East is "to foster economic freedom and prosperity for all people in the region." Nowhere is the challenge more urgent than in Israel. Enormous Israeli government spending, high taxes, and stifling overregulation have for years frightened away foreign investors, penalized Israeli businessmen, and discouraged would-be entrepreneurs. The result has been economic stagnation. Now mass Soviet and Ethiopian Jewish immigration is overwhelming an Israeli system ill-equipped for such dramatic, indeed cataclysmic, change.

The Israeli government says the cost of absorbing the 300,000 immigrants who have already arrived, and the one million more expected by 1995, is likely to be in the range of $50–$60 billion. Yet, Israel's gross national product in 1990 was only $50 billion. Thus, it will be impossible to raise the needed funds from higher taxes. Nor is it possible to raise the money from Western governments, who find themselves increasingly distracted by the enormous needs of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, nor from world-wide Jewry, who are already donating charity to Israel in record amounts.

Overgrown Government

Israel's economy instead needs immediate, comprehensive free-market reform to attract billions of dollars in desperately needed foreign investment and to unleash the creative talents of its own people. Without major structural change, such as large budget cuts, tax cuts and tax reform, privatization of government-owned companies, and significant deregulation of the private sector, Israel's economic crisis will worsen dramatically and exacerbate ethnic and political tensions between Soviet and Ethiopian Jews, native Israelis, and Palestinian Arabs on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. With a potentially historic, although still fragile, Arab–Israeli peace process gathering momentum, this is no time to allow Israel to edge toward economic chaos. American loan guarantees may temporarily alleviate Israel's immediate housing crunch, but such guarantees do not solve Israel's larger problem of stagnant economic growth. Only free-market reform can do that; yet Israeli leaders hesitate to move boldly and decisively on such reform.

In its early years, Israel was an economic miracle. The immense political and environmental challenges facing the fledgling state required central direction; government involvement helped channel Israelis' bold, pioneering spirit, not cripple it. Malaria-infested swamps were turned into rich, productive farmland. Creative irrigation strategies made "the desert bloom." And despite war and terrorism, Israelis built industry and infrastructure, homes and hospitals, to welcome hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab and Islamic persecution as well as from the butchery of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.

Once the new state had become established, however, government involvement in the economy began to grow dramatically rather than recede. Between 1965 and 1985, government spending doubled from 36 percent to 74 percent of Israel's gross national product. (Israel's proposed 1992 budget will also be about 75 percent of GNP.) Some argue that Israel's heavy defense burden has been responsible for the surge. The numbers, however, prove otherwise. Israeli defense spending as a percentage of GNP did soar from 9.5 percent in 1965 to 32 percent in 1975. This was due to the Six-Day War of 1967, the ensuing War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. However, defense spending has since dropped steadily to less than 24 percent of GNP in 1985, and less than 10 percent today. The dramatic rise in Israeli government expenditures has actually come from domestic spending, not spending on defense. Between 1965 and 1985, Israeli public-sector non-defense consumption jumped from 21 percent to almost 35 percent of GNP. During the same time, transfer payments soared from 6 percent to 16.5 percent of GNP, and payment on external debt rose from .5 to over 6 percent of GNP.

As total spending doubled, the government, not surprisingly, also doubled Israelis' tax burden, from 25 percent of GNP in 1960 to over 50 percent in 1985. Top marginal tax rates have been reduced dramatically, but

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Ethiopian Jews arriving at Ben Gurion airport. Israel needs immediate, comprehensive free-market reform to accommodate the inflow of hundreds of thousands of Soviet and Ethiopian Jews.

they are still among the highest in the industrial world. In 1965, Israel's top marginal tax rate exceeded 70 percent (in 1975 it was over 85 percent!); today it is 48 percent, although in January 1991 the government added a 5-percent surcharge to pay for increased immigrant absorption costs, raising the rate to 53 percent.

The Israeli government also owns 93.5 percent of the land within its pre-1967 boundaries, which it administers through the Israel Land Authority (ILA) to about 540,000 leaseholders. "The ILA, through its executive council, decides who is to get land, what price they will pay for it and the conditions under which they can use it," says Paul Rivlin, a policy analyst for the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Jerusalem. Such state control drives up the cost of land and thus the cost of housing by as much as 40 percent, according to Shlomo Schattner, former deputy director of the Israeli Finance Ministry's budget department. Such state control also hinders the ability of Israelis to use the land in the most efficient manner possible. The *Jerusalem Post* noted, for example, that a farmer with orchards near the town of Petach Tikva or cotton fields near the Ben Gurion International Airport may be making little or no profit, but because he leases the land and does not own it, he does not stand to benefit personally from selling it to someone who could use it more productively.

The Israeli government also employs one-third of the labor force, controls the nation's five largest banks, and permits the legal operation of 60 monopolies and cartels. It also owns over 160 companies, including total or substantial portions of the water company, the electric company, the shipping company, the radio and television stations, the telephone company, the airlines and the railroads, as well as dozens of other smaller companies in a variety of fields. Furthermore, as in other government-dominated economies, decisions made by Israel's state-owned companies often have less to do with profits than with political patronage and back-channel deal-making.

Regulatory Nightmare

What the government does not own, it heavily regulates. Agricultural regulations alone fill an 833-page tome. Until very recently, obtaining a building permit in Tel Aviv required 74 separate steps, 20 separate licenses, and could take up to five years to process, according to Ezra Sohar, an Israeli free-market pioneer, in his most recent book, *Israel's Dilemma: Why Israel Is Falling Apart and How to Put It Back Together.* Obtaining a business license could be just as difficult. Sohar cites a leaflet from the Tel Aviv Municipality sketching the process:

> Present an application to the Business Licensing Department, [then] obtain approval of the Planning and Building Department...the Fire Department...the Ecology Department...the Veterinary Service...the Public Health Department...the Police...the Ministry of Labor...the Ministry of Health...other agencies, as warranted...[then] pick up your license.

The leaflet concludes by saying that it "does not purport to list all the requirements in detail; it is meant to help the citizen understand the subject." It is not surprising therefore that many Israeli entrepreneurs have found themselves compelled to hire "go-betweens" who can

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navigate the labyrinth of government bureaucracy to finally obtain the desired license. Others simply give up.

Socialism's Stifling Hand

Such massive government interference has had a number of effects. First, Israel's economy faced a major crisis between 1983 and 1985. Inflation shot past 400 percent and the government was forced to cut $1 billion from its overall budget and nearly 25 percent of its defense budget. It also requested and received massive emergency assistance from the United States totalling more than $1.5 billion. American officials such as Secretary of State George Shultz helped make Israel's economic stabilization program a great success (bringing inflation down as low as 16 percent), but since then Israel has remained slow to implement other American reform suggestions. As a result, inflation is again creeping up, and now stands at 20 percent.

The dramatic rise in Israeli government expenditures has come from domestic spending, not defense.

Second, Israel has suffered severe economic stagnation. From 1950 to 1973, Israeli real per-capita growth of GNP averaged 5.5 percent annually. Since then, it has averaged less than 1 percent a year, and last year Israel actually registered negative per-capita growth. As a result, many Israelis have left for the United States, Canada, Australia, and other free-market countries in search of better economic opportunities.

Third, Israeli productivity is among the lowest in the Western world. The average output in the leading industrial countries is $40,000 per worker, and the leader, Switzerland, averages $49,600 per worker. Israel averages $28,200 per worker. Worse still is that Israeli productivity is rising more slowly than other industrialized countries. Israeli productivity in 1989 increased only .2 percent over 1988; by contrast, Italy's productivity (the leader in this area) rose 3.7 percent.

Fourth, since Israeli workers have little incentive to succeed within the system, they circumvent the system. Tax evasion in Israel is estimated at more than $3 billion a year, and Israel's underground economy is estimated at nearly 30 percent of GNP, a figure rivalling even the Soviet Union's famed black market.

Return to the Promised Land

Now enter overwhelming numbers of Soviet and Ethiopian Jews into a stagnant Israeli economy, dominated by a cumbersome, bloated, inefficient public sector. "The Soviet immigration is the greatest thing that could happen to Israel, but in terms of sacrifice, it also has the potential to destroy us and tear society apart," says Michael Kleiner, chairman of the Israeli parliament's committee on absorption. Michael Bruno, former governor of the Bank of Israel, warns that unless the government moves quickly to reform the economy, unemployment, which has already hit 11 percent, could reach as high as 18 percent, with more than 200,000 people leaving Israel in search of better opportunities. Israel's Manufacturers Association predicts the "worst socioeconomic crisis in Israel's history."

By contrast, if the Israeli government takes immediate steps to reform its own economy, these new refugees of socialism, and those who have already arrived, can offer Israel great hope for the future. Twenty-five percent of the newly arrived Soviet immigrants have an advanced degree, compared with less than 2 percent of native Israelis. With sufficient venture capital, Israel has the potential of becoming the Silicon Valley of the Middle East, specializing in high-technology exports and capitalizing on the skills of more than 2,000 top-line Soviet scientists and more than 40,000 architects and engineers who have arrived in Israel since 1989. Nearly 7 percent of the new immigrants are doctors. With additional investment and advanced equipment from the West, Israel could also become the medical center of the Mediterranean. With some entrepreneurial training, small amounts of capital, and the removal of government obstacles to the creation of small businesses, Israel could also enable Soviet and Ethiopian Jews to start newspapers and tutoring services as well as open ethnic restaurants and grocery stores, plumbing and electrical services, beauty salons and craft shops.

International investors see the potential for an enormously lucrative market developing in Israel, but they are discouraged by Israeli government interference in the economy. The Atari Corporation recently cancelled plans to build a $150-million plant and a $75-million investment center in Israel because of excessive government delays in approving their proposals, reported the *Jerusalem Post.*

In fact, by delaying reform, Israel has cut itself off from much foreign investment, and is left to rely upon foreign aid and charitable contributions. In 1988, total net foreign direct investment in Israel was only $311 million; in 1989 it was less than $100 million, while American and German foreign aid and charitable contributions to Israel topped $5 billion both years.

Recalcitrant Politicians

The obvious question, then, is why do Israeli leaders hesitate to enact sweeping economic reform despite such economic stagnation? There are many reasons. Other urgent issues—war at times, the peace process at others—take precedence; both major parties like to dole out political favors when they are in power and thus profit from the status quo; and Histadrut, the national labor union, fiercely resists economic reform—to the point of virtually shutting the country down with mass strikes when reform legislation appears imminent.

Some Israeli officials believe economic reform is important—but not just yet. Zalman Shoval, Israel's ambassador to the United States, for example, has said publicly that mass immigration is creating such disruptions in the

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economy that now would not be a good time to press forward with reforms, since they would likely cause further disruptions. On the contrary, now is the best time to move boldly and decisively on comprehensive reform. Foreign investors are waiting for a strong signal that Israel wants to become a haven for private enterprise, and the Israeli public understands the urgency of the hour and would likely be willing to endure the short-term difficulties of reform if it were convinced of the long-term benefits. Israeli leaders are unlikely to find a better international and political climate for reform than they have today.

Perhaps the most important reason behind the government's unwillingness to implement comprehensive structural change is that Israeli leaders have been insulated by American foreign aid from the full detrimental effects of their unique brand of socialism. Currently, Jerusalem receives from Washington $1.8 billion a year in military assistance and another $1.2 billion annually in economic assistance. The economic assistance helps Israel cover the interest payments on its outstanding debt to the United States. The debt, $5.5 billion of which is owed to American commercial banks and $4.5 billion of which is owed directly to the U.S. government, accumulated during the 1970s when American military assistance to Israel was given as loans, not in grants as it is today. Former *Jerusalem Post* economic reporter Joel Bainerman recently wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* that, since 1948, Israel has received nearly $48 billion in U.S. foreign aid. Of that, it has received $45 billion since 1973, the same year that Israeli domestic spending really began its significant upward spiral and Israel's economy began to stagnate.

Faithful Ally

From an American perspective, such aid has been a wise investment: Israel has been a faithful friend in a troubled and turbulent region. Throughout the 1980s, Israel was an extremely cost-effective asset in countering Soviet forces in the Middle East. Military planners in Moscow had to account for Israeli Jericho missiles capable of hitting southern Soviet targets and an Israeli air force widely believed to be capable of rendering the Soviets' Mediterranean naval forces ineffective in less than 24 hours. Today, Israel continues to provide the U.S. prepositioning sites for military equipment and supplies, excellent intelligence data on Middle East regimes and terrorist factions, practice bombing ranges for American fighter pilots, and docking rights for U.S. Navy ships. Last Christmas, Israel's navy and medical teams provided critical assistance to the crew of the USS *Saratoga* when a ferry shuttling sailors back to the aircraft carrier sank off the coast of Haifa. So, while decreasing foreign aid to Israel may someday become an issue of changing U.S. military priorities, it is unfair to say that this has been a giveaway by U.S. taxpayers. Israel has earned every bit of American military aid it has received.

That does not mean that American foreign aid to Israel should not be linked to economic reform. It should. George Bush once said, "Just as a strong Israel is in the national security interests of the United States, so, too, is a healthy Israeli economy." Because economic reform is, after all, in Israel's and therefore America's best interests, we should not hesitate to insist that American aid prompt such reform.

Lukewarm Reform

While Israeli leaders remain hesitant to move forward on bold, sweeping, comprehensive economic reforms, they have made some positive changes, partly as a result of American nudging, partly as a result of internal pressure for reform. In the past year, the government has cut many subsidies and price supports (which sent the cost of eggs, for example, soaring by 50 percent) and reduced import taxes on automobiles (previously as high as 250 percent on some models). The latter measure sparked a sharp increase in the number of car imports last quarter and led to a 33.2 percent rise in customs income, no surprise to believers in the importance of supply-side tax cuts to Israel's future. The government has also taken measures to ease restrictions on Israeli capital markets and announced that a new three-member treasury committee will have exclusive control over the sale of government companies. This should eliminate the primary obstacle to privatization—the veto authority of individual ministers over companies under its jurisdiction. The government thus plans to raise more than $500 million by selling 20 percent of its holdings in the Zim Navigation Company, 23 percent of the Bezeq Israel Telecommunications Corporation, 26 percent of Maman Cargo Terminal and Handling Ltd., and all shares in Malam System Ltd., Agridev Ltd., and Dead Sea Periclase Ltd. Some will be sold through the Israeli stock market, while others will go to private buyers.

While these have been positive moves, they are not enough and at times have been offset by the government's numerous regressive economic steps. Last January, for instance, the government raised value-added taxes from 16 to 18 percent, raised fuel and tobacco taxes, and added a 5-percent surcharge to personal income taxes—all to pay for increased government spending on immigrant absorption. Corporate taxes have been lowered by 3 percent, but are still a daunting 42 percent, hardly a rate to encourage significant private-sector growth. And many familiar with Israel's numerous, although still largely unimplemented, privatization plans say they remain leery of the government's much-trumpeted new plans. Furthermore, the government plans massive subsidization of new employment projects in 1992, including 880 new jobs at archeological digs, 150 new jobs in the census bureau, and 15,000 new jobs to "expand government services due to the increase in population," reports the *Jerusalem Post.*

State ownership of almost all land has driven up the cost of housing by 40 percent.

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Israelis are increasingly unhappy with the state of affairs. A recent poll in the Hebrew *Davar* newspaper indicated that 78 percent of Israelis were "not very supportive" or "not supportive at all" of the government's handling of the economy and 61 percent were unhappy with its handling of Soviet Jewish immigrant absorption. Another poll taken by the business daily *Mabat* in May showed that only 20 percent of the public supports Yitzhak Moda'i in his role as finance minister, and still fewer—less than 9 percent—want to see Labor Party leader Shimon Peres return to that post. Most simply registered their discontent with the economic status quo by indicating "no preference."

In fact, while their own government continues to debate endlessly the pros and cons of comprehensive economic reform, Israelis see many nations in the throes of a free-market revolution. Mexico, for instance, has sold 875 of its 1,155 state-owned enterprises, including the national telephone company and the national airline. And with a free-trade agreement likely between the United States and Mexico, foreign investors are growing eager to tap into Mexico's enormous potential. At the same time, Israelis read about Russia's Boris Yeltsin and Poland's Lech Walesa winning landslide victories on bold free-market reform platforms, leading many to ask: If even Poland and possibly Russia can plunge ahead toward economic reform, why can't Israel?

Since 1973, real per-capita growth of GNP has averaged less than 1 percent a year.

Out of the Wilderness

As a result, support for economic reform is growing in Israel. "Five years ago the free-market movement was still just a cloud on the horizon, barely the size of someone's hand," says Daniel Doron, a leading Israeli free-market proponent. "Today, that movement occupies center stage in the public debate." Israeli newspapers and magazines increasingly run articles criticizing the government's economic policies and airing the views of reform advocates; the army radio network's most popular economic program is hosted by a believer in the free-market; a number of books calling for free-market reforms have been published in Hebrew. More important, a growing number of politicians on both sides of the political spectrum agree reform is the way Israel must now go. David Brooks recently wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* that "you can't throw a stone in the Israeli parliament without hitting four politicians professing their faith in the free market."

The engines behind the economic reform movement in Israel are the free-market think tanks that have sprung up since Israel's last major economic crisis in the early 1980s. Most notable is Daniel Doron's Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress (ICSEP), launched with the help of American conservative Irving Kristol in 1984. Just one indicator of ICSEP's impact on Israeli thinking was its February 1990 conference on Soviet immigration and the urgent need for comprehensive structural reform. The event attracted 2,000 Israelis and nearly all of Israel's top economic policy-makers, including President Chaim Herzog, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's chief economic advisor Amos Rubin, and Labor Party leader Shimon Peres. It also received widespread attention in Israeli newspapers, including a two-page spread in the leading financial daily, *Globes*. Such impact would be an impressive accomplishment even in Washington, but is particularly indicative of the significant change in attitude among Israeli government leaders and academics toward the free-market over the past 10 years.

While ICSEP stresses free-market education, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS) stresses critical evaluation of Israeli economic policy. In 1987, IASPS's founder, Robert Loewenberg, published a book by Hoover Institution economist Alvin Rabushka and Johns Hopkins University professor Steve Hanke called *Toward Growth: A Blueprint for Economic Rebirth in Israel*, explaining what Israel could learn about economic growth from the four "Asian Tigers": Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. IASPS also publishes an annual *Scorecard on the Israeli Economy*. Rabushka and his colleagues recommend that the Israeli government adopt a 25-percent flat business tax to spark growth and eliminate inherent political pressures to award exemptions and loopholes to special interest groups. They also recommend closing numerous Israeli government agencies to eliminate redundancy and cut wasteful spending. IASPS's bold ideas have attracted considerable press attention both in Israel and the United States and are becoming a significant factor in the growing Israeli economic reform movement.

America's Role

Free-market think tanks are not the only ones championing reform. The Bush administration has been urging Israel to move decisively on free-market reform for years via the U.S.–Israel Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG). Begun in 1984 by President Reagan and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, the JEDG is composed of American and Israeli economic officials and private consultants who originally met to help stabilize Israeli hyperinflation and have since met twice yearly to help Israel develop and implement a reform strategy. The stabilization program was initially a great success; the long-term reform efforts have had mixed results. American JEDG participants say the Israeli delegation agrees with most of their reform suggestions but cannot get Prime Minister Shamir interested in, or the parliament committed to, reform legislation. Richard McCormack, who until recently served as U.S. undersecretary of state for economic affairs, is encouraged by the vast publicity the March JEDG meeting in Jerusalem received and agrees there is growing public support for economic change. However, he and other American officials are unsure whether current efforts are enough to get Israel's top leadership to take the neces-

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sary steps toward reform, especially amidst the ongoing and delicate peace process.

Bush has also spoken out strongly on the need for Israeli free-market reform. In July 1986, then-Vice President Bush told the Israeli Knesset that "the question for Israel's future is no longer how to stop the Israeli economy from deteriorating, but how to restore growth." And he offered four suggestions for sparking such growth: reduce government spending, lower taxes, avoid excessive regulation of the private business sector, and privatize state-owned industries. "Freer markets and lower taxes go hand in hand with more growth," Bush declared. He also stated that economic growth—both in Israel and throughout the region—can contribute to peace. "More jobs and more opportunities on the West Bank and Gaza, for example, could increase the confidence of Palestinians, and make it easier for them to participate directly in shaping a negotiated peace," he said, adding that such economic growth could "draw the energies of more young people into building a world for themselves, rather than destroying someone else's."

Opportunity for Quayle

Now is the time for the Bush administration to dust off these ideas and make Israeli economic reform a top priority on its Middle East agenda. That would first involve raising the profile of the JEDG. With the president and secretary of state already deeply involved in the specifics of the peace process, Vice President Dan Quayle should attend the next JEDG meeting likely to be held in Washington this November. Quayle is well-admired and trusted among Israelis and he played an important role in providing Israel with ballistic missile defenses and promoting strong U.S.–Israeli cooperation during the Gulf War. He is also an energetic free-market advocate.

Second, the Bush administration should encourage public support of economic reform in Israel by raising the profile of Israel's free-market movement. Quayle should make his first trip to the Jewish state by the end of this year to meet with the leaders of Israeli free-market think tanks, supply-side economists and journalists, and the top political leadership of both the Labor and Likud parties. He should also request to speak to the Israeli parliament, as did then-Vice President Bush, to discuss the shared American–Israeli values of strong defense, as well as the importance of free markets and limited government.

Third, the Bush administration should support and promote Senator Connie Mack's Index of Economic Freedom amendment to the 1992 foreign-aid bill as a way of encouraging Israeli free-market reforms. The index will rate the economic policies of countries receiving or requesting American foreign aid in order to give lawmakers accurate information regarding that country's "progress toward policies conducive to sustainable economic growth." If a country is not moving toward a free market, aid might either be denied or linked to a series of specific reforms.

The Index of Economic Freedom would subject Israel's foreign aid requests to such criteria as "the extent to which poor or landless individuals are illegally or otherwise artificially constrained from acquiring land" and the extent of a country's "nationalization of property"; "the difficulty and costliness of securing a business license"; "the extent to which government policies force economic activity into nominally illegal informal sectors" (*i.e.*, the black market); "the highest level of taxation...and the rate of value added tax"; "the value of industries owned by the government, [and the] percentage of GNP produced by state-owned industries"; and the "degree of government ownership of the banking sector."

If Mexico and Poland can plunge toward economic reform, why can't Israel?

Involvement of American Jewry

The American Jewish community should be included from the start in this effort to encourage economic reform in Israel. While generally more favorable toward liberal Democrats than conservative Republicans, the American Jewish community nevertheless realizes that Israel is facing the greatest challenge and opportunity in its brief modern history and that only with massive foreign investment, a more efficient economy, and a strong U.S.–Israel relationship can Soviet and Ethiopian Jews be successfully absorbed. Vice President Quayle and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp should discuss the importance and benefits of Israeli economic reform in both private and public meetings with the American Jewish community, particularly at the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee coming this spring.

Soviet Jewish immigration and the peace process are making Israel's economy an increasingly important issue for Washington policy-makers. Israel's request in September for $10 billion in American housing loan guarantees was essentially a request for an American vote of confidence in the long-term future of Israel's economy. The Bush administration should not hesitate therefore to make clear that only comprehensive free-market reform will enable Israel's economy to succeed over the long haul. In fact, it should promote reform at the highest levels of U.S.–Israeli contact. And while it may be tempting to set aside talk of reform for a day when Israel has "less important" issues to tackle, when will such a day ever arrive? Israel has not stopped facing monumental challenges since its creation. Indeed, unless Israel moves boldly and decisively on free-market reform, the monumental economic challenges it faces today will be only more urgent and even more difficult to solve tomorrow.

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Arsenal of Democracy

Defense Strategies for a Revolutionary Decade

Jay Kosminsky

Two revolutions are shaping America's defense agenda for the 1990s: the political revolution bringing down the Soviet Union, and the revolution in military affairs heralded by the performance of U.S. forces in the Gulf. Both these revolutions, while indisputably to the advantage of the U.S., will make defense planning—always more art than science—an increasingly difficult task.

The global anti-Communist revolution has blown away the familiar signposts of the Cold War landscape. Gone or transformed beyond recognition are the fearsome Soviet Army threat in Europe, Moscow's East European empire, and the fount of all Soviet adventurism, the once-monolithic Communist Party. Left behind is a murky and uncertain strategic terrain, populated by peripatetic dictators, nuclear wannabes, and perhaps most unpredictable of all, the wounded and confused remnants of Moscow's once-proud military.

The techno-military revolution, too, has left in its wake a measure of disarray. In Operation Desert Storm, just about everything worked: missile defenses, stealth technology, precision munitions, and the professional all-volunteer force. But across-the-board success leaves few clear choices for defense planners facing the prospect of indefinitely declining budgets. The Gulf War has been invoked as justification for myriad weapons that America is considering buying in the coming decade. But America will not be able to afford all these systems, no matter how worthy, within the constraints of projected budgets, at least not if it plans to have any soldiers, sailors, and pilots left to operate them.

The problems left behind by these revolutions nonetheless are problems of the best kind, those born of success. Neither the global anti-Communist revolution nor the revolution in military affairs could have happened without American leadership. Nonetheless, securing America's interests over the next decade will entail an understanding of the nature of the changes underway, and a willingness to rethink strategic concepts in ways that reflect and shape the evolving strategic world.

Abandoning the Unthinkable

Since the late 1950s, when nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter published "The Delicate Balance of Terror," defense planners have been engaged in a ferocious debate over what is known as "strategic deterrence." The debate revolved around how many and what kind of nuclear forces were needed to dissuade Soviet leaders from launching a war against America's NATO allies or a nuclear attack on the United States, assuming all the while that each side would remain vulnerable to nuclear strikes by the other.

The arcane and surreal aspects of nuclear deterrence invited much criticism. It was, after all, a bizarre doctrine that made a virtue of vulnerability. Nonetheless, the debate was crucial in its time. Effective defenses against nuclear attack were technologically infeasible throughout the first decades of the nuclear age. And overwhelming Soviet conventional military dominance in Europe forced America into a military strategy that relied on the unthinkable: deliberate escalation to nuclear war in response to a Soviet attack on NATO.

Today, with Soviet forces on their way out of Europe and the Warsaw Pact a memory, NATO for the first time in decades is quite capable of defending itself against conventional attack with conventional tanks, planes, and artillery. With this new, stable balance of power in Europe, the risk of Soviet aggression against NATO and of escalation to nuclear war should aggression occur are vastly reduced. Even in the unlikely event that Soviet factories continue to churn out missiles with undiminished zeal, strategic deterrence will become an easier, and less controversial, task. Planners and politicians will continue to debate the merits of the B-2 bomber versus cruise missiles, or mobile versus fixed-site intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), but the urgency that drove the debate has receded along with the imminent danger.

But just as the strategic deterrence debate fades from the scene, the concepts and technologies of strategic defense are ripening. Strategic defense—or SDI—will dominate the defense debate in the 1990s. Already such former skeptics as Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn are jockeying for position on the

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issue, competing with each other and with President George Bush to capture it as their own.

Historic Senate Vote

Why the shift? First, the Gulf War demonstrated beyond doubt that the revolution in military technology encompasses missile defenses. Scenes of Patriot missiles intercepting Scuds live on CNN made it tough to argue against the value or effectiveness of defending America in the same way that Israel and Saudi Arabia were protected during Operation Desert Storm. Further, the impending breakup of the Soviet Union has raised the fear, however spectral, of a Soviet nuclear arsenal in the hands of mad generals, ultra-nationalists, or bunker-mentality Communists. Particularly after witnessing Saddam Hussein hurl missiles at his enemies, wholly undeterred by their known retaliatory capabilities, even the most ardent proponents of deterrence are making the case that a little "insurance policy" in the form of defenses couldn't hurt.



In a historic 16-to-4 vote on July 17, the Senate Armed Services Committee went on record for the first time since the Nixon presidency in support of missile defense deployment. The committee's date for deployment, 1996, beats President Bush's plan to the punch by about four years. The committee also went on record for the first time in favor of renegotiating the restrictive 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to permit a limited defense system spread over a number of sites across the country. A week after the Senate's action, halfway around the world, Mikhail Gorbachev was in London proposing to the Group of Seven that the Soviet Union and the West cooperate on early-warning measures against missile attack, perhaps presaging U.S.–Soviet, or U.S.–Russian, missile defense cooperation.

Opponents of strategic defense already have been discredited on the question of building and providing more effective defenses against Scud-type missiles to protect allies and U.S. troops in the field. A political consensus is building behind the deployment of at least ground-based missile defenses to protect American territory by the mid-1990s. Only the notion of space-based missile interceptors now eludes consensus, but the decade is still young.

Arms Control vs. Arms Patrol

Arms-control negotiations are a peculiar form of competition between states that are not so hostile that discussion would be pointless, but not so friendly—or remote—that it would be superfluous. One way or another, U.S.–Soviet arms control is reaching the end of its run. By mid-decade Russia and the other likely successor states to the Soviet Union may have joined the ranks of the industrial democracies, in which case East–West arms control will be about as pressing an issue as U.S.–Canadian arms control. Or Moscow will revert to political neanderthalism, in which case the West will be fortunate if it gains compliance with accords already signed.

East–West arms control peaked in 1990 and 1991 with the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which restricts the numbers of conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which will reduce by about 30 percent the long-range nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the two nuclear superpowers. But the very forces that made these treaties possible already have made them largely irrelevant. The recent success of arms control is attributable not to any change of heart by the Soviet high command, but by the collapse of the militant state and Communist Party that so relentlessly pursued the arms race. The ostensible ends of arms control—reduced military competition and reduced risk of war—are being achieved not because of treaty constraints on superpower arsenals, but because the Soviet Union's apparently terminal political crisis has sapped Moscow of the will and ability to compete effectively with the West. As the British strategist Christopher Coker points out, arms control reflects the security environment, it does not create it. In this case a momentous event, the collapse of the Soviet Union, incidentally has created a strategic moment propitious for arms control. With the passing of this crisis, whether for good or ill, the moment for arms control is likely to have passed as well.

But in the 1990s, the United States and its allies still will face problems with the spread of highly destructive weapons to potential adversaries, mostly in the Third World. Traditional arms control holds little prospect of getting a grip on this problem, as demonstrated recently by the discovery of an extensive clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq. Slowing the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will require instead what might be termed "arms patrol," a series of measures ranging from strict Western safeguards on the export of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons technology, to the more extensive use of preemptive military strikes

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WHAT'S HOT

Bettmann Newsphotos

ARMS PATROL

WHAT'S NOT

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ARMS CONTROL

against facilities that produce weapons of mass destruction in such unremittingly hostile states as Libya and North Korea.

Chemical Equalizers

Aside from the United States, its allies, and the Soviet Union, about 17 countries around the world have or are trying to develop atomic weapons; as many as 25 have an interest in chemical weapons; and roughly 20 are working on some form of biological weapons—living organisms that spread such diseases as anthrax, encephalitis, plague, tularemia, and typhus. Not surprisingly, most of these countries also are in the market for ballistic missiles to deliver them against their adversaries. The incentives to develop weapons of mass destruction are strong. They offer the opportunity for local tyrants to throw their weight around regionally, and they are potential "equalizers" in confrontations with high-tech Western powers.

Prohibitions on the use or development of chemical and biological weapons are extraordinarily difficult to enforce. Chemical weapons can be produced in almost any commercial chemical or fertilizer plant. Meanwhile, some of the most restrictive arms-control agreements, such as the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, contain no verification provisions. One-hundred-thirty-two nations signed the convention. Among these was the Soviet Union, which this year was accused officially by the State Department of working on biological weapons against which "the United States has no defense."

The United States and its allies have the ability, militarily and politically, to stop the spread of these weapons to those tyrants in whose hands they would be dangerous—to the West, to regional neighbors, and to their own people. If the West does not muster the will to do so, the next Saddam Hussein, or perhaps Saddam himself, may well employ weapons that could cost hundreds of thousands of American lives on the battlefield, or conceivably at home. American leadership will be required to develop a comprehensive Western approach to arms patrol.

It will require, first, a serious effort among the industrialized states to identify and further restrict the export of technologies with applications for the production of mass-destruction weapons or ballistic missiles. Making good on these controls will require a willingness by the United States and other concerned allies to police the restrictions, unmasking and severely penalizing countries—including allies—and corporations that violate them. Measures also will have to be taken against arms and technology exporters that choose not to cooperate with control regimes, like China, which now seems bent on exporting missile and even nuclear technology to any country with the cash to pay for it. These measures should include severe, coordinated, economic sanctions.

Discrimination Between Nations

Any serious approach to anti-proliferation will have to encompass military options. These include the provision of defensive weapons and equipment to allies, the interdiction in international airspace or the high-seas of dangerous weapons or technology shipments, and in a few cases, preemptive military strikes to destroy production and storage facilities for mass-destruction weapons.

Finally, as Senator John McCain points out, if America and its allies are to get serious about proliferation, they will have to be willing to risk the charge that they are "discriminating" in deciding which states can and cannot possess weapons of mass destruction. Of necessity, arms control undertaken through the United Nations or other international auspices necessarily treats all nations equally. But viewed through the lenses of American and Western interests, all nations are not equal. Some countries—like China—pose threats, but are just too big and too far along in their weapons programs to use force against. Still others, like India and Pakistan, pose grave

Any serious approach to anti-proliferation will have to encompass military options.

dangers to each other, but not in any immediate sense to Western security. Others, such as Israel, are democracies that require advanced weapons in the face of threats from hostile neighbors.

Some countries, however, pose threats to American security already, and would pose bigger threats if they were permitted to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

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North Korea under Kim Il Sung is a case in point. If diplomatic efforts fail to persuade him to abandon his advanced atomic weapons program, America soon will have to choose between exposing U.S. troops in South Korea to a nuclear-armed adversary, or unilaterally putting an end to Kim's nuclear ambitions via a preemptive military strike.

Astronomical Price Tags

American military planning in the 1980s was geared toward avoiding "another Vietnam"; planning in the 1990s will be driven by a desire to be able to repeat the high-tech success of Desert Storm. The war against Iraq revealed a revolution in warfare as momentous as the development of the pike in medieval times or the longbow in the 14th century. Such advanced weapons as terrain-following cruise missiles and stealth aircraft dropping laser-guided bombs destroyed a medium-sized country's military and economic infrastructure in a matter of weeks, with minimal civilian casualties. Ground forces for the first time in history could not be protected, even in dug-in positions, against a technologically advanced force with command of the air; Iraq lost at least



Lower budgets will translate into higher casualties for U.S. troops.

1,700 tanks, 1,000 armored vehicles, and over 1,500 artillery pieces before the ground war began. Data on enemy positions were garnered by satellite and airborne radars, transmitted to ground stations, and relayed to front-line commanders within minutes. For the first time, missiles shot down other missiles in combat. In the hands of skilled commanders and a well-organized and professionally trained force, these technologies opened a tremendous gap between the military "haves" and those whom the revolution left behind.

The technology that wrought the revolution did not come cheap; paying for it took the largest-ever peacetime American military buildup. The new generation of weapons just now coming off the drawing boards will be even more expensive to develop and build than the last. But, by mid-decade, America will be committing a smaller portion of its national wealth to defense than at any time since before World War II. Money available for the procurement of new weapons is expected to be 30 percent lower in real terms by the middle of the 1990s than it was during the mid-1980s. Funds for research and development will drop by 21 percent from 1990 through 1996. Cuts are sure to be even more severe if the Soviet collapse proceeds relatively smoothly and if Russia and other potentially powerful successor states evolve democratically. Meanwhile, the price tags for current systems are astronomical: $65 billion for a fleet of 75 B-2 bombers; $15 billion for a new 100-mile range stealth cruise missile to arm the B-2 bomber; $98 billion for a fleet of 648 F-22 Lightning air-superiority fighters; and $2 billion per copy for the Navy's latest *Seawolf*-class submarine. The list goes on.

Through the early part of this decade, the armed forces will live off the stock of weapons purchased in the 1980s. But by mid-decade, programs to replace many of the weapons bought in the 1980s, from F-15 Eagle fighters to M-1 Abrams tanks, will have to be well underway. The money simply will not be there to carry out even the scaled-back modernization program now planned by the Pentagon. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the shortfall later in the decade is likely to amount to about $40 billion every year. Add to this the additional expenses added by congressional pork-barrel programs, unexpected military contingencies, and the inevitable less-than-expected savings from perennial Pentagon management reforms, and it is clear that the numbers will not add up as planned.

Cutting Corners

Within a few years the Pentagon either is going to have to be buying a lot less than expected, or spending more. Yet barring a turn for the worse in Moscow, Congress will not bust its budget caps to fund new defense programs. This means the competition for funds among weapon programs, and among the services, is going to be fierce. A hint of things to come was evident this spring when the Air Force suggested that its B-2 bomber could obviate the need for the Navy's planned carrier-based attack aircraft, known as the AX; the Navy was not pleased. Further, if budget trends hold, the services, particularly the Navy, will be "thinking smaller"; already research is underway for a more compact, cheaper submarine to follow the *Seawolf*, and a less-ex-

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pensive ship to substitute for $1-billion *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyers.

With shrinking budgets, Americans will start hearing more about things like "silver bullet" procurement strategies, or buying just a few of the highest-tech and most expensive weapons and reserving them for the toughest tasks. "Upgrading" old weapons systems with new technology instead of designing new weapons from scratch will also be common. Even the trusty B-52 bomber, which one defense magazine recently called the "mother of all upgrades," could be in for a facelift. If the sleek B-2 falls victim to the budget cutters, there undoubtedly will be talk of putting new engines on the B-52 to enable it to fly until close to the middle of the next century, at which point it will have outlived any of its first generation of pilots.

There will of course be a price to be paid for cutting corners. In the long run a military armed with a few "silver bullets" and lots of glorified retreads will not have the fighting capability of a fully modernized force. Smaller submarines and ships will not have the firepower, defensive capabilities, or versatility of larger platforms. The bottom line is that lower budgets will translate into higher casualties for American troops, and as General Colin Powell warned in congressional testimony this year, increased global security risks for the United States.

Bush's Unhelpful Architecture

Ultimately, American security in the 1990s will have less to do with which weapons the Pentagon buys than with the wisdom with which its leaders exercise the tremendous power and influence at their disposal. The

Stability worship, the capstone of President Bush's New World Order, is out of step with the 1990s.

1990s are shaping up as a revolutionary decade, marked by fundamental shifts in the international system. While the changes underway are largely of America's making, revolutions are inherently chaotic and unpredictable. Preserving American security through these tumultuous times will require an understanding of the shifting security environment and an ability to push history toward a new equilibrium in which America's interests are secured. Will this be George Bush's New World Order? Probably not. Grand architectures, particularly this one, are likely to prove transitory and poor guides to policy. But interests endure.

Bush's New World Order, while variously defined, is apparently wrapped around at least three core ideas: superpower cooperation; "collective security" centered on the United Nations and other international organizations; and an emphasis on international stability. None of these, however, are particularly useful as policy guides or in describing the emerging features of the new international security environment.

Chimera of Collective Security

Even before August's coup and revolution in the Soviet Union, superpower cooperation was a chimera. Moscow never so much cooperated with America as much as it abandoned the field. Even while Bush was touting U.S.-Soviet cooperation during the Gulf War, thousands of Soviet military advisors were fighting on the other side. Granted, Gorbachev did not back Iraq with U.N. vetoes, massive resupply, and implicit nuclear threats, as Brezhnev did for Syria when it went up against the American-backed Israelis in 1973. Gorbachev just stayed out of the way, demonstrating not that the superpowers were cooperating, but that the Soviet Union lacked the political and military clout to seriously assist or hamper the American effort. As the "center" continues to lose power to the republics, Moscow—whether as the capital of Russia or a successor confederation to the Soviet Union—may remain an important regional player in Europe and parts of the Far East, but has seen the end of its days as a global power. Unopposed by the Soviet Union, the United States simply is unopposed. It has no other serious military rivals and is the only true superpower, a nation with global interests and the ability to defend them. If anything, America's newfound capacity for unilateralism, rather than superpower bilateralism, is a hallmark of the new era.

Nor is "collective security" through the United Nations likely to be a seminal feature of the emerging international system. To be sure, the U.N. was an active diplomatic forum during the Gulf War, and its imprimatur lent added legitimacy—if any was needed—to the American-led embargo and war against Iraq. But composed as it is of dictators as well as of democrats, of aggressors and of the aggrieved, it cannot be counted on to provide effective "collective security" in the long run.

If the concept of "collective security" was in any sense validated during the Gulf War, it was not in the action of the U.N., but in the demonstrated solidarity of the Western powers. America could have acted alone, but it did not have to. Militarily the war would scarcely have gone differently without the allies. Nonetheless, Britain was there in strength and under American military command. Turkey proved the most loyal of allies. And even in the two countries that received the most criticism from Americans—Germany and Japan—the criticism at least was taken seriously. The war, after all, was paid for mostly in yen and deutsche marks, not U.S. dollars. And America's admonitions have provoked in both countries a serious reappraisal of their global roles and responsibilities. One could just discern in the Gulf War the glimmer of a unipolar world, anchored in a community of responsible, democratic states galvanized by American leadership and military power. If democracy survives in Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere, new states could well join what Charles Krauthammer calls the "confederated West."

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The Fetish of Stability

Finally, the apparent capstone of Bush's New World Order, international "stability," seems particularly out of step with the 1990s. Stability worship has been evident in the administration's unflagging backing of Mikhail Gorbachev and his efforts to hold together the Soviet Union, its initial support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and its foot-dragging before recognizing the independence of the Baltic states.

Bush is not alone in his exaggerated respect for stability. Editor of the *National Interest* Owen Harries argues that stability is a particularly conservative value, perhaps "*the* defining conservative value." And so it would be in normal times when the maintenance of the status quo is a viable and relatively safe option. These, however, are revolutionary times, during which the statesman who clings too ardently to the status quo is liable to be quickly marginalized. American statesmen, conservative or otherwise, ultimately owe their allegiance not to a particular configuration of the international system, but to a set of underlying values, and to the enduring interests that protect the American nation in which these values are embodied.

Turning to First Principles

For the past 40 years, the sole mortal threat to America's most fundamental interests, those rooted in such immutable factors as geography and resources, has been the Soviet Union: Soviet missiles threatened to bridge the protective oceans and wreak destruction on American territory; Soviet armies threatened to dominate the Eurasian landmass and overwhelm the partners in America's maritime coalition; and Soviet arms threatened American access to resources and sea-lanes from the Middle East to Central America. Moreover, the Soviet Union since its founding has been the exemplar of all Americans consider "evil" in the world. A New World Order that cannot see beyond the breakup and decolonization of what today is the USSR will not long survive in the American marketplace of ideas, and is likely in any event to be overtaken by events in coming months and years.

The techno-military and political revolutions now reshaping the international security environment will require a commensurate rethinking of American defense and national security policy in the 1990s. Military doctrines and concepts will have to be recast to effectively leverage new military technologies; in an era of declining budgets, these new technologies will have to be incorporated creatively and selectively into existing forces; and America and its allies will have to address seriously the range of issues arising from the spread of high-tech and mass-destruction weapons to increasing numbers of states around the world.

Meanwhile, the accelerating collapse of the United States' principal international adversary, the Soviet Union, will find American leaders involved in a renewed debate over national security matters. Without a viable status quo to anchor the debate, discussion increasingly will turn to first principles, to the fundamental values and interests that underlie American security. Even with this debate barely underway, already it is apparent that America has come too far in the past 40 years, and risked too much, to now turn from the world and relinquish its fate to others. U.S. leadership created the revolutionary world of the 1990s; no country is better positioned than America to take advantage of this new environment to secure its interests into the next millennium.

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No Room at the Inn

The Loneliness of the Black Conservative

Clarence Thomas

Clarence Thomas's June 1987 speech before The Heritage Foundation received widespread attention both before and during the hearings on his Supreme Court nomination—mostly because of his praise for natural law and for Lewis Lehrman's article on natural law as applied to abortion. The speech was also an important document for conservatism, because of Mr. Thomas's candid discussions of the difficulties faced by black conservatives—difficulties caused not only by the Left and the civil-rights establishment but by conservatives as well. The support conservatives gave Thomas in his confirmation battle is a sign that some of the problems he addressed in his speech have diminished. It is published here as a reminder of those that remain.

Much has been said about blacks and conservatism. Those on the Left smugly assume blacks are monolithic and will by force of circumstances always huddle to the left of the political spectrum. The political Right watches this herd mentality in action, concedes that blacks are monolithic, picks up a few dissidents, and wistfully shrugs at the seemingly unbreakable hold of the liberal Left on black Americans. But even in the face of this, a few dissidents like Thomas Sowell and J. A. Parker stand steadfast, refusing to give in to the cult mentality and childish obedience that hypnotize black Americans into a mindless political trance. I admire them, and only wish I had a fraction of their courage and strength.

Many pundits have come along in recent years, who claim an understanding of why so many blacks think right and vote left. They offer "the answer" to the problem of blacks failing to respond favorably to conservatism. I, for one, am not certain there is such a thing as "the answer." And, even if there is, I assure you I do not have it.

I have only my experiences and modest observations to offer. First, I may be somewhat of an oddity. I grew up under state-enforced segregation, which is as close to totalitarianism as I would like to get. My household, notwithstanding the myth fabricated by experts, was strong, stable, and conservative. In fact, it was far more conservative than many who fashion themselves conservatives today. God was central. School, discipline, hard work, and knowing right from wrong were of the highest priority. Crime, welfare, slothfulness, and alcohol were enemies. But these were not issues to be debated by keen intellectuals, bellowed about by rousing orators, or dissected by pollsters and researchers. They were a way of life; they marked the path of survival and the escape route from squalor.

My Grandparents' Family Policy

Unlike today, we debated no one about our way of life—we lived it. I must add that my grandparents enforced the no-debate rule. There were a number of concerns I wanted to express. In fact, I did on a number of occasions at a great price. But then, I have always found a way to get in my two cents.

Of course, I thought my grandparents were too rigid and their expectations were too high. I also thought they were mean at times. But one of their often-stated goals was to raise us so that we could "do for ourselves," so that we could stand on our "own two feet." This was not their social policy, it was their family policy—for their family, not those nameless families that politicians love to whine about. The most compassionate thing they did for us was to teach us to fend for ourselves and to do that in an openly hostile environment. In fact, the hostility made learning the lesson that much more urgent. It made the difference between freedom and incarceration; life and death; alcoholism and sobriety. The evidence of those who failed abounded, and casualties lay everywhere. But there were also many examples of success—all of whom, according to my grandfather, followed the straight and narrow path. I was raised to survive under the totalitarianism of segregation, not only without the active assistance of government but with its active opposition. We were raised to survive in spite of the dark oppressive cloud of governmentally sanctioned bigotry. Self-sufficiency and spiritual and emotional security were tools to carve out and secure freedom. Those who attempt to capture the daily counseling, oversight, common sense, and vision of my grandparents in a governmental program are engaging in sheer folly. Government cannot develop individual responsibility, but it certainly can refrain from preventing or hindering the development of this responsibility.

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Drawing by Alexander Hunter for *Policy Review*

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Conservative Gadget Ideas

I am of the view that black Americans will move inexorably and naturally toward conservatism when we stop discouraging them; when they are treated as a diverse group with differing interests; and when conservatives stand up for what they believe in rather than stand against blacks. This is not a prescription for success, but rather an assertion that black Americans know what they want, and it is not timidity and condescension. Nor do I believe gadget ideas such as enterprise zones are of any consequence when blacks who live in blighted areas know that crime, not lack of tax credits, is the problem. Blacks are not stupid. And no matter how good an idea or proposal is, no one is going to give up the comfort of the leftist status quo as long as they view conservatives as antagonistic to their interests, and conservatives do little or nothing to dispel the perception. If blacks hate or fear conservatives, nothing we say will be heard. Let me relate my experience as a designated black/conservative/Republican/Reagan appointee in the civil rights area—our soft underbelly as far as opponents are concerned.

"I grew up under state-enforced segregation, which is as close to totalitarianism as I would like to get."

I begin by noting that there was much that many of us who have been in the [Reagan] administration since the beginning could and should have done. This is at least as true for me as for anyone else. For example, I believe firmly that I should have taken a more aggressive stand against opponents of free enterprise and opponents of the values that are central to success in this society. For me, even more important, I should have been more aggressive in arguing my points with fellow members of the [Reagan] administration and with those who shared my political and ideological bent. With that said, let us take a look at my perception of the past six years.

In 1980 when Ronald Reagan was elected, I was a staffer for Senator John Danforth of Missouri. After the election, Thomas Sowell called to invite me to a conference in San Francisco, later named the Fairmont Conference. It was his hope, and certainly mine, that this conference would be the beginning of an alternative group—an alternative to the consistently leftist thinking of the civil rights leadership and the black leadership. To my knowledge, it was not intended that this group be an antagonist to anyone, but rather that it bring pluralism to the thinking and to the leadership of black Americans. At the conference at the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco, there was much fanfare, considerable media coverage, and high hopes. In retrospect, however, the composition of the conference, the attendees, and their various motives for being there should have been an indication of the problems we would encounter in providing alternative thinking in our society. Some of us went because we felt strongly that black Americans were being fed a steady diet of wrong ideas, wrong thinking, and certainly nothing approaching pluralism. There were some others, however, who appeared there solely to gain strategic political positions in the new [Reagan] administration. This would be the undoing of a great idea. But even so, hopes were high, expectations and spirits were high, and morale was high. For those of us who had wandered in the desert of political and ideological alienation, we had found a home, we had found each other. For me, this was also the beginning of public exposure that would change my life and raise my blood pressure—and anxiety level. After returning from San Francisco, the *Washington Post* printed a major op-ed article about me and my views at the Fairmont Conference. Essentially, the article listed my opposition to busing and affirmative action as well as my concerns about welfare. The resulting outcry was consistently negative.

Castigated and Ridiculed by the Left

Many black Republicans with whom I had enjoyed a working and amicable relationship on Capitol Hill were now distant, and some were even hostile. Letters to the editor castigated and ridiculed me. I was invited to a panel presentation by one organization, "Black Women's Agenda," and scolded by none other than Congressman Harold Washington of Chicago. Although I was initially shocked by the treatment I received, my spirits were not dampened. I was quite enthusiastic about the prospects of black Americans with different ideas receiving exposure. It was in this spirit in 1981 that I joined the [Reagan] administration as an assistant secretary in the Department of Education. I had, initially, declined taking the position of assistant secretary for civil rights simply because my career was not in civil rights and I had no intention of moving into this area. In fact, I was insulted by the initial contact about the position as well as my current position. But policies affecting black Americans had been an all-consuming interest of mine since the age of 16.

I always found it curious that, even though my background was in energy, taxation, and general corporate regulatory matters, I was not seriously sought after to move into one of those areas. But be that as it may, I was excited about the prospects of influencing change. The early enthusiasm was incredible. We had strategy meetings among blacks who were interested in approaching the problems of minorities in our society in a different way—among blacks who saw the mistakes of the past and who were willing to admit error and redirect their energies in a positive way. There was also considerable interest (among some white organizations) in black Americans who thought differently. But, by and large, it was an opportunity to be excited about the prospects of the future—to be excited about the possibilities of changing the course of history and altering the direction of social and civil rights policies in this country. Of course,

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"Martin Luther King was the last prominent American political figure to appeal to natural law....The inherent equality of man is the basis for aggressive enforcement of civil rights laws."

for much of the media and for many organizations, we were mere curiosities. One person asked rhetorically, "Why do we need blacks thinking like whites?" I saw the prospects of proselytizing many young blacks who, like myself, had been disenchanted with the Left; disenchanted with the so-called black leaders; and discouraged by the inability to effect change or in any way influence the thinking of black leaders in the Democratic Party.

Bob Jones Fiasco

But all good things must come to an end. During my first year in the [Reagan] administration, it was clear that the honeymoon was over. The emphasis in the area of civil rights and social policies was decidedly negative. In the civil rights arena, we began to argue consistently against affirmative action. We attacked welfare and the welfare mentality. These are positions with which I agree. But, the emphasis was unnecessarily negative. It had been my hope and continues to be my hope that we would espouse principles and policies which by their sheer force would preempt welfare and race-conscious policies.

The winds were not taken out of our sails until early 1982 when we changed positions in the Supreme Court to support a tax exemption for Bob Jones University which had been previously challenged because of certain racial policies. Although the point being made in the argument that the administrative and regulatory arm of government should not make policies through regulations was a valid point, it was lost in the overall perception that the racial policies of Bob Jones University were being defended. In addition, the perception that the [Reagan] administration did not support an extension of the Voting Rights Act aggravated our problems.

I was intrigued by several events that surrounded both the *Bob Jones* decision and the handling of the Voting Rights Act. As you probably remember, the decision to change positions in the *Bob Jones University* case was made public on Friday afternoon simultaneously with the AT&T break-up. On the following Monday, I expressed grave concerns in a previously scheduled meeting that this would be the undoing of those of us in the [Reagan] administration who had hoped for an opportunity to expand the thinking of and about black Americans. A fellow member of the [Reagan] administration said rather glibly that, in two days, the furor over *Bob Jones* would end. I responded that we had sounded our death knell with that decision. Unfortunately, I was more right than he was.

With respect to the Voting Rights Act, I always found it intriguing that we consistently claimed credit for extending it. Indeed, [President Reagan] did sign it. Indeed, [he] did support the extension of the Voting Rights Act. But by failing to get out early and positively in front of the effort to extend the act, we allowed ourselves to be put in the position of opposing a version of the Voting Rights Act that was unacceptable, and hence we allowed the perception to be created that the [Reagan] administration opposed the Voting Rights Act, not simply a version of it.

Indifference from the Right

Needless to say, the harangues to which we were subjected privately, publicly, and in all sorts of forums were considerable after these two policy decisions. There was no place that any of us who were identified as black conservatives, black Republicans, or black members of the [Reagan] administration could go without being

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virtually attacked and certainly challenged with respect to those two issues specifically and the [Reagan] administration generally. I remember a very good friend of mine complaining to me that he had been attacked simply for being my friend. Apparently the attack was so intense he simply left the event he was attending. They also made his date leave.

If that were not enough, there was the appearance within the conservative ranks that blacks were to be tolerated but not necessarily welcomed. There appeared to be a presumption, albeit rebuttable, that blacks could not be conservative. Interestingly, this was the flip side of the liberal assumption that we consistently challenged: that blacks were characteristically leftist in their thinking. As such, there was the constant pressure and apparent expectation that even blacks who were in the [Reagan] administration and considered conservative publicly had to prove themselves daily. Hence, in challenging either positions or the emphases on policy matters, one had to be careful not to go so far as to lose one's conservative credentials—or so it seemed. Certainly, pluralism or different points of view on the merits of these issues was not encouraged or invited—especially from blacks. And, if advice was given, it was often ignored. Dissent bore a price—one I gladly paid. Unfortunately, I would have to characterize the general attitude of conservatives toward black conservatives as indifference—with minor exceptions. It was made clear more than once that, since blacks did not vote right, they were owed nothing. This was exacerbated by the mood that the electoral mandate required a certain exclusivity of membership in the conservative ranks. That is, if you were not with us in 1976, do not bother to apply.

"The Left exacted a high price for any black who ventured from the fold. And among conservatives, the message was that there is no room at the inn."

For blacks the litmus test was fairly clear. You must be against affirmative action and against welfare. And your opposition had to be adamant and constant or you would be suspected of being a closet liberal. Again, this must be viewed in the context that the presumption was that no black could be a conservative.

Caricatures and Sideshows

Needless to say, in this environment little or no effort was made to proselytize those blacks who were on the fence or who had not made up their minds about the conservative movement. In fact, it was already hard enough for those of us who were convinced and converted to survive. And our treatment certainly offered no encouragement to prospective converts. It often seemed that to be accepted within the conservative ranks and to be treated with some degree of acceptance, a black was required to become a caricature of sorts, providing sideshows of anti-black quips and attacks. But there was more—much more—to our concerns than merely attacking previous policies and so-called black leaders. The future, not the past, was to be influenced.

It is not surprising, with these attitudes, that there was a general refusal to listen to the opinions of black conservatives. In fact, it appeared often that our white counterparts actually hid from our advice. There was a general sense that we were being avoided and circumvented. Those of us who had been identified as black conservatives were in a rather odd position. This caused me to reflect on my college years. The liberals, or more accurately, those on the Left, spent a great deal of time, energy, and effort recruiting and proselytizing blacks by playing on the ill treatment of black Americans in this country. They would devise all sorts of programs and protests in which we should participate. But having observed and having concluded that these programs and protests were not ours and that they were not in the best interest of black Americans, there was no place to go. There was no effort by conservatives to recruit the same black students. It seemed that those with whom we agreed ideologically were not interested and those with whom we did not agree ideologically persistently wooed us. I, for one, had the nagging suspicion that our black counterparts on the Left knew this all along and just sat by and waited to see what we would do and how we would respond. They also knew that they could seal off the credibility with black Americans by misstating our views on civil rights and by fanning the flames of fear among blacks. This is precisely what they did.

Animosity from Other Blacks

I failed to realize just how deep-seated the animosity of blacks toward black conservatives was. The dual labels of black Republicans and black conservatives drew rave reviews. Unfortunately the raving was at us, not for us. The reaction was negative, to be euphemistic, and generally hostile. Interestingly enough, however, our ideas themselves received very positive reactions, especially among the average working-class and middle-class black American who had no vested or proprietary interest in the social policies that had dominated the political scene for the past 20 years. In fact, I was often amazed with the degree of acceptance. But as soon as "Republican" or "conservative" was injected into the conversation, there was a complete about-face. The ideas were okay. The Republicans and conservatives, especially the black ones, were not.

Our black counterparts on the Left and in the Democratic Party assured our alienation. Those of us who were identified as conservative were ignored at best. We were treated with disdain, regularly castigated, and mocked; and of course we could be accused of anything without recourse and with impunity. I find it intriguing that there has been a recent chorus of pleas by many of

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the same people who castigated us, for open-mindedness toward those black Democrats who have been accused of illegalities or improprieties. This open-mindedness was certainly not available when it came to accusing and attacking black conservatives, who merely had different ideas about what was good for black Americans and themselves.

Reckless Media

The flames were further fanned by the media. I often felt that the media assumed that, to be black, one had to espouse leftist ideas and Democratic politics. Any black who deviated from the ideological litany of requisites was an oddity and was to be cut from the herd and attacked. Hence, any disagreement we had with black Democrats or those on the Left was exaggerated. Our character and motives were impugned and challenged by the same reporters who supposedly were writing objective stories. In fact, on numerous occasions, I have found myself debating and arguing with a reporter, who had long since closed his notebook, put away his pen, and turned off his tape recorder. I remember one instance when I first arrived at the Department of Education, a reporter, who happened to be white, came to my office and asked, "What are you all doing to cut back on civil rights enforcement?" I said, "Nothing! In fact, here is a list of all the things we are doing to enforce the law properly and not just play numbers games." He then asked, "You had a very rough life, didn't you?" To this, I responded that I did not; that I did indeed come from very modest circumstances but that I had lived the American dream; and that I was attempting to secure this dream for all Americans, especially those Americans of my race who had been left out of the American dream. Needless to say, he wrote nothing. I have not always been so fortunate.

There was, indeed, in my view, a complicity and penchant on the part of the media to disseminate indiscriminately whatever negative news there was about black conservatives and ignore or bury the positive news. It is ironic that six years ago, when we preached self-help, we were attacked *ad infinitum.* Now it is common among black Democrats to act as though they have suddenly discovered our historical roots and that self-help is an integral part of our roots. We now have permission to talk about self-help. The media were also recklessly irresponsible in printing unsubstantiated allegations that portrayed us as anti-black and anti-civil rights.

Unfortunately, it must have been apparent to the black liberals and those on the Left that conservatives would not mount a positive (and I underscore positive) civil rights campaign. They were confident that our central civil rights concern would give them an easy victory since it was confined to affirmative action—that is, being against affirmative action. They were certain that we would not be champions of civil rights or would not project ourselves as champions of civil rights. Therefore, they had license to roam unfettered in this area claiming that we were against all that was good and just and holy, and that we were hell bent on returning blacks to slavery. They could smirk at us black conservatives because they felt we had no real political or economic

Sygma

"School, hard work, and knowing right from wrong were a way of life; they marked the path of survival and the escape route from squalor."

support. And, they would simply wait for us to self-destruct or disappear, bringing to an end the flirtation of blacks with conservatism.

Interestingly enough, I had been told within the first month of going to the Department of Education in 1981 that we would be attacked on civil rights and that we would not be allowed to succeed. It was as though there was a conspiracy between opposing ideologies to deny political and ideological choices to black Americans. For their part, the Left exacted the payment of a very high price for any black who decided to venture from the fold. And among conservatives, the message was that there is no room at the inn. And if there is, only under very strict conditions.

GOP's Failure of Principle

It appears that we are welcomed by those who dangle the lure of the wrong approach and we are discouraged by those who, in my view, have the right approach. But conservatives must open the door and lay out the welcome mat if there is ever going to be a chance of attracting black Americans. There need be no ideological concessions, just a major attitudinal change. Conservatives must show that they care. By caring I do not suggest or mean the phony caring and tear-jerking compassion being bandied out today. I, for one, do not see how the government can be compassionate; only people can be compassionate and then only with their own money, their own property, or their own effort, not that of others. Conservatives must understand that it is not enough just to be right.

But what is done is done. Let's be blunt. Why should conservatives care about the number of blacks in the [Republican] Party? After all, it can be argued that the resources expended to attract black votes could be spent wooing other ethnic groups or other voters to vote Republican.

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I believe the question of why black Americans should look toward conservative policies is best addressed as part of the general question, why any American should look toward conservative policies. Conservatism's problem and the problem of the post-Reagan Republican Party, the natural vehicle for conservatism, is making conservatism more attractive to Americans in general. In fact, our approach to blacks has been a paradigm of the Republican Party as a whole. The failure to assert principles—to say what we are "for"—plagued the 1986 campaigns. Everyone was treated as part of an interest group.

Blacks just happened to represent an interest group not worth going after. Polls rather than principles appeared to control. We must offer a vision, not vexation. But any vision must impart more than a warm feeling that "everything is just fine—keep thinking the same." We must start by articulating principles of government and standards of goodness. I suggest that we begin the search for standards and principles with the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence.

Now that even *Time* magazine has decided to turn ethics into a cover story, there is at least some recognition that a connection exists between natural law standards and constitutional government. Abraham Lincoln made the connection between ethics and politics in his great pre-Civil War speeches. Lincoln was not only talking about the immediate issue of the spread of slavery but also about the whole problem of self-government, of men ruling others by their consent—and the government of oneself. Thus, almost 130 years ago Lincoln felt compelled to correct the erroneous reading set out in the *Dred Scott* decision:

> They [the Founding Fathers] did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact, they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the *right*, so that the *enforcement* of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and therefore constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere.

Reexamining Natural Law

We must attempt to recover the moral horizons of these speeches. Equality of rights, not of possessions or entitlements, offered the opportunity to be free and self-governing.

The need to reexamine the natural law is as current as last month's [May 25, 1987] issue of *Time* on ethics. Yet it is more venerable than St. Thomas Aquinas. It both transcends and underlies time and place, race and custom. And, until recently, it has been an integral part of the American political tradition. Martin Luther King was the last prominent American political figure to appeal to it. But Heritage Foundation trustee Lewis Lehrman's essay in the *American Spectator* on the Declaration of Independence [April 1987] and the meaning of the right to life is a splendid example of applying natural law.

Briefly put, the thesis of natural law is that human nature provides the key to how men ought to live their lives. As John Quincy Adams put it:

> Our political way of life is by the laws of nature and of nature's God, and of course presupposes the existence of God, the moral ruler of the universe, and a rule of right and wrong, of just and unjust, binding upon man, preceding all institutions of human society and of government.

Without such a notion of natural law, the entire American political tradition, from Washington to Lincoln, from Jefferson to Martin Luther King, would be unintelligible. According to our higher law tradition, men must acknowledge each other's freedom, and govern only by the consent of others. All our political institutions presuppose this truth. Natural law of this form is indispensable to decent politics. It is the barrier against the "abolition of man" that C. S. Lewis warned about in his short modern classic.

This approach allows us to reassert the primacy of the individual, and establishes our inherent equality as a God-given right. This inherent equality is the basis for aggressive enforcement of civil rights laws and equal employment opportunity laws designed to protect individual rights. Indeed, defending the individual under these laws should be the hallmark of conservatism rather than its Achilles' heel. And in no way should this be the issue of those who are antagonistic to individual rights and the proponents of a bigger, more intrusive government. Indeed, conservatives should be as adamant about freedom here at home as we are about freedom abroad. We should be at least as incensed about the totalitarianism of drug traffickers and criminals in poor neighborhoods as we are about totalitarianism in Eastern bloc countries. The primacy of individual rights demands that conservatives be the first to protect them.

Responsibilities of Freedom

But with the benefits of freedom come responsibilities. Conservatives should be no more timid about asserting the responsibilities of the individual than they should be about protecting individual rights.

The principled approach would, in my view, make it clear to blacks that conservatives are not hostile to their interests but aggressively supportive. This is particularly true to the extent that conservatives are now perceived as anti-civil rights. Unless it is clear that conservative principles protect all individuals, including blacks, there are no programs or arguments, no matter how brilliant, sensible, or logical, that will attract blacks to the conservative ranks. They may take the idea and run, but they will not stay and fraternize without a clear, principled message that they are welcome and well protected. ☎

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MAD Dogs and Congressmen

Arguments Against SDI Are Impotent and Obsolete

BAKER SPRING

Support is finally building in Congress for deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles. In August 1991, the full Senate voted for a plan to deploy 100 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) interceptors in Grand Forks, North Dakota, by 1996 and to push for renegotiating the ABM Treaty to permit deployments at additional sites. Congressional interest in missile defenses is likely to increase as uncertainty grows about control over 30,000 Soviet nuclear warheads.

It is therefore useful to review the criticisms that have been leveled at the strategic defense initiative (SDI) since the program's founding in March 1983. Because SDI undermines the key tenet of liberal foreign policy, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), liberal criticism has been shrill. But the shrillness of the voices has only highlighted the distortions and scare tactics resorted to in the campaign to kill SDI.

In general, five criticisms have been leveled at the SDI program since its inception: it would be too expensive; it wouldn't provide 100 percent protection; it would create strategic instability and make nuclear war with the Soviet Union more likely; it would jeopardize U.S.–Soviet relations, particularly in the field of arms control; and it just was not technically feasible.

Each of these criticisms was of questionable validity in the mid-1980s, and subsequent events have shown them to be completely groundless.

Criticism #1: Cost

The easiest way to terminate a defense program is to call it unaffordable, as supporters of the B-2 bomber program can attest. The "sticker shock" tactic has been resorted to with particular zeal by the opponents of SDI, who have put forth outrageous estimates of what it would cost to deploy an SDI system. Jimmy Carter's defense secretary, Harold Brown, warned in 1983, "The proposed defenses against nuclear attack, which could well become the first trillion-dollar defense system, would then constitute a nightmare rather than a hope we would leave to our children in the 21st century." "It would cost something like a trillion dollars to test and deploy weapons," claimed Democratic candidate Walter Mondale in a 1984 presidential debate. By 1985, Sovietologist Stephen Shenfield had doubled the number, maintaining in the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*: "The total cost of a Star Wars [SDI] system may eventually reach $2 trillion."

Technological advances and changes in the SDI architecture have brought down significantly the cost of deploying such defenses. The existing Pentagon proposal for deploying an SDI system, referred to as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (G-PALS), is now estimated to cost about $42 billion, about 2 percent of Shenfield's estimate. This puts the cost of an SDI system within the same general category as other strategic systems. For example, the B-2 program is now estimated to cost about $65 billion; and while there are no firm estimates for the cost of the Midgetman missile system it will likely turn out to cost between $30 billion and $40 billion.

Criticism #2: The Need for a Perfect Defense

Perhaps the strangest criticism leveled at SDI is the assertion that no defense against missile attacks would be worth deploying unless it were virtually 100 percent effective against a large-scale Soviet nuclear strike. This straw-man argument is constructed to convince the public that there is no practical alternative to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). It sets an artificially high standard for SDI, which SDI critics know would be impossible to meet. Harold Brown argued in a March 1983 *Washington Post* column: "If a single weapon can destroy a city of hundreds of thousands, only a perfect defense (which, moreover, works perfectly the first time) will suffice."

The standard set by Brown for deploying SDI would prevent the deployment of any U.S. weapons system. No weapons system will work perfectly every time. But what makes Brown's argument against SDI so disingenuous is the assertion that limited or imperfect defenses have no value. The Patriot system, which performed so well in the Persian Gulf War, did not provide a perfect defense. Still, nobody would argue today that U.S. forces and allies would have been better off if the Patriot had not been sent to Israel and Saudi Arabia because of its imperfec-

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tions. The Senate vote this summer was a direct repudiation of Brown's criticism of SDI. The senators recognized that there is considerable value in protecting the United States and its allies against accidental or small-scale missile strikes.

Criticism #3: Strategic Instability

Liberal critics of the SDI program have taken great pains to charge that the deployment of strategic defenses would increase strategic instability and therefore increase the risk of nuclear war. Editor John Tirman in a publication of the Union of Concerned Scientists made the connection between strategic stability and continued vulnerability explicit: "[A]n attempt by either superpower to protect its population or to develop counterforce weapons designed to attack the other's nuclear forces would be destabilizing. Either of these actions would erode the assured destruction capability of the adversary, undermining mutual deterrence by creating the possibility of a successful first strike."

It is important to remember that the liberal embrace of a strategy of mutual vulnerability underlies an ambitious arms control agenda. As Stanford physicists Sidney Drell and Wolfgang Panofsky wrote in the fall 1984 *Issues in Science and Technology*, "A further serious risk is that the effort to neutralize the effect of nuclear weapons by deploying nationwide missile defenses might make the use of such weapons appear to be more acceptable, thereby deflecting efforts to reduce through negotiations the dangers and burdens of arms competition."

The liberal orthodoxy concerning nuclear vulnerability cannot stand up to scrutiny. No self-respecting society would ever purposely leave itself open to attack. But liberals have come to view such vulnerability as a necessity, subordinating American national security to the quest for improved relations with the Soviet Union. This is why arms control became such a critical element of the liberal agenda. As Drell and Panofsky candidly admitted, they want to use strategic vulnerability to force U.S.–Soviet cooperation. The implicit message is that the United States cannot be trusted to be a responsible power, and therefore MAD's constraints on U.S. foreign policy is a healthy thing.

But MAD itself is a destabilizing doctrine full of internal contradictions. First, purposeful vulnerability is an open invitation to the Soviet Union to build strategic missiles capable of destroying U.S. retaliatory forces, which is exactly what the Soviets did in the 1970s and 1980s. The U.S. inability to protect its retaliatory forces allowed the Soviet Union to devise a carefully designed plan for a first strike without worrying about the complications or uncertainties that U.S. strategic defenses would impose.

Second, liberal criticism of strategic defenses has been one-sided. The Soviet Union historically has spent about 50 percent of its strategic budget on defenses. As of now the Soviets have 2,800 strategic defense weapons. The U.S. has none. The Soviet Union has deployed an antiballistic missile (ABM) system around Moscow, fielded extensive air defenses, and possesses the world's most ambitious civil defense plan. All of these are designed to reduce Soviet vulnerability to nuclear attack.

Perhaps no episode better demonstrates the extent of the liberal double standard than the debate over whether the Soviet Union's phased-array radar near the town of Krasnoyarsk violates the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which all but bans anti-missile defenses. Liberal Congressmen Bob Carr of Michigan, Thomas Downey of New York, and Jim Moody of Wisconsin reported after they visited the radar facility in September 1987: "...we judge it to be not a violation of the ABM Treaty at this time." Two years later Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated: "[T]he construction of this [radar] station, equal in size to the Egyptian pyramids, constituted an open violation of the ABM Treaty." Even Soviet leaders feel compelled to admit what SDI critics seek to deny about Soviet intentions toward building strategic defenses.

Liberals seldom criticize these Soviet programs, which also undercut a policy of mutual vulnerability. Finally, SDI critics fail to explain how purposeful vulnerability, supposedly stabilizing in terms of a purposeful Soviet strike, would not be destabilizing in terms of an accidental or unauthorized Soviet strike or attacks from third countries.

Criticism #4: Soviet Opposition

SDI critics have taken at face value claims by the Soviets that they were unalterably opposed to U.S. deployment of anti-missile defenses. In essence, the Soviet Union threatened to balk at reducing offensive nuclear arsenals if the United States proceeded with SDI. Liberal critics of the SDI program then argued that SDI jeopardized the arms control process. As Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware stated in 1986: "The Soviets are in fact [through their opposition to SDI] expressing no more than the simple logic of arms control, which is that neither side, in its own interest, can agree to sharp reductions in offensive weaponry when faced with the prospect of defensive deployments by the other."

But the fact that these Soviet statements were part of a negotiating ploy, and not truly reflective of Soviet strategic thinking, sometimes put SDI critics in embarrassing positions. For example, after months of parroting Soviet statements that there would be no Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty unless SDI were curtailed, liberals were shame-faced when the Soviets announced in February 1987 that an INF Treaty could be concluded without resolution of the "SDI problem." The INF Treaty was signed later that year, while the SDI program continues to this day. SDI critics are now parroting the same type of statements by the Soviets concerning the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

But reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals are not incompatible with the deployment of non-threatening strategic defenses. In fact, much of the early discussion at the Defense and Space Talks (DST), which are the U.S.–Soviet negotiations concerning SDI, focused on when, not if, defensive deployments would take place. At the December 1987 Washington summit Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to a joint communique that stated it was the objective of both sides to set a period of time after which each could deploy strategic defenses,

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notwithstanding the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. The same communique committed both sides to proceeding expeditiously with negotiations to reduce offensive nuclear arsenals through START. The 1987 communique gives testimony to Soviet willingness to agree to both to the deployment of strategic defenses and the reduction of strategic offensive arsenals, as long the United States does not allow the Soviet Union to gain unilateral advantage. The SDI program has proved to be our strongest negotiating tool for arms control.

Criticism #5: A Defense Is Not Feasible

The final argument SDI critics have resorted to in their attempts to kill the program is that a defense against ballistic missiles is not technically feasible. As Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts charged on the Senate floor in 1985: "We will never know [whether SDI will work], because among other things we could never test the system under realistic wartime conditions ahead of time." Also, an army of liberal scientists and engineers spent countless hours studying ways the Soviet Union could "easily" counter such defenses. The list of Soviet "countermeasures" was lengthy. It included using fast-burn missile boosters, deploying elaborate decoys, shooting down U.S. satellite systems, and increasing the strength of missile bodies to withstand laser attacks. The same scientists and engineers also produced an impressive list of things that they thought would go wrong with an SDI system. They included computer failures, communications breakdowns, and false warnings of attacks from sensors.

The argument that it is not feasible to shoot down ballistic missiles in flight was itself shot down by the performance of the Patriot missile in the Persian Gulf War. Millions of Americans saw on television that anti-missile defenses work. It is important to note that the Patriot had only received limited testing as an anti-missile weapon and had never been used in actual combat prior to the Persian Gulf War.

SDI critics have since retreated from the assertion that it is impossible to shoot down at least shorter-range missiles under combat conditions. But they maintain that long-range strategic missiles are much more difficult to shoot down than Scuds, particularly when such missiles are coupled with Soviet countermeasures. What the critics do not say is that the G-PALS system plans include interceptors much more capable than the Patriot to counter strategic missiles. It includes three layers of defenses, where the Patriot afforded only one. Space-based interceptors called "Brilliant Pebbles" would stop incoming missiles in their boost phase before they released individual warheads. Another interceptor, called the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) would smash individual warheads outside the atmosphere. The final interceptor, called the Exoatmospheric/Endoatmospheric Interceptor, would have the capability to counter strategic warheads after they have re-entered the atmosphere and decoys have been stripped away. This layered defense will be very effective against missile strikes of up to 200 warheads regardless of what countermeasures the Soviets choose to incorporate into their missiles.

Old Orthodoxies

Old orthodoxies die hard. Just this July, Senator Carl Levin, a member of the Armed Services Committee, attacked in a *Washington Post* op-ed the Nunn–Warner plan to deploy limited strategic defenses. He maintained that limited deployment should be scuttled because it would not protect the entire country, would not counter other threats such as "suitcases from nuclear terrorists,"

The argument that it is not feasible to shoot down ballistic missiles in flight was itself shot down by the performance of the Patriot missile in the Persian Gulf War.

and that it would "plunge us into a new round of arms competition with the Soviets." It can be expected that critics of the SDI program will continue to argue that keeping America vulnerable to missile attacks is essential.

But it is an argument they are destined to lose. If for no other reason, the argument in opposition to strategic defenses will lose because it is the product of a liberal dream world, in which both the Soviet Union and the United States would jettison their national interests and even jeopardize their national security in the pursuit of better relations. It is a world where arms control is substituted for a rational and balanced security policy. It is a world in which accidents or miscalculations would never occur. Finally, it is a world where neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would face the threat of missile attacks from third countries. In short, the opposition to anti-missile defenses will have to succumb to the unbending forces of reality. The only question that remains is how much longer will it take?

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The Ice Age Cometh

Remembering the Scare of Global Cooling

Anna J. Bray

While scientists, politicians, and the media alike present global warming as an imminent catastrophe, we might do well to remember what was, 15 to 20 years ago, regarded as an inevitable environmental catastrophe. It was widely believed that an ice age threatened to destroy civilization.

Although most climatologists of that time predicted the return of an ice age, they never agreed upon the possible causes of an ice age, or the extent to which it would occur. Some claimed that increasing amounts of particulate matter in the atmosphere—from volcanic ash to man-made pollutants—reflected sunlight, and thus heat, away from the earth. Others claimed that the earth experienced climatic cycles, due to irregularities in the earth's orbit. Some thought the onset of this ice age would take centuries; others predicted a "snowblitz" that would occur within several decades. An ice age, they said, would result in droughts, a shorter growing season, and worldwide hunger at first, and later in extensive glaciation. The deliberate melting of polar ice, strict pollution regulation, and the stockpiling of food were commonly proposed solutions to the crisis; carbon dioxide-induced warming seemed to be just what the doctor ordered.

So, before we take global warming as a scientific truth, we should note that the opposite theory was once scientific verity. Doomsday predictions have always been popular with the media, as climatologist J. Murray Mitchell, then of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, noted in 1976: "The media are having a lot of fun with this situation. Whenever there is a cold wave, they seek out a proponent of the ice-age-is-coming school and put his theories on page one....Whenever there is a heat wave...they turn to his opposite number, [who predicts] a kind of heat death of the earth."

Senator Pell's Global Warning

"The cooling has already killed hundreds of thousands of people in poor nations. It has already made food and fuel more precious, thus increasing the price of everything we buy. If it continues, and no strong measures are taken to deal with it, the cooling will cause world famine, world chaos, and probably world war, and this could all come by the year 2000."

—Lowell Ponte, *The Cooling*, 1976.

"Mr. Ponte's warning is not as far-fetched as it may seem....If Mr. Ponte's worst fears come to pass, *The Cooling* could prove to be the most important and prophetic popular science book of the 1970s."

—Senator Claiborne Pell (D–RI), foreword to *The Cooling*, 1976.

"The facts have emerged, in recent years and months, from research into past ice ages. They imply that the threat of a new ice age must now stand alongside nuclear war as a likely source of wholesale death and misery for mankind."

—Nigel Calder, former editor of *New Scientist* and producer of scientific television documentaries, "In the Grip of a New Ice Age," *International Wildlife*, July 1975.

Catastrophic Impact

"At this point, the world's climatologists are agreed on only two things: That we do not have the comfortable distance of tens of thousands of years to prepare for the next ice age, and that how carefully we monitor our atmospheric pollution will have direct bearing on the arrival and nature of this weather crisis. The sooner man confronts these facts, these scientists say, the safer he'll be. Once the freeze starts, it will be too late."

—Douglas Colligan, "Brace Yourself for Another Ice Age," *Science Digest*, February 1973.

"There are ominous signs that the earth's weather patterns have begun to change dramatically and that these changes may portend a drastic decline in food production—with serious political implications for just about every nation on earth. The drop in food output could begin quite soon, perhaps only 10 years from

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now....The evidence in support of these predictions has now begun to accumulate so massively that meteorologists are hard-pressed to keep up with it....The central fact is that after three-quarters of a century of extraordinarily mild conditions, the earth's climate seems to be cooling down. Meteorologists disagree about the cause and extent of the cooling trend, as well as over its specific impact on local weather conditions. But they are almost unanimous in the view that the trend will reduce agricultural productivity for the rest of the century."

—Peter Gwynne, *Newsweek*, April 28, 1975.

"According to the academy [National Academy of Sciences] report on climate, we may be approaching the end of a major interglacial cycle, with the approach of a full-blown 10,000-year ice age a real possibility. Again, this transition would involve only a small change of global temperature—two or three degrees—but the impact on civilization would be catastrophic. Scientists once thought the onset of an ice age would be very gradual, with glaciers slowly pushing down from the North, but recent studies...indicate the transition can be rather sudden—a matter of centuries—with ice packs building up relatively quickly from local snowfall that ceases to melt from winter to winter."

—*Science*, March 1, 1975.

"And if the climatologists are correct, who now think that cold conditions in the North are likely to be linked with a drier climate in the tropics, there is also a long list of countries in danger of worsening drought....The onset could still be gradual, giving plenty of time for human populations to adapt to, or combat, the changes, or it could be disastrously rapid. The evidence, though, for the episode of the sudden cooling and for the mechanism of the snowblitz favors a catastrophic view of the threat of ice."

—Nigel Calder, *The Weather Machine*, 1976.

"With many signs today pointing to the possibility that the earth may be headed for another ice age, minor or major...there is suddenly renewed interest within the scientific community for some sort of monitoring of the sun's input.

"'I seriously doubt if we're headed toward another Wisconsin glaciation,' Eddy [Dr. John A. Eddy, then of the National Center for Atmospheric Research] said, speaking of the last great Ice Age that smothered much of the Northern Hemisphere under huge sheets of ice more than 11,000 years ago. 'But a cooling trend like this could bring on a little ice age.'"

—*New York Times*, August 14, 1975.

"Certain signs, some of them visible to the layman as well as the scientist, indicate we may have been watching an ice age approach for some time without realizing what we were seeing....

"As Ewing [geophysicist Maurice Ewing, then director of Columbia University's Lamont Geological Observatory] and [geologist William] Donn read the evidence, an ice age will result from a slow warming and rising of the ocean that is now taking place....They predict that it will cause great snows which the world has not seen since the last ice age thousands of years ago....The advance south will be slow, but if it [the wall of ice] follows the route of previous ice ages, it will encase in ice large parts of North America and Europe....Its coming is an inevitable consequence of the cycle which Ewing and Donn believe is now taking place."

—Betty Friedan, "The Coming Ice Age," *Harper's Magazine*, September 1958.

"The cooling since 1940 has been large enough and consistent enough that it will not soon be reversed, and we are unlikely to quickly regain the 'very extraordinary period of warmth' that preceded it. Even this mild diagnosis can have 'fantastic implications' for present-day humanity, Wallen [C. C. Wallen, then of the World Meteorological Organization] says."

—*Science*, March 1, 1975.

"The surface temperature of the whole North Atlantic has cooled one-eighth of the way back to full ice-age conditions and the Gulf Stream has migrated to the south, forcing fishermen who had ventured northward back to traditional grounds."

—Anthony Wolff, "Are We Headed for a New Ice Age?" *Current*, May–June 1976.

"The armadillo, which once ranged as far north as Nebraska, has been retreating steadily southward. A species of heat-loving snail reportedly has vanished from the forests of Central Europe. Glaciers which had been retreating until 1940 have begun to advance. The North Atlantic is cooling down about as fast as an ocean can cool. The growing seasons in England and Scandinavia are getting shorter."

—David Salisbury, *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 27, 1974.

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Frozen Oceans

"For aerosols...the net effect of increase in density is to reduce the surface temperature of earth. Because of the exponential dependence of the backscattering, the rate of temperature decrease is augmented with increasing aerosol content. An increase by only a factor of four in global aerosol background concentration may be sufficient to reduce the surface temperature by as much as 3.5 degrees Kelvin. If sustained over a period of several years, such a temperature decrease over the whole globe is believed to be sufficient to trigger an ice age."

—Dr. S. I. Rasool and Dr. S. H. Schneider, "Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide and Aerosols: Effects of Large Increases on Global Climate," *Science*, July 9, 1971.

"The continued rapid cooling of the earth since World War II is also in accord with the increased global air pollution associated with industrialization, mechanization, urbanization, and an exploding population, added to a renewal of volcanic activity....I believe that increasing global air pollution, through its effect on the reflectivity of the earth, is currently dominant and is responsible for the temperature decline of the past decade or two."

—Reid Bryson, "Environmental Roulette," *Global Ecology: Readings Toward a Rational Strategy for Man*, John P. Holdren and Paul R. Ehrlich, eds., 1971.

"A model of future climate based on the observed orbital-climate relationships...predicts that the long-term trend over the next several thousand years is toward extensive Northern Hemisphere glaciation."

—J. D. Hays, John Imbrie, and N. J. Shackleton, "Variations in the Earth's Orbit: Pacemaker of the Ice Ages," *Science*, December 10, 1976.

"We know that we are in the middle of an ice age, and we know that we are living in an interglacial interlude....Only 13,000 years ago the vast ice sheets of Scandinavia and North America were still with us, and now that they have gone we know it is only a matter of time before they come again."

—Brian S. John, *The Ice Age: Past and Present*, 1977.

"...Studies of both short-term climate patterns (the past 300 years or so) and of long-term cycles (thousands of years) point to the same tentative but harsh conclusion: We've been living in warmer than normal times—and we may have to face an increasingly cold future."

—George Alexander, "Will This Winter Be Like Last Year's?" *Popular Science*, October 1977.

"The sensitivity of climate was pointed up independently by a Soviet and an American scientist, who concluded that a permanent drop of only 1.6 to 2 percent in energy reaching the earth 'would lead to an unstable condition in which continental snow cover would advance to the Equator...[and] the oceans would eventually freeze,' according to a recent U.S. scientific advisory report."

—Samuel W. Matthews, "What's Happening to Our Climate?" *National Geographic*, November 1976.

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LETTERS

Angelo Codevilla, Robert H. Krieble and Paul M. Weyrich, Brian Crozier, James H. Brusstar, Paula Dobriansky, Jeffrey T. Bergner, Ewa M. Thompson, Ray S. Cline, William J. Durch, John Pike, Kate Michelman, Talcott Camp, Elizabeth Richman, Jacob Levy, Senator Robert W. Kasten Jr., John Patrick Feehery, Morton C. Blackwell

Editor's note: The letters in response to Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.'s article as well as Mr. Fairbanks' response were received prior to the attempted coup in August.

Birth of a Revolution

Dear Sir:

Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.'s "Russian Roulette: The Dangers of a Collapsing Empire" (Summer 1991) is the most perceptive treatment yet of what the Soviet Union's decay means for the United States.

Talk of a "new world order" notwithstanding, our foreign policy establishment underestimates the dimensions of the upheavals in the East. It has "bet the farm" on a peaceful transition to a regime run by the *nomenklatura* that would be the global co-manager that Franklin Roosevelt and American Progressives have always wanted. But the Communist *nomenklatura* is no more willing and it is less able to play this role today than it ever was.

Blood-Grudge

Mr. Fairbanks is quite right that the "titanic forces...accumulated over 70 years" are going to produce cataclysms that no one can control and that the U.S. had better prepare to defend against. There is hardly a family in the Soviet Union that does not nurse a blood-grudge against Communists. Hence, the Communists cannot peacefully dismount their tiger. They have also built their lives on scaring the world with nuclear weapons. These weapons are the last world-class assets they control.

The U.S. government, in its "technocratic optimism," regards the Soviet regime as a mere mega-error in economic policy that may be remedied by economic advice-*cum*-aid. Soviet economic problems, however, are due to the very presence of a parasitic *nomenklatura*. Because retirement is the last thing on their minds, economic dealings with them will be a waste.

Ruthless Men

Our dealings with regard to arms control may do far more harm. Note that at a time of economic collapse, the men in charge of the Soviet Union have made their careers and their self-images in the internal or external exercise of violence. These men have no reason to fear for their lives. The assets most certainly in their hands are the professional troops who manage nuclear weapons systems (as well as *Spetsnaz* units). And even these may split. The armed forces, who control the launch systems, might well fight the KGB units, who control the warheads, for sole control of nuclear weapons systems.

There are also thousands of people in the Soviet Union who, disillusioned as they might be with Communism, still see strategic nuclear power as the only way for themselves and their country to be major players in the world. All these people, plus legions of rebels coming from every ethnic and ideological direction, will be making their decisions in a context that Mr. Fairbanks calls "Weimar Russia"—where people know that guns compel butter and are eager to make somebody else "pay." It is the height of imprudence to assume that all this accumulated power and hatred will not result in civil war, and that this war will not overflow Soviet borders.

The U.S. government, however, has officially forgotten that there exist in the Soviet Union today roughly four ballistic missile warheads for every American strategic target. The U.S. government considers in bad taste any reference to the fact that under the START Treaty that ratio is likely to worsen—for us—by a factor of two. Most important, in homage to the present Soviet regime, the president and his national security adviser insist on adhering to the ABM Treaty, which continues to guarantee that any warhead launched against the United States will get through. Whom does any of this please in the Soviet Union besides the very worst elements? What sorts of options do these U.S. government policies give to whoever might control the Soviet arsenal?

In sum, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union is based on the view that peaceful evolution has already removed the main danger.

Mr. Fairbanks and *Policy Review* do a public service by pointing out that the revolution is just beginning, and that the most dangerous years may lie ahead.

Angelo Codevilla
Senior Research Fellow
Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA

Soviet Civil War

Dear Sir:

We strongly agree with Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. that the current situation in the Soviet Union confirms the wisdom of President Reagan's original decision to develop the strategic defense initiative. If that were in place, even imperfectly, we

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would be largely immune from the possible doomsday scenario that Mr. Fairbanks envisions as the Soviet empire collapses. But American diplomacy, stuck in the old ways, persists in negotiating treaties that would have had little validity even under the former order of things. In our new situation, when it becomes daily less and less clear who is in charge of anything in the Soviet Union, it is simply foolish to think we have achieved something worthwhile by concluding agreements such as START.

Changing World

Indeed the international environment today illustrates the inadequacy of the American foreign policy approach to the world: the State Department insists upon dealing with governments when we barely know who heads them now, and it yearns for stability (especially in the Communist world, including Yugoslavia, which heretofore always seemed so stable) at a time when we must operate in a world of flux. Still, we cannot entirely agree with Mr. Fairbanks when he argues that Soviet nuclear forces may be more threatening (to us) rather than less threatening at a time of internal instability. Soviet nuclear forces are under the control of well-trained military professionals, not Moslem fanatics; and it is difficult to imagine that, even in a time of internal turmoil, those professionals could perceive any advantage in launching nuclear rockets either against a foreign power or against rivals within the Soviet Union. During a civil conflict—even a bloody one—within the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons are most likely simply to be irrelevant.

If this is so, then a civil conflict within the Soviet Union will not have any negative impact upon our security interests provided only that we do not further delude ourselves into thinking that we can influence its outcome to any substantial degree.

Robert H. Krieble
Chairman
Paul M. Weyrich
President
The Krieble Institute of
the Free Congress Foundation
Washington, DC

Gorbachev Still a Leninist

Dear Sir:

Mr. Fairbanks starts on a triumphalist note: "The demise of Leninism is an awe-inspiring victory for freedom" but later raises the specter of Moscow's use of Third-World Communists as an instrument of power.

It is important to remember exactly what Leninism is. Its two basic elements are: 1) the right to a permanent monopoly of power by the ruling party; and 2) the duty to extend that power to all countries of the world without exception.

The "legitimacy" of Leninism derives from the assertion of its

founder that it is the only way to enshrine Marxism, first in Russia and in time the world over, and keep it there forever.

It is crucial to an understanding of what is going on in the Soviet Union to ask oneself whether, and to what degree, Mikhail Gorbachev still believes himself to be a Leninist. His book *Perestroika* is peppered with loyalist references to Lenin, with hardly a mention of Marx or Marxism. On the analogy of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) he argues that Lenin, if alive today, would approve of perestroika.

But can Leninism survive without its legitimizing element, Marxism? Gorbachev sparked the revolutions of Eastern Europe in 1989–1990, even though they spun out of control, at least in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. There is nothing un-Leninist in Gorbachev's current behavior. The party, is still in office, if not wholly in power. Gorbachev's slogan of a "common European home" is echoed in the four bilateral treaties Gorbachev concluded last fall (two with Germany, one with France, one with Italy), and the ploy of persuading the West to pay for the financial consequences of seven decades of Marxist–Leninist mismanagement is in the purest Leninist tradition.

In his handwritten memorandum to foreign commissar Chicherin, Lenin argued that capitalist "deaf mutes" would give the Communists the credits needed and would work hard to "prepare their own suicide."

In contrast, Boris Yeltsin repudiated Lenin when he tore up his party card at the 23rd Party Congress a year ago. His problem, as the Soviet Union's first major elected leader, lies in the static power of the entrenched bureaucracy. The party may be discredited, but it controls the buildings, the transportation, the newsprint, and the printing and television equipment.

Western leaders are profoundly mistaken in their policy of supporting Gorbachev, thus allowing the Leninist party to maintain its static power. As for the military dangers, they have certainly diminished; but do not forget that there are still more than 300,000 Soviet troops in eastern Germany and a large number in Poland. Personally, I am less worried than Mr. Fairbanks is about the nuclear danger. This view, however, would change if indeed a KGB–military coup were to take place. The hold of the KGB on the armed forces (through its third chief directorate) has probably been weakened, but not yet to the stage where a "Bonapartist" coup could take over.

A final thought: nuclear weapons are a singularly inept means of restoring internal order; and although insanity cannot be ruled out, it does seem unlikely that a nuclear strike on the outside world would be ordered for the fun of it.

Brian Crozier
London, UK

Power in the Republics

Dear Sir:

Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.'s thesis—that the security threat from the Soviet Union or its successor regimes has not disappeared—is

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well taken. However, his argument that Soviet nuclear forces are likely to become more threatening as a result of the present upheaval in the Soviet Union is overstated.

Mr. Fairbanks's portrayal of the future of the USSR is excessively dismal. His dismissal of the republics as having legitimacy but no power is cavalier, and a serious misreading of the dynamics of current Soviet politics. Nine of the republics, comprising over 90 percent of the population and territory of the USSR, have been negotiating with Gorbachev over a new union treaty redefining the relationship between the central government and the republics. The republics have demanded—and to a large measure obtained—increased political power at the expense of the central government. In turn, the new relationship with the more popularly supported republics has given the central government greater legitimacy. In this way the union treaty process has gone a long way in establishing the foundation for a stable political transition in the Soviet Union.

In particular, Mr. Fairbanks could have paid more attention to the serious effort underway to increase the nine republics' involvement in defense policy-making. Since mid-July of this year, a series of meetings between the leaders of these republics and the Soviet Ministry of Defense have been taking place to work out the details of how the republics will participate in the policy-making process. For their part, the nine republics, on whose territory most Soviet nuclear weapons are deployed, have all endorsed the central government's control over the armed forces, including nuclear forces, as long as the republics have the say they seek in defense policies.

In sum, Mr. Fairbanks's skepticism about the ability of the Soviet Union to quickly "raise from the whirling dust storm the serene white marble pillars of the New Order" is prudent. However, there are other alternatives besides increased disarray and disintegration.

Mr. Fairbanks also postulates two developments in the Soviet domestic situation that would increase the possibility of military conflict. The first is the emergence of a fascist state from a "Weimar Russia." The second is the serious threat of territorial realignments between the non-Russian republics and Eastern Europe. The possibility of the first development is remote; the second is more realistic. However, Mr. Fairbanks's arguments could have been stronger if he had directly pointed out the reality that Europe faces for the foreseeable future, even beyond the implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement. The Soviet Union, or whatever political entity replaces it, will still have the biggest standing army on the continent. Furthermore, the new generation of leaders in the Soviet Union may not be inhibited from using force against their neighbors to achieve a limited political objective—particularly if they perceive that their sovereignty is threatened.

James H. Brusstar
Senior Fellow
National Defense University
Institute for National
Strategic Studies
Washington, DC

Democracy Rises from the Ashes

Dear Sir:

Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. provides an excellent account of the ongoing developments in the Soviet Union. Unlike so many pundits, his accounting of the strategic pros and cons engendered by the collapsing Soviet empire is a balanced one. On the positive side is the virtual demise of the erstwhile Soviet blitzkrieg strategy; indeed, "the loss of Eastern Europe disrupted everything that had been carefully prepared [by Moscow] for war for 40 years." To be sure, as some Western analysts, including myself, have argued, Moscow was in the process of revising its approach to possible military operations in Western Europe, and restructuring its theater-based military forces, as early as the beginning of the 1980s. This change of heart by the Soviet general staff was attributable to the advent of the third revolution in military affairs, and Moscow's conclusion that its densely packed, forward-deployed military forces were becoming vulnerable to NATO's long-range air power and "smart" strike systems. Thus, the collapse of the Eastern European Communist regimes merely ratified the direction in which the Soviet military was moving anyway—a more protracted war in Eurasia, that proceeds in several

phases, requires mobilization, and features leaner, high-quality military forces. The success of any such venture would, of course, depend both on domestic conditions in the USSR, as well as NATO's ability to sustain a vigorous defense effort in the years ahead.

An equally important benefit of the imperial collapse is the death of Communism, both "as a doctrine and as an organization unified by that doctrine." The fact that Communism has proved both its spiritual bankruptcy and its inability to foster economic prosperity and political stability greatly lessens its attraction to various modernizing Third-World regimes. It also removes a great deal of messianic and anti-systemic ethos from Soviet foreign policy.

So much for the good news. Mr. Fairbanks lists a number of key problems stemming from the ongoing imperial collapse. These range from what he terms the divorce between power and legitimacy in the Soviet Union—a point also poignantly described in Zbigniew Brzezinski's recent book, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (1989)—economic chaos, ethnic and religious clashes, nuclear terrorism, civil war, and other

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phenomena adding up to what Stephen Sestanovich has called "Weimar Russia"; a Hobbesian state of nature would be an equally apt characterization. To the extent that Mr. Fairbanks tries to predict the future of the Soviet Union, he is not particularly optimistic. With few exceptions, *e.g.*, the Baltics, he does not seem to give much credence to the notion that stable democracy can be established in much of the present Soviet Union.

Perhaps he is correct in his pessimism; certainly, a prudent Western policy must consider all of the alternatives. I personally believe, however, that out of all the suffering and privations that presently exist in the USSR, a true democracy may well be born. To be sure, basing one's policy solely on this prospect is foolhardy. Yet, not doing the best we can to bring about this outcome would be inexcusable. To the extent that the requirements of maintaining stability and promoting liberty may be presently in conflict in the Soviet Union, Western foreign policy should be animated by a judicious balance between the two. Arguably, a policy that serves to promote only immediate stability and ignores the demands of liberty is not only morally flawed, but risks prompting even greater instability in the long run.

Paula Dobriansky
Associate Director for Programs
United States Information Agency
Washington, DC

The views expressed in this letter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of any agency of the U.S. government.

U.S. Response to Change

Dear Sir:

It has become almost an article of faith that a collapsing empire is a dangerous (some even say more dangerous) empire. For perspective, let's begin by saying that a collapsing empire is by no means as dangerous as an expanding empire.

Out of all the suffering and privations that presently exist in the USSR, a true democracy may well be born. To be sure, basing one's policy solely on this prospect is foolhardy. Yet, not doing the best we can to bring about this outcome would be inexcusable.

—Paula Dobriansky

Indeed, if we look at the causes that have drawn Americans into conflict in this century, they have far more to do with resisting the growth of other powers than with properly managing their decline. This is certainly true of the war against Hitler's Germany in Europe and of the war against Japan in the Pacific. It is also true of the wars in Korea and Vietnam, as well as of the U.S. response to Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait. Indeed, the two most dangerous moments of the Cold War—the Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crisis—were both triggered by Soviet efforts to *expand* its power.

Perhaps Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. himself has made the best possible comparison with the present time, in likening it to Latin America after the collapse of Spanish colonial dominion. Although American diplomacy as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine helped to shape responses to that collapse, it was certainly not a highly dangerous occasion in world affairs. In this regard, we seem to have far less to concern ourselves about than we did a decade or so ago.

Nevertheless, Mr. Fairbanks has offered a remarkably useful enumeration of the problems that could emerge as a result of the decline of the Soviet Union. Some of these eventualities are less likely than others. For example, it seems unlikely that we will see a resurgence of Soviet Third-World adventurism in the near future. A declining empire, after all, is a declining empire. The USSR appears to have lost its missionary zeal to impose its will on anyone outside its borders. Its problem is whether there exists a will to impose anything on people *within* its borders. In fact, creation of a new client state in some far-flung corner of the world (And on what basis—the appeal of Marxism? The promise of Soviet aid? A chance to buy Soviet goods?) seems to me less likely than the early return of Soviet troops in eastern Germany to play some role in a Soviet civil conflict.

How then should the United States respond to these widely divergent possibilities? Mr. Fairbanks is certainly correct that we should not slash the defense budget. But I am afraid that we must go beyond saying that we cannot cut our defense spending because we live in an uncertain world—this rationale simply will not provide the political force necessary to combat the many voices now arising to say that we should turn inward and drop our foreign preoccupations.

Theoretically, it is possible to do all that we need to do for an active defense with as little as 4 percent of GNP—to maintain forces in Europe and Asia, to create a sizable rapid-deployment force, to maintain our nuclear forces, and to press forward with strategic defense. But our danger lies in the fact that any clarity as to why we should do these things, particularly to remain deeply involved in the security structures of Europe and Asia, is rapidly slipping away in the American political consciousness.

The principal threat in the next years is how *we* respond to the sweeping changes now occurring. If we take refuge in murky economic determinism, and lose sight of the crucial role we still play in the political and security structures within which worldwide economic competition takes place, we will have ourselves to blame. The present time

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demands clarity about the limits of our commitments, to be sure; but it demands no less clarity about why they must remain so extensive.

Jeffrey T. Bergner
President
Bergner, Boyette, & Bockorny
Washington, DC

A Weak and Peaceful Russia

Dear Sir:

In an exceptionally insightful and lucid article, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. worries about the possibility of increased danger for the West from the disintegrating Soviet Russian empire. He should have looked at the history of Russia for possible precedents. Historically speaking, a weak Russia at odds with the West was a peaceful Russia, whereas a Russia that was shored up by the West usually became a Russia that threatened the West.

In World War I and the Crimean War Russia fought the European powers, while during the Russo–Japanese War it received no help from the European powers. In contrast, in 1815, when Russia became part of the Holy Alliance concluded after the Napoleonic Wars, it gained territory, whetting its appetite for more; hence the Crimean War. When the Western democracies shored up the Soviet Russia government in World War II, Soviet Russia scored large territorial gains and shortly afterward became enemy number one of the Western democracies.

If these historical precedents are taken into account, it appears that the Russians are likely to be calmed rather than made belligerent by their loss of prestige, economic decline, and a possible emergence of independent states on the fringes of the empire.

Russocentric Paradigm

It should also be remembered that while economic disintegration has affected the entire Soviet Union (*i.e.*, both Russians and non-Russians), "the Soviet nuclear menace" should more properly be called "the Russian nuclear menace" since it is not Georgians, Lithuanians, or even Ukrainians, but Russians who control the strategic weapons. If the nuclear weapons are in the hands of Russians, it follows that our policy should distinguish between Russians and the rest of the Soviet population. But we know next to nothing about the agendas and history of those non-Russians. American scholarship about them is based almost exclusively on Russian sources, and policy debates are dependent on the terms of discourse developed in response to information that has been coming to us via Moscow and Leningrad. To assess correctly the impact of the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union, new information has to be acquired from those representing nationalistic forces within the republics. For the United States to continue its policy of dealing with the peoples of the Soviet Union according to a Russocentric paradigm would be short-sighted and ill-advised. It also seems critical to make sure that "that gigantic burglar alarm," Eastern Europe, is not again obliged to funnel its resources to the Moscow planners.

Ewa M. Thompson
Professor of Slavic Studies
Rice University
Houston, TX

End of the Nuclear Era

Dear Sir:

Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. makes many excellent observations about the collapsing empire, but some of his views are wrong.

My first criticism deals with the author's statement that Soviet nuclear forces "are likely to become more threatening, rather than less threatening." The fact that Gorbachev has been able to force the Soviet military hierarchy to accept the START Treaty means that the nuclear era is over. Actually, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States intended to use nuclear weapons except as a last resort, and they both intended to avoid the last resort by every feasible means. Nikita Khrushchev withdrew the nuclear missiles from Cuba in 1962 under duress. He knew that the United States had many more intercontinental missiles and bombers than the Soviet Union. Khrushchev had no option to use nuclear weapons to his advantage.

While theoretically a maverick military dictator controlling one or two nuclear weapons might fire one against his enemies, this is not the same as wholesale nuclear destruction. Moreover, any military dictator crazy enough to launch a nuclear missile or explode a bomb would be utterly destroyed either by the United States or the Soviet Union.

Historically speaking, a weak Russia at odds with the West was a peaceful Russia, whereas a Russia that was shored up by the West usually became a Russia that threatened the West.
—Ewa M. Thompson

On the other hand, Mr. Fairbanks is dead right about the conflict "between power and legitimacy," which will agonize the Soviet Union for many years. And he correctly recognizes that U.S. policy-makers will have limited capability to shape events in the Soviet Union. The Communist ideology has been thoroughly discredited, it is true, but the struggles between the power centers and a free-market democratic institutional system will continue.

The KGB, the military leadership cadre, and the *nomenklatura* bureaucracy of the old Communist Party have been the center of power for 70 years. They will not give up easily. It was the KGB, then led by Yuri Andropov, that invented Gorbachev—plucked out of the lower ranks of the party—to modernize

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and improve the image of the party and the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately for the KGB, Gorbachev's wavering between "power and legitimacy" has done little to modernize the Soviet Union. In fact, the decentralization of the old empire has put the Soviet Union on indefinite hold. The GNP is probably going down 10 to 15 percent this year—an economic disaster that may bring the "power people" back into ascendancy. Since not even the Russians themselves know exactly what will happen, it is wise for Americans to watch closely but reserve judgment about how the Soviet Union will evolve.

Ray S. Cline
Chairman
U.S. Global Strategy Council
Washington, DC

Extensive Defenses Unnecessary

Dear Sir:

Conservative and liberal strategists alike are having trouble reorienting themselves to the post-Cold War era, but by deleting most of the "Communist" references from an otherwise familiar array of conservative political arguments, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. reveals the driving force behind those arguments, and their accompanying political agenda: fear of the unknown, of dangers (in Mr. Fairbanks's words) "unfamiliar and strange."

Of those dangers, attack by Soviet nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles is potentially the most catastrophic to the United States, but also most remote. Tactical weapons, which are smaller, designed to be moved, and more widely dispersed are a greater potential problem, but the threats they pose cannot be countered by the globe-girdling defenses that Mr. Fairbanks proposes.

If we do wish to hedge against accidents, or one rogue submarine, let us dust off the Grand Forks ABM site permitted by the ABM Treaty. Or, for improved coverage, let us negotiate a return to two sites apiece, as permitted initially by the treaty, and position them nearer the coasts, coupling these deployments to on-site inspections and component-production monitoring to deter breakout.

If we wish to protect expeditionary forces against regional missile threats, let us continue to upgrade the Patriot and deploy longer-legged systems like THAAD, but at the same time clarify with Moscow the currently murky boundaries between unlimited anti-tactical missiles systems and treaty-limited ABM. Why? Until we are more comfortable with one another as non-adversaries, U.S. and Soviet strategic forces will remain trained on each other to maintain the paradoxical comfort of the nuclear standoff. Reductions in those forces need to be symmetric, to preserve the comfort level. That is the function of START. To try for similar symmetry through active defenses would require even more arduous negotiation, and if there are still prospects for talks with Moscow, why not direct our energies toward deeper cuts in strategic warheads?

Extensive defenses will give ammunition to the most xenophobic of Russian militarists, reinforce their traditional sense of encirclement, and give them a reason to divert scarce resources to the very strategic systems about which Mr. Fairbanks worries most.

—William J. Durch

Arming Xenophobes

If we abandon that route now and go for extensive defenses, as Mr. Fairbanks suggests, we won't have them in time to weather the most critical period in the political transition of Soviet Eurasia, namely the next five years. But such policies *will* give ammunition to the most xenophobic of Russian militarists, reinforce their traditional sense of encirclement, and give them a reason to divert scarce resources to the very strategic systems about which Mr. Fairbanks worries most. Meanwhile, we would add many billions to a U.S. defense budget that can hardly support the downsized conventional forces that will surely be needed in lesser, but more likely, contingencies around the world.

Prudence may suggest deployment of treaty-limited defenses, but technology will never make us safe. If we want to ward off catastrophe, better to stay actively involved, along with the other industrial democracies, in the dramas now unfolding in Europe and the USSR, using the duller but more directly effective tools of political, technical, and economic support.

William J. Durch
Senior Associate
The Henry L. Stimson Center
Washington, DC

Nuclear Threat Is Dead

Dear Sir:

The contention of Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. that the potential for disintegration of the Soviet Union provides a case for deploying the strategic defense initiative is not compelling. SDI has been reduced to a capability in search of a mission, but that search has not ended with the threat of the Soviet civil war.

Responding to unauthorized launches is the one threat that requires deployment of a large SDI system. Although it would certainly be imprudent to ignore the consequences of Soviet nuclear war, the threat to America is greatly exaggerated.

While the threat of rogue submarine commanders is a staple of popular fiction, reality is somewhat less frightening. General Colin Powell testified, "We have a pretty

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good handle on how the Soviets manage to control their nuclear weapons, [and] I think that's something of a stretched scenario that does not cause me any great concern. I think they have very good control over their systems, and they treat them with the same care that we do."

Strict KGB Control

Warheads for tactical nuclear weapons are stored away from their launchers under strict KGB control. Says Henry Dodds, editor of *Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review*, "The depots that the weapons would be held in and the security systems would be such that only another army would be capable of getting into the depots and taking the weapons." The Soviets have already increased the consolidation of nuclear weapons, withdrawing them from the troubled Transcaucasus. Except for a few SS-18s in Kazakhstan, Soviet ICBMs are only deployed in the Russian Republic and the Ukraine (which intends to become a nuclear-free zone).

Bruce Blair, noted command-and-control expert at the Brookings Institution, observes that "Everyone agrees that the Soviets have really intense, tight controls on their nuclear weapons." The Soviets follow the American practice of having two officers in each ICBM launch-control center, both of whom must independently authorize the launch of their missiles. One of these officers is from the KGB, the other from the Strategic Rocket Forces.

While American submarine commanders are not burdened by such permissive action links (PALs), the concerted effort of several senior officers, at stations throughout the submarine, is required to launch the submarine's missiles. Soviet procedures are undoubtedly equally rigorous.

No plausible scenario has been painted that would explain why any Georgian or Lithuanian nuclear weapons would be aimed at the United States. All of the political ferment in the USSR has been over control of territory. Why, for example, would anyone fighting to achieve an independent Latvia or Armenia launch nuclear weapons at the United States and risk turning their newly liberated territory into a sea of radioactive glass?

Are these methods foolproof? Perhaps not. Can more be done? Undoubtedly. Instituting PALs on naval vessels, for example, would generate benefits in addition to tighter control over nuclear weapons. Until such a review establishes the futility of alternatives to Star Wars, the case for extensive modifications to the ABM Treaty remains unproven.

John Pike
Director
Space Policy Project
Federation of American Scientists
Washington, DC

Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. replies:

I am very grateful for the serious reflection my article seems to have provoked. I agree with Brian Crozier that it is profoundly necessary to study the Leninist aspects of Gorbachev's conduct. But I cannot agree that "there is nothing un-Leninist in Gorbachev's current behavior." What, in Leninism, is the one thing you should never give up? Power. By allowing partly free elections, Gorbachev has given up a substantial part of the party's power. Our reluctance to admit the increasingly obvious fact that Gorbachev has not done Soviet Communism any good has been very damaging to the conservative voice in Western policy.

Ewa Thompson makes a sophisticated case for letting Russia drift, but the examples of the Russo–Japanese and 1914–1918 wars seem to cut two ways. What we got out of these wars was Bolshevism, no longer a fringe group, but now in control of a mighty state; the collapse of the sense of an international community with common standards of decency; and a nuclear-armed world that for me, at least, remains dangerous.

With this I turn to the optimists. Paula Dobriansky argues the relationship between stability and freedom cogently, and may have somewhat exaggerated my pessimism. I agree that a true democracy *may* be born, but it cannot happen without many tribulations, at best, and that several much worse outcomes are very possible.

With the remarks of Messrs. Durch, Brusstar, and Pike we cross into a different country: one where we can "clarify *with Moscow*" our exact mutual obligations, because the union treaty process is safely and surely turning an utterly discredited and failed despotism into a popular and legitimate state that just happens to have the same leader. In this country, the Federation of American Scientists is confident, the crash of historic hopes, the ruin of whole social classes and of myriad lives, and the disintegration of the state will leave certain bureaucratic routines entirely untouched. In this country, the Defense Ministry and the republics are meeting to "work out *the details* of how the republics will participate in the policy-making process"—as though everything else was already firm. Perhaps Mr. Brusstar alludes to the agreement between the Soviet General Staff and the Uzbek Republic, over the head of the feeble president, that Uzbek soldiers do not have to serve in Transcaucasia, that is, where the USSR needs them. To me, this sounds like a country that does not have a government in the sense we understand it. In all three of these comments, I sense the impossibility of believing that there can exist a country without a government that people accept as basically legitimate and obey out of habit. The country they describe sounds very nice; it is not the country I returned from recently, whose very capital was already gripped by the confusion, the hedonism, and the desperation of a city under siege.

In comparison with these unworldly expectations, Messrs. Weyrich and Krieble have the intellectual honesty to recognize confusion when they see it. Theirs has been the most impressive conservative response to perestroika. They displayed the political qualities necessary to re-orient themselves in a new situation and to see how it could become an opportunity for the exercise of conservative energy and faith

Specter of Nuclear War

On the nuclear issue I sensed a dawning agreement between the Left and the Right: What's all the fuss about nuclear weapons? I wonder whether we are already for-

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getting much of what we learned in the 1950s. First, the greatest nuclear dangers come not from someone's intent to use their forces in a surprise attack, but from some conventional conflict that draws in nuclear forces because other forces and doctrines are not available to resolve conflicts at a lower level of violence. Over the next few years, the reliance of nuclear forces in the U.S. and Soviet force mix will be increasing, as it always does in a period that combines international disorder with budgetary stringency (*e.g.*, 1947–1950). During these same years, the likelihood of a deliberate general war will be far less than it was even in the 1970s, but the likelihood of armed conflicts along the Soviet border will increase. Are these two shifts taken together reassuring, or the opposite? Remember that any nuclear conflict probably would begin conventionally.

Second, deterrence is not achieved simply by the existence of terrifying nuclear forces—the lesson Ray Cline draws from Cuba. Those who believe in this kind of deterrence should reflect on Napoleon's return from the island of Elba. Reliable second-strike deterrence presupposes a complex system made up not only of *survivable* offensive forces, but also a unified national command authority that can communicate with the forces and make a rational decision to order or withhold nuclear strikes. It is the latter element that we took for granted and that is now coming into question. A country without a leader, or whose leader will not be obeyed as a matter of unquestioned habit, is not a reliable partner in deterrence. Let me make the last point clearer for scientists at the FAS, who simply did not answer the argument in the article: because the general secretary is not a nuclear weapons technician, no nuclear release security system can function without some degree of intangible, human *loyalty* on the part of certain army and KGB officers. No existing system can assure centralized control over nuclear release by technology alone.

Finally, the nuclear problem cannot be reduced to the danger of nuclear attack. Threats of force can poison the international atmosphere and open the way to actual acts of violence, as in the 1930s.

This is admittedly an essay in worst-case analysis. Worst-case analysis is useful, as we just saw in the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein had extremely powerful reasons not to invade Kuwait. But suppose he did it anyway? What then?

This brings me, in conclusion, to Jeffrey Bergner's very interesting response. His view is shaped more by the experience of 1933–1989, mine more by that of 1789–1933. But we share a very serious concern about *our* response to today's sweeping change. My nervousness about the next decades partly reflects my fears of what may emerge after that. Unless the wellsprings of ideological fanaticism in the human heart are completely choked, we can expect its re-emergence, but in a form completely different from Marxism–Leninism, as fascism was new and strange in the 1920s. This challenge will tax our children and grandchildren very seriously. We can help by handing down to them some of the awareness and determination we gained in the long but victorious struggle with Communism.

Abortion is not our preferred solution; the preferred solution is to help women avoid unintended pregnancies altogether.
—Kate Michelman

Abortion and True Choice

Dear Sir:

Frederica Mathewes-Green's "Unplanned Parenthood: Easing the Pain of Crisis Pregnancy" (Summer 1991) is a cleverly formulated but morally vacant attempt to disguise as compassionate the punitive, callous, and paternalistic motivations of anti-choice extremists.

To clarify a key point: By no means do pro-choice advocates consider abortion "the only sensible, mature thing" for women facing unplanned pregnancies to do. We want women to have the option to decide whether *or not* to continue a pregnancy, and the economic and emotional support to give birth to and raise healthy children if they choose to do so. Unlike opponents of choice, we are working to improve America's reproductive healthcare policies by strengthening pregnancy prevention initiatives so that fewer women will have to face crisis pregnancies. We support sex education, research into more effective contraception, and improved family planning and birth control.

Women facing unintended pregnancies find themselves in difficult circumstances burdened with complicated choices. Pro-choice policies are designed to provide women with support rather than trying to coerce these life-shaping decisions. The "Chicago Method" endorsed in Ms. Mathewes-Green's article—telling women that the healthcare clinic they are about to enter is guilty of medical malpractice—is typical of anti-choice tactics. It is a cruel and coercive attempt to harass and intimidate women who already are under stress dealing with an unplanned pregnancy.

Rather than resorting to cruelty and coercion, pro-choice forces offer women and families real choices. We are working for policies that are aimed at both helping women avoid unintended pregnancies, and promoting healthy childbearing. That includes providing infertility treatment to couples who need it, giving prenatal care and nutritional supplements to every pregnant woman, enacting humane family-leave policies, and making child-care available and affordable. And it includes recognizing a woman's fundamental right to decide whether or not to continue a pregnancy free from government interference, and keeping abortion a safe, legal option.

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The irony is not that "the pro-choice position *is* so scarce of choices." The irony is that anti-abortion activists will not work for more responsible and responsive reproductive health policies.

Abortion is not our preferred solution; the preferred solution is to help women avoid unintended pregnancies altogether.

Bringing hope to desperate situations is a worthy goal. It can best be achieved by adopting reproductive health policies that reduce the need for abortion and give women and families control over their reproductive destinies—not by taking away the right to choose once a crisis pregnancy has occurred.

It is pro-choice Americans who are working for real solutions.

Kate Michelman
Executive Director
National Abortion Rights
Action League
Washington, DC

Scare Tactics

Dear Sir:

While it is refreshing to read an anti-choice partisan's disavowal of the insulting assertion that abortion is ever a matter of convenience, Frederica Mathewes-Green's stance of concern for women is disingenuous at best.

The most shocking passages of this article, written by an Americans United for Life staffer, are not those that mischaracterize the pro-choice movement, but rather those that misinform women on the medical and psychological sequelae of abortion and childbirth. Ms. Mathewes-Green describes a set of mental disturbances as "post-abortion syndrome," even though no such condition exists. President Reagan's avowedly anti-choice surgeon general, C. Everett Koop, looked for proof of such effects, but found none. Indeed, women's primary reaction in almost all cases of abortion is relief. Moreover, the author pointedly omits information on the severe emotional scarring of forced childbirth.

I was equally appalled to read Ms. Mathewes-Green's erroneous list of medical side-effects of abortion. Legal abortion is one of the safest surgical procedures, and is, as the Centers for Disease Control have documented for over 15 years, many times safer, in terms of both serious illness and death, than continued pregnancy and childbirth. *That* is information that any woman facing crisis pregnancy must have.

Ms. Mathewes-Green further asserts that women undergo abortion without sufficient information. It would be unethical indeed for a doctor, save in a medical emergency, to perform an abortion on a woman who had not received counseling on each of her options and their medical ramifications, and who had not thereby given her informed consent. It is, however, precisely by providing full-options counseling and referrals that reproductive health-care and abortion providers do their share to make choices concretely available to women in these circumstances—a situation the author declares as her goal. There is no one right choice of how to resolve unwanted pregnancy: since the best choice for a given woman could be parenting, giving a child up for adoption, or terminating pregnancy, the way to promote women's rights and women's welfare is to preserve the variety of options. I agree that a choice made in an information vacuum is a coerced choice, and emphasize that coerced abortion is just as egregious a violation of basic rights as is coerced childbirth. I agree, for instance, that forcing a woman to choose between aborting a pregnancy and losing her job is impermissible.

"Informed Consent"

However, the statutes Mathewes-Green refers to as "informed consent legislation" have nothing to do with informing women and opening up choices for them; rather, these forced-lecture laws are de-signed to discourage women from choosing abortion, as the author as much as concedes in writing that these laws may "tip the scale" toward continued pregnancy. Again, abortion providers, like all physicians, are legally bound to perform medical procedures only after the patient gives informed consent. By singling out abortion for special legislation beyond that applied to other medical procedures—including labor and cesarean section—Ms. Mathewes-Green exposes her real agenda.

That agenda becomes crystal clear in the author's discussion of birth control. She first criticizes IUDs and low-dose pills because they may act as "abortion-inducers." She then cites "pervasive skepticism" about contraceptives in general because of their failure rate and because they "tamper with a woman's body." Ms. Mathewes-Green finally offers, as panacea for a host of social ills, that "sex should be sheltered by the marriage bond," and she evidently intends that even married, fertile couples should have intercourse only when prepared to conceive. This agenda comes as no surprise at the end of Ms. Mathewes-Green's article: starting out as she does with misinformation, how could she do more than pretend to champion women; given her means, what could she champion but her own ideological end?

Talcott Camp
Senior Staff Writer
American Civil Liberties Union
Reproductive Freedom Project
New York, NY

Sex Ed as Abortion Prevention

Dear Sir:

Frederica Mathewes-Green has beautifully challenged those of us who view with horror the widespread practice of abortion. We must indeed ease the pain. Ms. Mathewes-Green also reminds us, "To decrease the number of crisis pregnancies will ultimately require restoring to sexual activity the kind of respect such a potentially volatile experience deserves." That's a large order and will require cleaning up more than one act.

Education of the young is certainly one field that needs critical attention. Non-directive, "study all the options, decide what's best for you" teaching in public schools, although demonstrably counterproductive, is still the norm. There is, however, an alternative approach. The Educational Guidance Institute defines it as a "directive model that abstinence from premarital sexual involvement is a positive and normal life-style for

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adolescents." Their approach also promotes parental participation in the teaching process.

Courses based on this approach are in place in scattered public schools in an assortment of states, including California, Illinois, Washington, Mississippi, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Missouri. It is so successful that the ACLU has filed a suit in Wisconsin, asking that it be banned. It seems the course teaches that boys and girls are different, which the ACLU says is stereotyping. It also praises marriage and has a predilection for two-parent families.

The course, "Sex Respect," was prepared by Project Respect, located in Golf, Illinois, and was developed under a grant from the U.S. Office of Adolescent Pregnancy Programs. Materials include videos, brochures, and three coordinated books: one for the student, one for the teacher, and one for the parents.

Teen-Aid of Spokane, Washington, is another group that has prepared courses for use in public schools. They describe their junior high program, "Me, My World, My Future" as a "values-based program [that] encourages parental involvement, the postponement of immediate gratification in exchange for future goals in the area of drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and sexual activity." Teen-Aid, like Project Respect, teaches the basic physical facts, without resorting to the condom-on-a-banana approach.

Elizabeth Richman
Alsea, OR

Frederica Mathewes-Green replies:

My correspondents are quick to note that, although there are two elements necessary in any complete program to decrease the incidence of abortion, my article addressed only one: support of the woman who is already pregnant. The other element, prevention of unplanned pregnancy, is just as vital, but as it lay beyond the scope of the article, it was addressed only glancingly.

Effective programs to prepare the young both to value and respect their sexuality are needed urgently. I appreciate Ms. Richman's recommendation of two of the best, and hope that their use will spread.

Ms. Michelman is clearly aware of the burdens of an unplanned pregnancy, but her emphasis on the "preferred solution" of preventing these pregnancies is irrelevant to the focus of this article: helping the woman who is *already* pregnant. When one is already wrestling with an unexpected pregnancy, an offer to "support" sex education or better contraceptives is pretty cold comfort, if not outright insulting.

While Ms. Michelman ignores all my suggestions for aiding the pregnant woman in practical, compassionate ways, she asserts that NARAL is doing its part: "We are working for policies...giving prenatal care and nutritional supplements to every woman...family leave policies, and...child-care." This unwittingly exemplifies my very thesis: that we are tempted to turn first to political solutions for generic, faceless women, rather than building personal, family, neighborly, and workplace circles of support around them. Abortion is a lonely choice. If, as Ms. Michelman is fond of saying, no woman wants to have an abortion, we help her more by opening our minds, our hearts, our homes, our pocketbooks, as I described. "We're working for policies" rings a bit cold.

Post-Abortion Syndrome

Ms. Camp also missed my central point in her haste to correct any impression that abortion is undesirable. C. Everett Koop did not find that "no such condition [as post-abortion syndrome] exists," but that studies both proving and disproving it were flawed. As the health of millions of women is at stake, he called for funding for a study to determine the truth. Pro-lifers joined him in clamoring for such funds; pro-abortion groups were strangely silent. No such funds have ever come forth. Meanwhile, women keep saying that relief is fleeting and the pain lasts a lifetime, and still they are ignored. Is this a symptom of the pervasive trivialization of women's health concerns? Or a result of a suspicion that a study might disclose findings neither politically correct nor good for the $500-million abortion business?

As to informed consent, once again we must listen to the women who say that they received no counseling, and that information on the dangers of abortion was scanty and coupled with a warning that pregnancy was worse. Moreover, they say that their questions about the development of their babies were met with lies, as they later discovered to their horror; the truth would have led them to reject abortion. It begins to become obvious why abortion advocates must oppose informed-consent laws. We do not ask that abortionists meet a higher standard than other doctors—just the same standard—and women who have had abortions say that this is not being done. Ms. Camp even objects to my saying that "a directory of local support...can tip the scale" in a crisis pregnancy. One who objects to women learning of alternatives to abortion is not pro-choice, but pro-abortion, hoping that isolation and despair will force that bloody choice. The Maryland state legislature agreed, passing in last winter's abortion law a provision repealing the Information Act of 1979 that gave so many women hope.

Lastly, Ms. Camp completely misunderstands the passage on contraception. The skepticism is not about contraceptives in general—a great many pro-lifers rely on them with no qualms—but about whether their promotion is reducing the number of abortions. As I said, half of all aborting women were using no form of birth control; women

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schooled in contraception make up nearly half the annual abortion customers; even those who faithfully use contraception learn that even a 5-percent failure rate rolls up alarmingly over time. I analyzed the problem as having a deeper root—a general breakdown in lasting, committed male–female relationships—with concomitant sorrows beyond just unplanned pregnancy. If we are going to call for less exploitative and trivial sex, and more of the emotionally grounded and secure sort, I see no reason not to call that "marriage." Her belief that pro-lifers reserve sex for only those occasions when they wish to conceive will no doubt provide amusement for many pro-life readers.

I remain concerned by Ms. Camp's mentioning that "this agenda [comes]...at the end" of the article. Actually, there were three more pages. I hope she will go back and read the rest of the article, reflecting on the content—the many things we can do to help women who are already in a crisis pregnancy.

Free Markets and Culture

Dear Sir:

In her zeal to make free-marketeers and cultural conservatives palatable to each other, Amy Moritz, in "Family Feud: Is the Conservative Movement Falling Apart?" (Summer 1991), papers over some of the very real, perhaps insurmountable, differences between them.

Ms. Moritz, in dismissing the claim that cultural conservatives oppose personal liberty, claims that "no leading social conservative group (save the pro-life movement) is attempting to impose an agenda by legislation." She goes on to detail the voluntary nature of some conservatives' moral crusades—boycotts as a tool to reduce sex and violence on television, voluntary labels on rock albums, and a popular rejection of pornography.

While many of the nationally based cultural conservatives have decided to forgo long and costly court battles over the constitutionality of legislated morality, it is an exaggeration to claim that the leadership of all the major social conservative groups have forgone the heavy hand of the state. Then-Attorney General Edwin Meese III had no qualms about using the threat of Department of Justice action to ban *Playboy* and *Penthouse* from convenience stores. Social conservative groups are constantly before the Federal Communications Commission, trying to expand the definition of "obscene" material and to enact a 24-hour ban on "indecent" material on radio and television. The current head of the FCC has proven himself more than sympathetic to their efforts, reversing President Reagan's goal of deregulation of the airwaves.

The American Family Association has not restricted itself to voluntary boycotts and seeking an end to government sponsorship of certain types of artwork. It urged last year's prosecution of a Cincinnati museum director for displaying Robert Mapplethorpe's photography. It was in the front ranks of the drive to get album retailers thrown in prison for selling 2 Live Crew's *As Nasty As They Wanna Be*. Of the major social conservatives, only William F. Buckley Jr., Milton Friedman, and the free-marketeers oppose the policy disaster that is drug prohibition. Even respectable, Washington-based social conservatives are perfectly happy to use the state to interfere with the moral and economic choices of individuals.

Redneck and Proud

At the grass-roots level, the social conservatives do nothing to counter the image that they are rednecks, and they are more eager than their national counterparts to use legislation and the state. The eventual disintegration of the conservative alliance is seen whenever a state legislature considers the repeal of sodomy laws. The Republicans elected to cut taxes frequently side with the liberals against regulation of sex between consenting adults. The social conservatives talk of "abominations against God" and fire and brimstone. Their constituents, in turn, use sodomy laws as proof that gay and lesbian groups should be prohibited at public universities or forbidden from holding parades or public events since those groups would be advocating a criminal act. The crucial distinction between voluntary persuasion and education, on the one side, and legislation and control, on the other, is held only tenuously by the social conservatives at the national level, and ignored by their counterparts and constituents at the state and local levels.

Free-marketeers hold the beliefs they do for two reasons: they understand what works, and they believe that individual liberty is a normative good. What works is a free market based on private property. Interventions in that market on moralistic grounds fail and have negative side effects just as interventions on egalitarian grounds do; thus, any alliance between free-marketeers and social conservatives is temporary at best.

Jacob Levy
Providence, RI

Pro-Family and Pro-Growth

Dear Sir:

Regarding Amy Moritz's "Family Feud: Is the Conservative Movement Falling Apart?": Conservatives must begin to recognize that pro-family tax policy is inherently "pro-growth"—and, conversely, pro-growth tax policy is "pro-family."

Many supply-siders tend to overlook the importance of strong families in building our economic strength. Our nation's productive capacity depends not only on the *quantity* of our physical capital but on the *quality* of our human capital. The most important habits formed by young people have taken root not in school or on the street, but at home with mom and dad. That's why it is essential that we make families stronger by increasing their earning power. If we let families keep their resources to save and invest in their children through pro-family tax cuts like doubling the personal exemption, we will set a solid foundation for long-term economic growth.

Similarly, pro-family advocates should recognize that supply-side tax incentives help promote the well-being of families. For example, restoring the tax incentive for individual retirement accounts would help young families save for their future while at the same time boost

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national saving. In addition to sparking entrepreneurship and job creation, cutting capital gains taxes will let families keep more of their investment dollars to help pay for Johnny's college education.

Conservatives ought to unite behind an omnibus package of pro-growth *and* pro-family tax cuts. Such a proposal should include further marginal tax rate reductions, new tax credits for families with young children, expanded tax deductions for IRAs, a 15-percent capital gains tax rate within inflation-indexing, and new incentives for plant and equipment investment. A properly designed tax-reform plan that maximizes economic growth and job creation would not add to the budget deficit. Now more than ever, conservatives must rally behind a true pro-family, pro-growth agenda to regain the political offensive.

Senator Robert W. Kasten Jr.
(R–WI)
Washington, DC

Balancing Freedom and Control

Dear Sir:

I found Amy Moritz's "Family Feud" very interesting. Undoubtedly, tension exists between fiscal and social conservatives in the post-Reagan era, and the question that Moritz asks is extremely important: Is this tension really necessary?

I agree with Ms. Moritz that it is not. A broader view helps us understand why these two factions of conservatism should ultimately reinforce, and not compete with, each other.

In a democratic society, there is a necessary tension between freedom and control. Absolute freedom amounts to anarchy. Absolute control leads to totalitarianism. The success of American democracy comes with the balancing of freedom on one hand and control on the other. Over the years, two philosophical traditions have created diametrically opposite ways to achieve this balance.

Liberal Foolishness

The liberal tradition, stretching back to the late 1960s, has chosen to control the economic dimensions of American life, and to allow the widest freedom on moral issues. Thus, liberals traditionally favor the redistribution of wealth through higher taxes, bigger welfare programs, and greater governmental control of the economy. They also favor abortion rights and oppose any attempts to "legislate morality." This tradition emphasizes cultural relativism, downplays the Judeo-Christian tradition upon which this country is based, and concentrates on limiting the wealth of entrepreneurs through taxation.

The conservative tradition, which can trace its roots to the founding of our nation, allows the maximum freedom for economic entrepreneurship through low taxes and limited government. Conservatives, however, also seek to control society through a moral code. While conservatives see government as a necessary evil that must be strictly controlled, they also believe it is possible to "legislate morality." For this reason, the conservative movement favors the family, opposes abortion, and emphasizes an individual's responsibility for his or her actions.

Mutual Need

Ms. Moritz is absolutely correct when she points out how the two factions of the conservative movement need each other. Alone, these factions are open to the charges of extremism. Indeed, libertarians who emphasize freedom at any cost are widely seen as unrealistic anarchists. Fundamentalists who seek a theocratic state are widely perceived to have totalitarian leanings. Neither one is a friend of American democracy.

A conservative movement that successfully creates an amalgam of economic freedom and moral standards can quite easily portray itself as the rightful heir of the nation the Founding Fathers fought for in 1776. When Thomas Jefferson wrote that among the basic rights of humanity is the pursuit of happiness, he was not speaking of moral debauchery and the redistribution of wealth.

John Patrick Feehery
Research Analyst
Office of Rep. Bob Michel
Washington, DC

Birth of Conservatism

Dear Sir:

Amy Moritz's "Family Feud: Is the Conservative Movement Falling Apart?" is excellent. Congratulations. Too few of our colleagues give much thought to the health of the conservative movement.

One sentence in her article, though, is off the mark. The conservative movement we know today wasn't born November 4, 1980. There was life before that.

The movement of today was conceived by Frank Meyer, who cross-fertilized good strains of traditionalism and libertarianism. It was born in the midst of the Goldwater upsurge, and its infancy was spent learning by trial and error in the Reagan upsurge. November 4, 1980, did not mark even its maturity. Perhaps that date was when our movement reached puberty, which would help explain our present problems as adolescents. Maturity is yet to come.

Morton C. Blackwell
Council for National Policy
Washington, DC

Amy Moritz replies:

To some extent all these letters validate the premises of my article: that there are strains in the alliance, but they need not be fatal; that social and economic conservatives benefit from working with each other; that the conservative movement is maturing. Even Mr. Levy verified the view that much of the strain between economic and social conservatives is due to the fact that some conservatives "unnecessarily exaggerate points of difference." Perhaps unintentionally, Mr. Levy substantiated my observation that, except on abortion, no leading social group is attempting to impose an agenda by legislation, as he was only able to demonstrate that social conservatives advocate enforcement of *existing* laws on social issues. Mr. Levy thus confirmed that social conservatives are not outside the existing public consensus on these issues, and therefore are not so far out of the mainstream that economic conservatives should have difficulty forming alliances with them. ☎

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

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If America is to survive, its indisputably modern elements must be conjoined with what Russell Kirk has called the "permanent things," spiritual things and the institutions that sustain them. Without this fusion, the American experiment may fail—not because it is a regime of liberty but because liberty alone cannot instruct us how to live. It is what we *do* with our liberty that will determine our country's future, and for that guidance we must turn outside the marketplace and the polling booth. If the old modernity is not to succumb to the relativism and anti-religious nihilism of the new, it will have to draw on transcendent, pre-modern sources—on religious faith—to infuse our lives with meaning.

George H. Nash
Pilgrims' Progress:
America's Tradition of Conservative Reform

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